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Niet-technische Nederlandse
samenvatting
Vanaf de eerste stappen in het Europees eenmakingproces leefde de bezorgdheid dat verdere
economische integratie gepaard zou gaan met negatieve sociale e¤ecten en een potentiële afkalv-
ing van de welvaartsstaat. De recente totstandkoming en uitbreiding van de Europese Unie
waarin het handels- en monetaire beleid onder strakke controle staan, maakt deze vrees nog
virulenter. Dit proefschrift wil een theoretische bijdrage leveren tot de discussie of globalisering
een risico inhoudt voor onze sociale welvaartsstaat.
De dominante stroming binnen de huidige literatuur focust op belastingsconcurrentie voor
mobiel kapitaal en argumenteert dat er te weinig publieke goederen voorzien worden van
zodra deze productiefactor niet de begunstigde is van de belastingen en wanneer het deze
(bron)belastingen kan ontwijken (door migratie). Recente bijdragen in de Nieuw Economische
Geograe (NEG) literatuur proberen deze resultaten te plaatsen in een spatiaal kader.
Het model dat in deze dissertatie ontwikkeld wordt, is ingebed in dit NEG-kader. Op die
manier kunnen we globalisering niet enkel modelleren via de mobiliteit van een productiefactor
(in casu kapitaal) zoals in de standaard modellen van belastingsconcurrentie, maar zijn we ook
in staat om te kijken wat de e¤ecten zijn van goederenmobiliteit en handel op belastingscon-
currentie. Gezien de zwaardere belasting op arbeid dan op kapitaal in de Europese context,
richten we ons ook op situaties waar er uitsluitend belastingen geheven worden op (immobiele)
arbeid. Ten slotte introduceren we een overheid die op basis van een Atkinson verkorte sociale
welvaartsfunctie een werkloosheidsuitkering voorziet als verzekering tegen het sociaal risico van
werkloosheid. Dit laatste creëren we endogeen via e¢ ciency wages. De introductie van een
x
herverdelende overheid in plaats van een algemeen publiek goed, maakt dat dit model beter in
staat is om sociale zekerheidsconcurrentie te bestuderen.
We starten onze analyse met de meest eenvoudige situatie, nl. autarkie. Deze referen-
tiesituatie laat ons toe om de belangrijkste mechanismen waarlangs de overheid de optimale
werkloosheidsuitkering bepaalt, te kenschetsen. Bovendien illustreert dit geval ook de positieve
invloed van de ongelijkheidaversie van de overheid op de belastingvoet.
Vervolgens onderzoeken we het geval waarbij er enkel interactie is tussen de regios via
goederenhandel. In dit korte termijnevenwicht gedragen de Nash belastingsvoeten zich als
strategische complementen die te allen tijde onder het Pareto niveau liggen. Met andere woor-
den, er is reeds detrimentele belastingsconcurrentie in een situatie zonder enige mobiliteit van
een productiefactor. Daarnaast leidt de studie van de afhankelijkheid van de handelsvrijheid
op het Nash evenwicht tot een tweede bijdrage aan de bestaande literatuur, nl. toenemende
globalisering leidt tot afnemende belastingsconcurrentie.
Indien we kapitaalmobiliteit toevoegen in de voorgaande context, valt de potentiële posi-
tieve invloed van handelsliberalisering op de sociale welvaartsstaat weg. Ook verergert de
neerwaartse druk op de welvaartsstaat in een intern locationeel evenwicht als we de vergelijking
maken met de situatie zonder kapitaalmobiliteit. Ten slotte kunnen we het Baldwin&Krugman
resultaat geldig in een kern-periferie situatie conditioneren op de ongelijkheidaversie van de
overheid. Kernregios kunnen hun agglomeratieopbrengsten blijven belasten zonder vrees voor
delokalisatie maar dit subgame-perfect evenwicht wijkt steeds verder af van het door de overheid
gewenste niveau van sociale voorzieningen naarmate de overheid meer geeft om ongelijkheid.
Het model voorspelt dus dat kernregios veel meer te vrezen hebben van andere kernregios dan
van perifere regios. Met andere woorden belastingsconcurrentie speelt zich voornamelijk af
tussen gelijken in de blue banana in Europe dan tussen vb. West- en Oost-Europa.
Buiten deze analyse van sociale zekerheidsconcurrentie bevat deze dissertatie ook twee meer
theoretische bijdragen over NEG-modellering zelf. Naast een onderzoek van de dynamica van
de meeste gebruikte NEG-modellen, combineert het ontwikkelde model ook twee tot nu toe
onverzoenbare eigenschappen van dit soort modellen, nl. analytische eenvoud en rijkdom aan
eigenschappen.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
From its earliest stages in the 1950s, every step in European economic integration appears to
have been met with concern about its potential negative social e¤ects, particularly as regards
protection against social risks (unemployment, sickness and invalidity, age, etc.) and poverty.
This fear lead to many attempts of the European authorities to promote social convergence.
In the beginning of the European integration process, with the signing of the Treaty of
Rome in 1957, the dominant opinion of the Member States was written down in article 117 of
the Rome Treaty which founded the social policy of the Communities:
Member States agree upon the need to promote improved working conditions and an
improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible their harmonisation
while the improvement is being maintained. They believe that such a development
will ensure not only from the functioning of the common market, which will favour
the harmonisation of social systems, but also from the procedures provided for in
this Treaty and from the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation
or administrative action.
On the one hand this article stipulates that the common market and the provisions of
the Treaty concerning the removal of barriers to trade and factor mobility would stimulate
growth, spurred by economic integration. Social convergence, the harmonisation of national
social security schemes would follow from economic convergence, i.e. convergence in economic
productivity and e¢ ciency. This condence that cross-country di¤erences in labour and wage
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conditions only stem from productivity di¤erences was high but not complete since, on the
other hand, the same article also stated that the Member States recognised the necessity of the
improvement of the living standard and labour conditions. Why was such recognition necessary
if the Member States were convinced of spontaneous income convergence? Some of the following
specic articles on social matters in the Treaty, namely article 119 and 120 regarding the equal
treatment of men and women and on paid holidays, a¢ rm the less than complete condence
in the market forces of the Member States. However, article 118 of the EEC Treaty gave the
Commission only a modest function on social policy (issuing reports, organising consultations,
formulating recommendations, etc.). Undoubtedly the limited function of the Commission with
respect to social policy was prompted by the immanent fear of the Member States that they
would lose their sovereignty. Hence, much compelling initiative from the Commission was not
expected.
In 1974, the European Commission noted that the common market program indeed had
spurred economic growth, yet without bringing a solution to the social problems of the Com-
munity, which in some cases even had increased. The Commission referred to regions or parts
of the population that didnt benet duly from global economic progress (Commission, [33]).
The Commission proposed the Council a more voluntary social policy with three objectives,
the Social Action Programme:
 Full employment at regional, national and community level;
 Workers participation at rm and Community level;
 Improvement of working and living conditions.
The Social Action Programme was motivated by the idea that the European Community
had also a political and social dimension and was intended to be "more" than a common market.
The insistence that the community was fundamentally a social and political organ-
isation, rather than simply an economic one, which could not tolerate disparities
unjustiable in moral terms and which were anti the principle of Community soli-
darity which is the base of the European Community idea, was the guiding motive
behind the attempt to establish a social policy designed not only to remove inequalities
2
but to raise the standard of living, unify social systems and pay particular attention
to the social conditions of impoverished regions. (Collins [32], p.160).
The Social Action Programme was not a complete success. Some important directives were
accepted, mainly regarding equal opportunities, health and safety. But the latter two were
never seriously contested and the rst concerned individual rights that prevail on national
laws and of which application may be enforced by the European Court of Justice. Taking a
Community-friendlyinterpretation of the articles of the Treaty with respect to discrimination
contributed considerably to the success of the Social Action Programme. Accomplishments in
other elds were far more modest: either the directives were weakened to the point to become
irrelevant (like collective lay-o¤s, see e.g. Vogel-Polsky in [103]) or they were neutralised when
implemented in national laws.
Another way to tackle social welfare state competition lies in promoting scal co-ordination
to harmonise the income side of social security systems instead of the expenditure size. Like
in social protection, national vetoes against any change prohibited the realisation of many
ambitious goals of the Commission. The only exception to this was the guidelines concerning
VAT. There was rather rapidly a consensus that the free mobility of goods (and services)
required co-ordination of the VAT-levels which was achieved on a European level in 1977. All
direct taxation policies remained the exclusive competence of the Member States.
The fear for a race to the bottom in social security protection became even more apparent
with the signing of the rst mayor change to the founding treaties, namely the Single European
Act at the Luxembourg summit on December 3, 1985. This treaty aimed at further accelerating
European integration by introducing qualied majority voting in the eld of the internal market.
At the same time, a date for the completion of the internal market was set as January 1,
1993. The Commission believed that, in the absence of minimum harmonisation of social
policy, Member States or rms might try  in an increasingly unied Europe  to achieve
a competitive advantage through social downscaling. This would inevitably lead to social
dumping and of the infringement of basic social rights. Thats why the commission headed by
Jacques Delors took the initiative in 1987 to launch the Social Charter which was passed by the
European Council in Strasbourg in 1989 by all members except Great Britain1. Contrary to the
1 It took another decade before Great Britain could accept this soccle of basic social rights. This happened at
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Social Action program where one aimed at a social harmonisation at the Community level, the
Commission became more political realistically and limited its proposal to a soccleof social
rights, enforceable in every Member State. For instance, the Social Charter established the
right to belong to a trade union, the right to paid annual leave and a weekly rest period. These
and the other rights were acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the Member States. In
this way the Commission hoped to ensure that social progress remained in line with economic
growth and second, to avert unfair competition (Commission, [34]).
Although the Single European Act stated clearly that measures on scal matters required
unanimity to be approved, the Commission Delors attempted to extend the application of the
qualied majority voting in the eld of the internal market to scal matters by propagating a
market distortion approach of scal policies. The commission argued that, if there are as many
(capital) taxation regimes as Member States in the European Union, investment decisions can be
distorted by rent seeking scal optimisation that doesnt improve economic e¢ ciency. This could
lead to a shift in the tax burden to the immobile production factors, labour in particular. Based
on this argument the Commission obtained the approval by the Council of the merger guideline
and the parent-a¢ liate company guideline. However, the market distortions approach did
not enable much progress as regards European co-ordination of others issues of capital and
corporate taxation.
The Treaty on the European Union, that was signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992,
meant a new step in the European unication process since it created the European Economic
and Monetary Union with the introduction of the euro in 1999 as the most visible result. Just
as the Single European Act revived the concerns about the potential negative social e¤ects,
the Maastricht Treaty had the same e¤ect: the introduction of the EMU means that the use
or menace of beggar-thy-neighbourpolicies by means of income or social security measures
becomes even more tempting because other economic policy instruments such as trade policy
or monetary policy are kept under tight control. A further step in scal co-ordination had to be
taken, this time by commissioner Monti in 1996. He succeeded in reaching two new decisions,
based on the same harmful tax competition argument as before, regarding scal co-ordination.
First, the phasing out of the special tax treatments and, second, the savings guideline were
the Summit of Amsterdam in 1997 where the Social Agreement was incorporated into the text of the EC Treaty.
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agreed upon. The latter ensured  although there are still a lot of exceptions  that all
rewards to capital were fully declared in the country of origin of the capital owner. For the
rst, the Commission imposed its view of special tax treatments as public aid and obtained its
phasing-out by threatening to charge the Member States before the European Court of Justice
for infringement of the Treaty agreements on state subsidies. The agreement on the savings
guideline was eventually reached with its unanimously approval by all the Member States and
entered into force on July 1, 2005.
In recent times the Member States and the Commission changed tack. Instead of focussing
on a harmonisation of the social policies at the community level or even providing a larger
soccle of social rights, one now tries to increase the a¤ordability of the social security system
by promoting activationand the modernisationof the social welfare state:
..the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam went back on this divergence [the separation between
economic and social questions and the sovereignty on social policy of the member
States] with its Title on Employment (Title VIII). This was the beginning of the
Luxembourg process, which explicitly aims to "modernize" social protection systems
in order to eliminate the disincentives to work. It set out employment guidelines
which place employability at the heart of the European Employment Strategy (EES).
The Social Agenda adopted by the European Council in Nice in 2000 made this one
of its priorities, since conrmed for the period 2005-2008.
... "Modernization", "activation", "contractualization", "employability" and indi-
vidual "responsibility" are the key words." (Zimmermann [145], p.36)
This strategy of activation and modernisation must be distinguished from the Anglo-Saxon
workfare approach based on the principle of individual responsibility and which forces the poor
into badly paid jobs (Euzéby, [48]). The continental approach also encompasses redistribution
and insurance. For instance, the Commission Barroso proposed a European Globalisation Fund
with an annual budget of 500 million Euros aimed at facilitating the return to gainful activity of
the EU workforce. It provides amongst others time-limited job-search allowances and assistance
for workers that su¤ered from the profound changes of globalisation.
All these renewed attempts to mitigate the tensions between an almost complete economic
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integration and the social welfare state were found to be inadequate or insu¢ cient for the
Dutch and French voters who rejected the EU Constitution. The Eurobarometer ([46], [47])
lists among the top reasons given by the voters for their rejection loss of jobs (31%) and
not enough social Europe(16%). This indicates that even today  after half a century of
European integration  people remain fearful over a potential race to the bottom in social
welfare states. In this work we will try to assess whether this fear is justied, mainly from a
theoretical point of view.
In order to dene this research question more specic, we start by elucidating the di¤erence
between tax competition and social security competition. Tax competition is a form of systems
competition where the governments tax setting capabilities are limited because of globalisa-
tion. So the two dening characteristics of tax competition are the tax setting of a government
and the externalities arisen from globalisation. Globalisation is dened in models as the mo-
bility of goods, rms and/or factors of production. Expenditure competition can be seen as
the other side of the same coin. If regions are limited in their tax setting due to globalisation
externalities, they are also limited in the scope of social protection schemes under constant pref-
erences. Social security competition has a third dening characteristic, namely a government
that provides a social insurance against some risks or  otherwise formulated  a government
that redistributes between di¤erent groups in society. This redistribution will, contrary to the
provision of a general public good or an ad-hoc general redistribution between di¤erent groups
in society, profoundly a¤ect the globalisation forces in play.
We begin our analysis with a review of the literature. I turns out there have hardly been
any attempts to model social security competition. However, there does exist a large literature
concerning (capital) tax competition, thus without the inclusion of a social risk, that can serve
as a benchmark. Historically most models in this literature focussed on only one dimension of
globalisation, namely capital mobility. More recently some models (also) based on labour mo-
bility have been developed. An interesting ramication in this literature concerns models where
governments dont provide a general public good with the raised taxes but where they have
redistributive aims. These welfare state competitionmodels closely resemble social security
competition with the exception of the inclusion of a social risk. The dominant strand in these
papers emphasizes a severe race to the bottom. The di¤erent strands of the tax competition
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literature are discussed in chapter 3.
In recent years a new interest in location arose in economic literature with the development
of a whole range of new economic geographymodels. These models are lumpyby their very
nature and this casts new light on the conclusions made based on the standard tax competition
literature. We discuss the main set-up of these models and their most important characteristics.
As an important side-step (but also a way to better understand the new economic geography
models) we look at the  hitherto  neglected dynamics of these models. We show that the
modelling set-up greatly inuences the transitional behaviour of the models. This allows us to
make some cautious remarks regarding policy implications. We end this chapter by looking at
some recent (capital) tax competition contributions in the new economic geography framework.
Contrary to the standard tax competition models, the new economic geography tax competition
models have two dimension of globalisation namely goods and factor of production mobility.
However, the tax competition in these models remains based on the mobility of capital or labour,
not on the goods mobility. In essence, these models indicate that locationally symmetric regions
end up with suboptimal low taxes while core regions are able to tax the agglomeration rents
without incurring any loss of economic activity. By combining the conclusions based on these
richer models and the standard tax competition literature, we are able to indicate four di¤erent
policy points of view.
In chapter 4 we motivate the main assumptions of the social security competition model
developed in this dissertation. In the subsequent chapters we discuss an autarkic situation, a
situation where the only dimension of globalisation consists in the trade of goods and a model
where there is social security competition in a framework of capital and goods mobility. This
allows us not only to see whether tax competition can occur without capital and/or labour
mobility but also we are investigating if we can falsify the standard tax competition models. In
the nal chapter we draw some conclusions and give some suggestions for further research.
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Chapter 2
A review of the tax competition
literature
2.1 Tiebout: a perfect world
The rst strand of the literature starts with Tiebout ([128]). Although his paper was primarily
intended to solve the public nance problem of Samuelson and Musgrave1, it is now considered
as the rst mayor work on tax competition. In his model consumers are fully mobile and move
to the region with a public good level that best satises their preferences. The public goods are
paid for by a source-based head tax. Due to some xed resources (e.g. land size) every region
has an optimal size where the average cost to provide the public good is lowest. The more
regions are allowed in this set-up, the closer the market degree of satisfaction is attained by the
public good provision. There is full e¢ ciency in innitum: people reveal their true preferences
by voting with their feet.
To attain this result Tiebout made abstraction of any imperfection. For instance, he ex-
cluded any information imperfections by assuming that all consumers had perfect knowledge on
regional revenues and expenditures. He also avoided any labour market problems by asserting
that everybody lived on dividend incomes.
The original formulation of this model lacked a rationale for the governments. Nowadays
1They claimed that there doesnt exist a market type solution to determine the level of expenditures on public
goods ([115], [90]). This would mean that a large portion of the GDP would be allocated in a non-optimal way.
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it is often assumed that each regions government is controlled by its landowners who want to
maximize their after-tax land value. They do this by attracting people with a certain level of
public goods. In this way it is clear that the government in fact plays the role of a rm under
perfect competition with the after-tax land value as prots and the public goods serving as
prices.
This model can easily be extended to include mobile rms and households (Fischel [50],
White [133]). Crucial in these extensions is the fact that the mobile factor continues to derive
utility from the public goods each region provides. In the case of mobile rms, regions have to
provide public input goods such as infrastructure, a law enforcement system, etc.
It is clear that there is no need in the Tiebout-hypothesis for any form of coordination
whatsoever. There is no underprovision of the public good nor a tax setting that is too low.
2.2 The basic tax competition model: need for coordination
2.2.1 The origin of the basic tax competition model
The nowadays dominant strand in the tax competition literature really took o¤ with Oates
([92]). As the rst to fully grasp the potential pitfalls of tax competition, he described the
problem as follows:
The result of tax competition may well be a tendency toward less than e¢ cient
levels of output of local services. In an attempt to keep taxes low to attract business
investment, local o¢ cials may hold spending below those levels for which marginal
benets equal marginal costs, particularly for those programs that do not o¤er direct
benets to local business.
As Sinn ([118]) noted, the main argument on which Oates based his view stemmed from
MacDougall ([86]) and Richman ([108]). These economists claimed that a small open economy
cant have an interest in putting a source tax on international mobile capital because mobile
factors would ee from this tax. As a result the domestic production and marginal productivity
of the complementary immobile factors would fall. This leads to a decline in income of the
immobile factors larger than if they had to pay all the taxes by themselves.
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Figure 2-1: Argument of MacDougal and Richman.
Graphically this argument is easily explained. The downward sloping curve on gure 2-1
represents the marginal productivity of capital in an economy that produces under a linearly
homogeneous production function and that has a xed supply of labour. The mobility of capital
equalizes the net world market return r. Due to the source-based tax  on capital, the amount
of capital falls from K2 to K1 such that the marginal after-tax return to capital is again equal
to the world return rate. The tax revenue is equal to BCEF but this amount is smaller than
the wage loss the immobile labour incurred (AGE-ABC).
This line of thought lead in the eighties to the rst formal models explaining wasteful tax
competition. The seminal papers here are Zodrow and Mieszkowski ([144]) and Wilson ([140]).
As the model of Wilson is somewhat more complex, we give here the model of Zodrow and
Mieszkowski. We refer to this model as the Basic Tax Competition Model (hereafter BTCM).
2.2.2 The model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski
Consider many small regions (N), each with two factors of production: immobile labour2 L and
perfectly mobile capital K. All regions are identical and the residents in each region own an
equal share of the labour and capital. As a consequence all national redistributional concerns
are omitted in this model. The perfect mobility of capital ensures that all capital earns the
2 In the original paper of Zodrow and Mieszkowski the immobile factor was land. As the essential part of this
factor is his immobility, we replace it by labour as is done in most discussions of this seminal paper.
10
same return r.
Each Walrasian economy produces the same, homogeneous private good using K and L.
This output is traded free of charge, which equalizes the international prices for that good. The
utility u(C;P ) of each consumer depends on his consumption C of the private good and on the
provision of a residential public good P . This public good is provided by the government using
a source-based capital tax T and a head tax H on the residents. The benevolent government
wants to maximize the consumersutility taking into account his budget restriction:
max
T;H
u(C;P ) = max
T;H
u

F (K;L)  (r + T ):K + r:KN  H;P

s:t: P = T:K +H
(2.1)
Optimisation leads to two rst order conditions:
FOC(H)) uP
uC
= 1 (2.2)
FOC(T )) uP
uC
=
1
1 + TK
dK
dT
=
1
1 + TK
1
FKK
(2.3)
The unconstrained equilibrium follows immediately: governments nance the public good solely
with the non-distorting head tax H and set the capital tax T equal to zero (FOC(T ) is equal to
1). The public good is provided up to the point where the social benet of higher tax revenues
(the marginal rate of substitution between private and public goods uPuC ) equals one. As a
consequence the Samuelson rule for e¢ cient provision of public goods is obeyed.
Things become more interestingly if we exogenously constrain the level of the head tax to
be less than the optimal level. The rst rst order condition drops and the second rst order
condition will be larger than one because of the negative sign of FKK . In other words, the
public good is underprovided (uPuC > 1) as soon as governments are limited in their use of head
taxes on immobile factor. Total di¤erentiation of equation 2.3 leads to the two remaining main
conclusions of the Zodrow and Mieszkowski constrained set-up:
 The less the government can rely on lump-sum labour taxation, the more governments
have to rely on capital taxation ( dTdH < 0).
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 The reduction in the permitted source-based head tax on immobile labour causes a
reduction in the provision of the residential public good ( dPdH > 0).
As a nal remark note that we used the taxes as the optimisation variable in problem 2.1.
We could also have taken the public good levels as strategic variables. As could be expected and
also proved by Wildasin ([135]) expenditure competition where the tax rates adjust to reect
the chosen budget level leads to the same results as mentioned above.
2.2.3 How can we explain these results?
The best way to understand this model is using some intuitive reasoning (as always). Suppose
the government wants a unit increase in the residential public good provision. In the assumption
that the government doesnt have the possibility to use head taxes on the immobile labour, she
has to increase her capital tax rate by an amount T . This causes a raise3 in the cost of capital
r+ T . The capital starts to ee the country by an amount K and stops to run away as soon
as the marginal productivity of capital has risen enough to compensate for the higher tax rate.
At the same time the labour income has to decrease by the same amount as the tax increased
because the zero-prot condition of the rms continues to hold in the Walrasian world of the
BTCM.
The above reasoning means that the tax rise must be high enough to compensate not only
for the cost of the public good itself (marginal cost MC) but also for the loss of tax income
( TK). The optimal level of taxation is where the residentsmarginal willingness to pay for
another unit of the public good equals their wage reduction (MC  TK). Since the marginal
benet of the public good is higher than its marginal cost in equilibrium, the Samuelson rule
is no longer valid and the public good is underprovided.
We are now able to distinguish the two sources of ine¢ ciencies. The rst arises because of
the increased marginal productivity of capital in the high-tax region. This leads to a world-wide
misallocation of capital. The second ine¢ ciency is the suboptimal provision of the public good.
These results justify forms of coordination to be implemented. Specic forms of coordination
will be discussed in section 3.4.4.
3 In the BTCM model regions are numerous and small. This means that they cant inuence the return rate
r.
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The cause of these suboptimalities stems from the fact that the government does not account
for the positive scal externality it entails on the other regions by increasing her tax rate. She
does this because she is only concerned with the welfare of her own residents. It is also necessary
that the mobile capital has the opportunity to escape a tax it has no benets from.
2.3 Extensions of the Basic Tax Competition Model: anything
becomes possible
In the years following the publication of these seminal papers, a vast literature emerged ex-
tending the e¢ ciency results of Zodrow and Mieszkowski in several directions. Some e¤ects
discussed in papers not directly linked with the tax competition literature were included in new
models.
In our review of the literature we tried to discuss the most important and far reaching
extensions of the original Basic Tax Competition Model (hereafter BTCM), besides a short
digression on optimal taxation. For other extensions like asymmetric information, commitment
problems and double taxations, we refer to the useful surveys of Wilson ([143]), Cremer and
Pestieau ([38]) and Fuest, Huber and Mintz ([54]).
2.3.1 The nature of the regions
Large regions.
In the BTCM-model a large number of small regions was introduced. If instead, we assume a
more limited number of regions of larger size, the model changes in a fundamental way. Large
regions have the market power to inuence the after-tax return rate on capital. This means
that a tax rise of a region leads to a less than proportional increase of the cost of capital. As
a result capital becomes less sensitive to tax changes and the underprovision of public goods
is attenuated. This partial capitalisation e¤ect of higher tax rates into the after-tax return on
capital is further discussed in Hoyt ([61]).
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Asymmetric populated regions.
The original set-up of the BTCM was characterized by perfect symmetry. All regions had
the same number of residents and the same capital-to-labour ratio. Both assumptions can
be relaxed. The rst form of asymmetry is analyzed by Bucovetsky ([26]) and Wilson([141]).
These authors show that less populated regions enjoy a higher level of welfare following capital
integration and that the small region levies lower taxes. This point of view can be best proved
with a reductio ad absurdum.
Suppose that we have two regions with the same tax rate but one region has more residents.
Capital mobility ensures the equalization of the after-tax return rate on capital, so the marginal
productivity of capital must be the same4 in both regions. Because the neo-classical production
function used in the BTCM only depends on the capital-to-labour ratio, the K/L-ratio also
has to be the same in both regions. As a consequence the region with the largest number of
inhabitants has to have the largest amount of capital. Due to the partial capitalisation e¤ect
mentioned in the paragraph above, the larger region has a cost of capital that is less sensitive
to changes in the tax rate. This consideration suggests that the large region will compete less
vigorously for capital through tax rate reductions and therefore end up with the higher tax
rate. Our initial hypothesis that they have equal tax rates therefore must be incorrect.
Based on this straightforward proof, we dene the three aspects of the small region advan-
tage:
 Small countries have lower tax rates than large countries.
 Small countries have a higher capital-to-labour ratio than large countries; there is a neg-
ative correlation between tax rates and KL -ratios. Ceteris paribus, small countries have
higher per capita incomes.
 Small countries are capital importers; capital should ow from poor to rich countries.
The consequences of the second form of asymmetry are studied by Peralta and van Ypersele
([99]). They show that countries with smaller capital to labour ratios loose from tax competition
4FK(1  T ) = FK(1  T ) ^ T = T  ) FK = FK , with T and T  the tax rates in both countries and with
FK and FKthe marginal productivity of capital in both countries.
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following capital mobility. Otherwise said, third world countries have nothing to gain with
globalisation.
Both extensions still lead to an underprovision situation where coordination is needed if one
would like to attain higher welfare levels.
2.3.2 Multiple tax instruments and optimal taxation literature
In the original set-up of the BTCM the government could choose between a source-based capital
tax and a source-based labour head tax. As already explained there is an e¢ cient provision of
the public good (but a lot of redistributional concerns) when the public good could be nanced
using source-based labour tax.
In reality governments often can dispose of more types of taxation. Bucovetsky and Wilson
([28]) investigated this problem. If governments were given the opportunity to levy residence-
based taxes, wasteful tax competition would become impossible. The mobile factor cant ee
the taxes anymore. Unfortunately administrative and tax compliance problems are often too
hard to overcome to implement this form of taxation5.
Other papers concerning the use of multiple tax instruments often extend the BTCM in
several directions. Thats why well postpone the discussion of these papers (e.g. Cremer
and Pestieau ([38]), Richter and Wellisch ([111]), Wilson ([142]), Fuest and Huber ([53])) to
the subsequent paragraphs. We hope that this will enhance the understanding of the linkages
between the multiple tax instruments and other changes in the set-up of the BTCM made in
those models.
The main conclusions one can draw if governments are allowed to use multiple tax instru-
ments are fourfold:
 The use of residence-based taxes would solve the race to the bottom.
 The introduction of multiple tax instruments often leads to an ine¢ cient tax choice by
governments.
5Some authors (e.g. Lesage ([80])) think that the scope for residence-based taxation is wider than commonly
believed.
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 The larger the number of tax instruments becomes, the more likely it becomes that the
Tiebout result can remain intact.
 It depends on the number and nature of tax instruments if tax coordination is needed
from the social planners point of view.
As soon as one introduces multiple tax instruments that are feasible for a government, the
question of dening normative prescriptions for an optimal tax policy becomes relevant. A good
survey of this optimal taxation literature can be found in Rosen ([114]), Auerbach and Hines
([5])or Stiglitz ([125]. This literature took o¤ back in the twenties with the Ramsey problem
of the optimality of a uniform commodity tax rate ([107]). It turns out that setting the same
tax rate for all goods in order not to distort relative goods prices is adequate since one cannot
tax leisure. The optimal set of commodity taxes should lead to an equal percentage reduction
in the Hicksian demand for all goods6. More recent some contributions have been made in
this literature concerning an optimal direct taxation scheme. For instance, Stern ([121]) was
able to demonstrate that even the most inequality averse governments still shouldnt opt for
marginal (linear) income tax rates of 100 percent. Another striking and non-intuitive result has
been made by Seade ([116]) who showed that the marginal (non-linear) income tax rate on the
highest-income person should be zero.
2.3.3 The nature of the public good
The original model was quite abstract in modelling the task of the government. Zodrow and
Mieszkowski introduced a public good benecial to the immobile residents. In reality the
government has more to o¤er to society. Some aspects of this broader governmental provisional
concept have been studied in other papers, although a lot has still to be done.
Public input goods
Some economists claim that public goods can also be benecial to mobile capital. The con-
sumption public good becomes an input public good, which one can interpret as infrastructure,
6When demands for di¤erent goods are unrelated, this rule can be simplied to the well-known inverse-
elasticity rule stating that tax rates should be inversely proportional to their elasticity of demand.
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a judicial system, etc. Social security can also  to a certain extent  be interpreted as a
public input good because it helps to preserve social peace in rms which saves costs for capital.
This argument has far-reaching consequences in the BTCM: there is no longer a race to the
bottom for the capital taxation. To see this, we look back at gure 2-1.  now represents the
cost of the public input good. If this good is paid for by the immobile residents, the amount
of capital remains at K2 and the labour income drops to AEG-BDEG=ABC-CDG. If on the
other hand the mobile factor has to pay for the public good, the capital stock decreases to
K1, capital pays an amount BCEF and the labour income is equal to ABC. This means that
the government has no interest in taxing the immobile factor. The mobile factor is willing to
pay for the public good because the capital gets something in return. Papers based on this
argument are from the hand of Oates and Schwab ([94]), Wellish ([132]) and Oates ([93]). Note
that this argument basically is a rephrasing of the Tiebout hypothesis as the beneciary of the
public good is also the payer of the good. Fiscal externalities disappear.
Some researchers investigated this line of thought further by introducing public consumption
and public input goods (Keen and Marchand ([65]), Noiset ([91]), Bayindir-Upmann ([12])).
They nd that the equilibrium pattern of expenditures is ine¢ ciently weighted toward too
much public input provision and too little public good provision. This result even holds when
the government only cares for the welfare of the immobile residents. We arrive again at a
suboptimal provision of the (consumption) public good. This time because these kinds of
goods dont attract mobile capital by improving the productivity of capital.
Usage and Congestion costs
Until now we only considered the production cost of the public good. In reality many public
(input) goods have usage and congestion costs. Firms pay for the usage costs but dont pay
for congestion costs. The government solves this ine¢ ciency by levying a tax equal to the
(marginal) congestion externality. The Samuelson rule for public good provision is obeyed.
As regards to the redistributional aspects of the public good provision with usage and
congestion costs, one could take two points of view. On the one hand, you could assume
that the public good is provided with no scale e¤ects and this assumption will lead to an
optimistic assessment of tax competition (see wildasin ([134]), Richter ([109]) and Gerber and
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Hewitt ([57])). On the other hand you could follow Bewley ([14]) and Sinn ([118]). They argue
that increasing returns to scale in the production of (infrastructure) public goods prevent a
competitive equilibrium, since the tax levied by the government and equal to the marginal cost
of the public good, is below the average cost. As a result the immobile labourers partially have
to pay for the public good provision. Sinn defends his view by stating the Selection Principle:
governments have taken over those activities that are not performed well by markets (e.g. non-
existence of optimal pricing mechanism as is the case here) and as a consequence introducing
competition on those elds wont work.
Public good with spill-over e¤ects
It has longer been known in public nance literature (see e.g. Williams ([139]) and Brainard
and Dolbear ([23]) that public goods can have spill-over e¤ects for other regions. Bjorvatn and
Schejelderup ([16]) applied this idea in a globalisation context. In this case the Samuleson rule
is not followed because the marginal benets that residents of other regions derive from the
provision of the public good arent included. This leads to a tendency towards underprovision of
the public good. Or otherwise said, free-riding behaviour becomes possible. On the other hand
these spill-over e¤ects reduce the incentive of the regions to compete for the mobile capital since
it becomes irrelevant who has the capital and supplies the public goods. The relative strength
of both phenomena determines the equilibrium outcome and is a priori di¢ cult to say.
2.3.4 Introducing mobile labour
Broadly speaking, you could distinguish two ways in which labour could be mobile. In the rst
case the mobile labour also benets from the public good in the other region (source-based
public goods), in the second case this is no longer the case since the public goods are assumed
to be residence-based. In the latter case one can interpret the mobile labour as commuters who
dont benet from the public services provided by the foreign region7. Note that in this section
all the discussed models remain based on capital mobility and capital taxation.
7 In the assumption that the public good is not infrastructure, etc. but e.g. social security.
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Migrational models.
In the model of Brueckner ([25]) all assumptions except one of the BTCM-model are retained:
labourers becomes mobile and chooses the region which o¤ers the highest welfare according to
his or her individual preferences. Not surprisingly this set-up continues to lead to an underpro-
vision of the public good because the positive scal externalities that a tax rate has on the other
regions continue to exist. In fact, the equilibrium condition of the BTCM remains completely
valid in this set-up.
A more complicated model with multiple tax instruments and mobile labour is Wilsons
model ([142]). In his model each region has a xed amount of land. Capital and labour are
mobile in search of the highest reward8. The government maximizes the value of the land using
a uniform source-based tax on capital and land and a source-based head tax on labourers9. If
there are no economies of scale in the provision of the public good, only head taxes are needed
to ensure an e¢ cient provision of the public good. This is the same result as obtained in the
BTCM-model but again there are a lot of redistributional issues. Notice however that in this
case the government uses the head tax to e¢ ciently control migration since the government sets
the tax rate equal to the marginal cost of providing the public good to the mobile resident.
If one, on the other hand, would introduce scale economies in the provision of the public
good, it becomes impossible for the government to tax the mobile labour appropriate. The
marginal cost becomes lower than the average cost. This justies the use of the uniform tax on
capital and labour. Surprisingly the usage of this distortionary capital (and land) tax does not
lead to an underprovision of the public good. The Samuelson rule holds. One can understand
this as follows: the government uses the non-distortionary head tax to compensate for the
distortionary capital tax e¤ects. This is a clear case where multiple tax instruments can lead
to an e¢ cient outcome.
8Just as was the case in the model of Brueckner, migrants have individual preferences ensuring that a con-
tinuous range of possible levels of public good provision becomes possible.
9Note that labour in this model is in fact modelled as capital was in public input goods provision models.
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Commuter models
Commuters cant enjoy the benets of the public good of the regions where they go to work.
The set-up in the model of Braid ([22]) is parallel to Wilsons set-up. Competitive rms need
immobile land, mobile labour and capital to produce goods. In Braids model the government
cant levy a head tax on the residents but instead she can dispose of a source-based labour tax.
The uniform property tax on capital and land remains. Braid nds that an increasing number
of regions leads to declining wage taxes, rising property taxes and a stronger underprovision of
the public good. This result should come as no surprise since the capital and labour tax are
highly distortionary in this model and by using the uniform property tax governments always
induce a partial capital ight. Allowing labour to be mobile in a commuters way creates an
additional rationale for the underprovision of the public good.
2.3.5 Redistribution
Some researchers introduced a government that provides no tangible public good but instead
cares about inequality. Income is transferred from richer people to poorer people by levying
a tax on mobile and/or immobile factors of production. An excellent survey of this literature
is given by Cremer, Fourgeaud, Leite-Monteiro, Marchand and Pestieau ([36]). Usually one
introduces two factors of production, mobile high-skilled and immobile low-skilled labourers.
Taxes are levied on the mobile labourers in an e¤ort to equate the disposable income of both
factors of production. As one could expect10, this tax competition leads to a race to the bottom.
An interesting and recent contribution to this literature is the work of Cremer and Pestieau
([38]). They consider three factors of production: immobile capital, mobile unskilled labour and
immobile skilled labour. While the skilled labourers get their wage and a share of the capital
income, unskilled labourers only earn a (lower) labour income. The government levies source-
based taxes on all three factors of production and uses these revenues to equate the disposable
income of both groups of residents. They only succeed in this objective in the autarkic case.
The more economies open their border with the region in question, the larger the downward
pressure on the redistribution becomes. In a small open economy (with an innite number of
10Just rename the factors of production: the mobile high-skilled labour becomes capital and the immobile
low-skilled labour becomes labour in the BTCM.
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regions) a complete race to the bottom emerges. A capital tax increase continues to create a
positive interregional externality in this model but the reason lies now in the benecial equity
e¤ects. The partial capitalisation of a higher tax rate into the after-tax return on capital (it
decreases) creates a more equal income distribution since the high-paid high-skilled labourers
also have (more) capital income.
A second example of the recent literature in this strand is the work of Huber ([63]). He
also incorporated distributional concerns in his model, but he slightly changed the set-up of
Cremer and Pestieau which allowed him to draw another interesting conclusion. Hubers set-up
di¤ers in two respects: there is a homogeneous tax on all labour income and he makes capital
(again) mobile and labour immobile. This means that in his system the government has to
rely on the capital tax to equate disposable incomes between the two groups of labourers. He
also emphasizes the importance of the complementarity or substitutability between capital and
labour. If for instance a capital stock increase (caused by a tax decrease) shifts the marginal
productivity of the high-skilled labourers upwards (complementarity) but decreases the mar-
ginal productivity of the unskilled, a tax decrease would be unwanted from a distributional
point of view. In either case, Hubers analysis suggest that the capital taxation would remain
ine¢ ciently low, although  due to the complementarity or substitutability of the factors of
production  the equilibrium capital tax level may be positive or negative. So, whether the
equilibrium capital tax on capital is positive or negative does not tell us if it is too low from
the perspective of the social planner. Both models indicate that redistributive governments or
governments that provide a general public good face the same risk of wasteful tax competition.
2.3.6 The nature of the government
Rawslian versus Benthamite benevolence
The government in the Basic Tax Competition Model only cares for the welfare of the residents.
Because there is only one type of residents, the behaviour of a Rawslian benevolent and a
Benthamite benevolent government coincides. As soon as more types of residents are introduced
in the model as was the case when there is a redistributing government, one has to distinguish
between the di¤erent types of benevolence. Redistributional issues become important. In
autarky a Benthamite government that maximizes the sum of residentsutilities would have no
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redistribution between the poor and rich residents under the assumption that utility depends
linearly on income11. A Rawslian government that looks at the primary goods of the least
advantaged in society would equate the after-tax disposable income of both groups.
As Cremer and Pestieau ([38])12 showed in an extension of their model (with mobile skilled
labour) discussed in paragraph 2.3.5, globalisation works in a strange way between a Rawslian
and utilitarian government. In equilibrium the Rawslian government has to cut back on her
redistributional policy while the utilitarian government will tax the rich residents (who are
mobile and high-skilled in ([38])) and as such installs a redistributive policy. This is because
part of the taxed skilled workers are immigrants who dont count in the objective function of
the government. Otherwise said, the Benthamite government can let foreign people pay for the
maximisation of the total revenue of natives. This tax exporting behaviour that counteracts
the race to the bottom also happens in models with absentee ownership of capital or land. Lee
([76]) and Burbridge and Meyers ([29]) have developed models of this kind.
Leviathan governments
In real life not all governments follow the will of a median voter. Some governments are not
benevolent but Leviathan. They try to maximize the government size itself which leads to an
overprovision of the public good. It were Brennan and Buchanan ([24]) who rst realized that
tax competition can be a welfare enhancing tool if one considers this Leviathan e¤ect. It took
nearly a decade after the appearing of their article in 1980 before this view was formalized. In
the formal modelling of the Leviathan e¤ect, one can on the one hand make abstraction of the
electoral systems (Edwards and Keen ([44]), Rauscher ([106]), Gordon and Wilson ([58])), on
the other hand one could consider voting models (Persson and Tabellini ([100]), Biglazer and
Mezzetti ([15])). We discuss both set-ups.
In the rst group of papers re-election concerns are only modelled implicitly by assuming
that the objective function of the government is partial Leviathan and partial benevolent. The
conclusion these papers embody is rather evident. It depends on the relative weight of both
characteristics of the government to assess the e¢ ciency e¤ects of tax competition. If the rents
11This will be the case in the social security competition model we will develop later on.
12Similar results were obtained for a di¤erent set-up through simulations in a paper of Meeusen and Rayp
([89]).
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that government o¢ cials claim decrease more than tax revenues when tax rates increase, the
provision of the public good normally will increase due to tax competition.
A di¤erent angle in this research is taken by Gordon and Wilson ([58]). They dichotomize
the policies. On the one hand, residents initially set tax rates to maximize welfare (benevo-
lent government), on the other hand, self-interested government o¢ cials choose on policies in a
Leviathan way. Residents try to provide incentives to o¢ cials that curb rent-seeking behaviour
while the government tries to attract as many migrants as possible to increase tax revenues.
Under the assumption of residential mobility, the governmental competition for mobile house-
holds reduces the intrinsic wasteful behaviour of the government. The higher e¢ ciency of the
government allows increases in public expenditure and hence also in resident utility. The au-
thors call this governmental behaviour expenditure competition. But the result is not optimal.
Gordon and Wilson show that the equilibrium tax rates are above the coordinative tax rates
and that public good still may be underprovided.
The second group of papers explicitly model voting. Persson and Tabellini ([100]) introduce
median voters in a BTCM set-up and these voters can alter the race to the bottom result.
It is shown that tax competition makes the median voter more leftist oriented. This leads to
increased government sizes which counteracts the wasteful tax competition.
Biglaser and Mezzetti ([15]) took a di¤erent voting approach. They started with a bidding
for rm-model13 to which they added re-election concerns. O¢ cials know that by attracting
the new rm they increase their chance of winning the election. As a result they have a tendency
to o¤er tax packages that can exceed the economic value of the investment. Dependent on the
strength of this e¤ect, governments may become ine¢ cient.
13One extension of the BTCM concerns the discretisation of capital mobility. People like Black and Hoyt ([17])
designed models with this assumption to better reect the lumpiness in reality of capital investments. When for
instance regions want to attract a large car manufacturer they can o¤er serious subsidies or tax credits specic to
that rm without changing their tax system as a whole. They found that bidding for rms can play an e¢ ciency
enhancing role since the newly attracted rm also attracts more labourers who can pay for the public good
provision. We omitted this strand of literature in our review because the focus of attention in these papers is
directed toward optimal locational decisions of rms and not towards the tax competition e¤ects on public good
provision.
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Vertical tax competition
The Basic Tax Competition Model was a horizontal tax model where all the governments
competed at the same level. In reality it can happen that a federal government and a local
government impose a tax on the same tax base. This vertical tax competition normally leads
to an overprovision of the public good. The rationale behind it is simple. A tax increase of a
vertical ranked government will reduce (and not increase) the tax base of the other governments.
Each government does not count in this e¤ect and as a result taxes will be ine¢ ciently high.
This has been illustrated by Keen and Kotsogiannis ([64]). This kind of systems competition
is however more slippery than horizontal tax competition because the political environment
becomes important. If for instance, the objective functions of the federal and local government
partially overlap, one would see a reduced overprovision of the public good. Another caveat
lies in the timing of the political game. As Boadway, Marchand and Vigneault ([18]) showed, a
rst-mover federal government will create a situation where the federal government cannot do
better than if it was directly controlled by states. This is because it foresees the ine¢ ciencies
that arise locally and will act accordingly. A more in-depth analysis of these phenomena can
be found in Hoyt ([62]).
2.3.7 Introducing labour market imperfections
In all the models we have discussed so far, the labour market was modelled as a perfect full
employment market. In the last ten years there have been made some e¤orts to introduce
labour market imperfections in the Basic Tax Competition Model.
The rst ones to develop a model of this kind were Lejour and Verbon ([78], [79]). They
introduced unemployment in a BTCM set-up using a union-rm wage bargaining process. The
benevolent government can only levy source-based labour head taxes to nance an unemploy-
ment benet. Under the specic assumption that the wage elasticity of labour demand is larger
than one, it follows that increasing capital mobility leads to lower taxes. Higher capital taxes
lead to a capital ight which causes a reduction in labour productivity and hence to more
unemployment (if wages cannot adjust to the market clearing level). We again arrive at the
race to the bottom. A similar result was obtained by Lozachmeur ([85]) and Leite-Monteiro
et. al. ([77]). These results indicate that labour market imperfections may strengthen the
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underprovision case since there was no underprovision in the BTCM for a case where a labour
head tax was available.
Other articles focussed on cases of underemployment. For instance, Fuest and Huber ([53])
made the individuals wage supply elastic in a rm-union wage bargaining model. They also
expanded the BTCM with multiple tax instruments: the government can levy a source-based
labour and capital tax as well a 100%-prot tax to nance the public good. If the wage elasticity
of labour demand is larger than one and government does take into account the e¤ect of their
tax setting on the wage bargaining process, wage and tax setting is to low from the point of
view of a social planner. If government are myopic and dont consider the e¤ect they can have
on wage bargaining, tax setting does not have to be too low
Richter and Schneider ([110]) and Koskela and Schöb ([69]) synthesize both cases in a
common framework of analysis. They show that the standard conclusions of BTCM remain
intact in most cases but that - dependent on the properties of the production function and
on the restrictions of other scal instruments - there are cases where tax competition does not
necessarily lead to lower taxes. For instance, when labour markets are dominated by monopolies
or monopsonies, capital taxes can serve as a (second-best) means to countervail the distortion.
2.3.8 An example of a model with multiple extensions
An interesting example of a model with extensions in several directions is the paper by Richter
and Wellisch ([111]). We present their model here as an example of how the several additions
to the original BTCM set-up intertwine.
In each region, rms produce (under perfect competition, CRS) a homogeneous good using
an immobile factor land, a mobile factor labour and a local public factor (public input good).
This public factor has no spill-over e¤ects to the other regions. The only income of the immobile
residents is the land rent of all the land in the world but the place of ownership does not have
to coincide with the place of residence (absentee ownership extension). The mobile residents
earn a wage income and get all the prots of the rms. The government in this model can levy
four taxes (multiple tax instruments). It disposes of a head tax on both types of residents, a
source-based land tax and a head tax on the prots of the rms. The government that only
cares for the immobile residents use these revenues to provide a source-based and local public
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consumption and input good. These goods are characterized by congestion costs. Ergo, there
have been made a lot of extensions toward the public good properties.
In equilibrium the governments will tax the land to the max. They do this because there
is tax exporting in the model. The government can bank on absentee owners who cant evade
the tax. But by levying high taxes on land, the immobile residents are hurt. Thats where the
multiple tax instruments come in: the government will use the head tax on immobile residents
to compensate for the high land tax (it becomes a subsidy).
The authors also asked themselves what will happen if one restricts the use of the land tax
(as done in Zodrow and Mieszkowski ([144]). Using the same reasoning as above, the equilibrium
state of the economy would be typied by a government who tries to stop the outow of rents.
She does this by manipulating the land rent. In order to lower the land rent, the government
has to tax rms ine¢ ciently high (compared to the social planner) and to underprovide public
factors. She also imposes high head taxes on mobile factors. The public consumption good
provision remains e¢ cient for two reasons. Firstly, the government cares for the immobile
residents who derive utility from it and secondly it is unnecessary to deter the mobile factor by
underproviding the public consumption good since the mobile head tax is available and is more
directly oriented toward the mobile factor.
The congestion e¤ect manifestates itself when the immobile head taxes and the absentee
ownership of land are excluded from the model. In this case the government tries to reduce the
congestion costs it cant internalize any longer. To reduce the inow of the mobile residents,
she taxes them too high and underprovides the public goods.
2.4 Conclusion
As far as we know, there have not been developed real social security models in the literature.
However, there is a large volume of papers concerning tax competition, thus without the in-
clusion of a social risk but with the inuence of globalisation on the tax setting capabilities
of the government. An interesting ramication in this literature concerns the introduction of
redistributing governments which in e¤ect creates a social welfare system in a tax competition
setting. These di¤erent models can serve as a valuable benchmark for our  yet to develop 
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social security competition model.
The standard tax competition literature mainly focuses on one aspect of globalisation,
namely capital mobility. There are also researchers who enrichened the basic tax competi-
tion models, especially in the framework of redistributing governments, by focussing on labour
(and capital) mobility. We will encounter even richer set-ups with a third globalisation dimen-
sion (goods mobility) when we discuss tax competition models in a new economic geography
framework.
The main message from the tax competition literature concerning the potential drawbacks
of globalisation is not very optimistic: Public goods are underprovided as soon as tax payers can
escape the taxes necessary to pay for these public goods from which they derive no utility. The
mechanism behind this postulate is quite simple. Tax raises create positive externalities for the
other regions since their tax basis increases. However, the home region does not account for
this e¤ect and as a consequence the home government will underprovide the public good.
But even when the government manages to tax those who also benet from the public good
(e.g. public input goods) or if it can taxes resources that cant evade the taxes (e.g. absentee
ownership, residence-based taxes), a Samuelson provision of public goods is still not guaranteed
as some extensions showed. For instance, public goods subject to increasing returns to scale in
their production su¤er from underprovision since marginal costs (equal to the taxes) are always
lower than the average costs.
Fortunately there exist some other extensions that can attenuate or even reverse the race to
the bottom result. The introduction of large regions that have the market power to inuence
the after-tax return rate on capital lead to an attenuation of the underprovision of the public
goods. Public goods with positive spill-over e¤ects reduce the incentives of regions to compete
for mobile (and taxed) capital. Tax competition can also reduce the overprovision of public
goods when governments are purely Leviathan.
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Chapter 3
New Economic Geography and tax
competition
3.1 Introduction
In recent years a new interest in location arose in economic literature. In neo-classical eco-
nomics it is assumed that everything takes place in an imaginary world with no dimensions.
This is not real life. If one looks at the distribution of economic activity on city, national or
even global level, one clearly can come to the conclusion that the distribution is quite uneven.
In most countries of the world rms and customers are clustered in large metropolitan areas.
This tendency of economic activity to be agglomerated is not new and has already been stud-
ied as early as in the beginning of the 19th century by Von Thünen ([127]). In the following
century a lot of economists have studied the existence and origin of agglomeration in economies
(Hotelling ([60]), Weber ([131]), Cristaller ([30]), Lösch ([84]), ...). Although the immanent
importance of location decisions of rms and consumers to decision makers, this strand of liter-
ature never succeeded to become mainstream in economic reasoning. As pointed out by Thisse
and Ottaviano ([98]) "the reason for such emargination is likely to be found in the di¢ culty
for the competitive paradigm, which has dominated so much economic research, to explain the
formation of economic agglomerations". The spatial impossibility theorem of Starrett ([120])
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showed more formally that there is no competitive equilibrium in a homogeneous space1 in-
volving transportation as soon as transport is costly and economic activity is not perfectly
divisible.
There are two ways to overcome this theoretical deadlock. First nature theorists relax the
constraint of a homogeneous space and introduce heterogeneous externalities. For instance Ri-
cardo argued that technological di¤erences are essential in understanding location decisions. In
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework factor endowments are crucial. These theories are
certainly capable to explain partly the location decision. However a lot of modern clustering
is much less dependent on natural advantages and remained unexplained by rst nature theo-
ries. This is where New Economic Geography modelling (NEG) comes in. It tries to explain
economic agglomeration after having controlled for rst nature causes (homogeneous space)
and avoids at the same time the theoretical deadlock of Starretts spatial impossibility theorem
(perfect competition). The key to develop this general equilibrium framework incorporating
increasing returns to scale and transport costs lies  according to the founding fathers of the
NEG, Krugman, Venables and Fujita  in a few modelling tricks: Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competition and Samuelsons iceberg transport costs. Even under these special assumptions
NEG modelling remains complex and often analytically intractable.
In the next section of this chapter we start with a short description of the basis features of the
new economic geography models, followed by some simulations concerning the dynamics of these
models. Despite the large volume of research done in the eld of NEG-modelling2, the dynamics
of these models have been scarcely treated. Besides a hopefully increased understanding of
the NEG-models, the simulations of the transitional behaviour of NEG-models will also allow
us to cast some caveats towards policy-makers. In section 3 of this chapter we give a short
review of the still limited literature that combines new economic geography modelling with tax
competition. All the models discussed in the previous chapter were smooth models were small
changes lead to small e¤ects. NEG-models are lumpy by their very nature and this will shed
some new exciting lights on tax competition. We conclude this chapter with an overview of
1A space is homogenous if a rm has the same production set in all locations and consumers have the same
preferences at all locations.
2The amount of research done in this eld expanded even to such an extent that a new journal, The Journal
of Economic Geography, took o¤ in 2001.
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how governments should react given the di¤erent models discussed in chapter 3 and 3.4.
3.2 Basic features of New Economic Geography models
3.2.1 General set-up
NEG-models normally have two regions: the north N and the south S. We assume that they
are symmetric in terms of tastes, technology and openness to trade so as to rule out rst nature
explanations. This means at the same time that expressions for both regions are isomorphic. In
each region two sectors are active: the manufacturing sector M and the agricultural sector A.
The A-sector is made as simple as possible because its prime role is to allow for trade imbalances
in the M -sector. Therefore it is modelled as a perfect Walrasian sector (constant returns to
scale, perfect competition, ...). The M -sector is characterized by Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competition and iceberg transportation costs. As noted by Thisse and Ottaviano ([98]), what
the two sectors represent, changes with the stage of development of the economy as well as with
the epoch under consideration. For instance in the 19th century the M -sector mainly stood for
manufacturing while nowadays tradable services can be included as well in the M -sector.
Although there are good reasons to believe that spatial competition is essentially oligopolis-
tic (Gabsewicz and Thisse ([56])), NEG-models assume for reasons of analytical tractability that
the market structure is Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competitive. This means that the supply
side is modelled as a sector with increasing returns to scale within varieties and no economies of
scope across varieties. At the same time one assumes that there are so many rms that they are
not in a position to inuence on other rms production levels. The only strategic parameter
for the rms is the global production of the market. The demand side can be represented by
a consumer whose preferences exhibit varietas delectatnot only on the amount consumed of
each A- and M -good but also on the number of varieties bought of these goods. Hence, we can
represent the consumers utility as follows3:
U = CMC
1 
A with CM =
 Z n+n
i=0
c
1  1

i di
! 1
1  1
(3.1)
3We follow the notation of Baldwin et. al. ([10]).
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The upper tier of the utility function 3.1 represents the constant division between the con-
sumption CA of the homogeneous A-good (fraction ) and CM , the consumption of a composite
of all di¤erentiated varieties of industrial goods (fraction 1   ). The lower CES-tie gives the
preferences of the consumers over the di¤erentiated manufactured goods with  the constant
elasticity of substitution between the di¤erent varieties. For ease of analytical workability we
represent the product space as continuous and n and n represent the mass of northern and
southern4 manufactured varieties respectively. The consumption of a single variety i is repre-
sented by ci.
Entry and exit of a rm to a sector is assumed to be costless. This means that competition
leads to marginal cost pricing. However in some models5 entry and exit to a sector are not
instantaneous, indicating that pure prots can arise.
The manufactured goods are subject to iceberg transportation costs when exported. This
means that in order to have 1 unit exported to the other region, the rm has to send  units
( > 1) because a fraction   1 melts away during transport. This ad valorem sales tax models
the trade barriers. These can be dened as all costs incurred in getting a good to a nal user
other than the marginal cost of producing the good itself: freight costs, time costs, policy barriers,
information costs, contract enforcement costs, currency costs, legal and regulatory costs, and
local distribution costs (Anderson and Van Wincoop ([4])). In the NEG-modelling trade this
parameter only appears in a transformed way, namely as 1 , which is interpreted as the trade
freeness . That is, the freeness of trade rises from  = 0, with innite trade costs, to  = 1,
with zero trade costs. In this way an important variable in the NEG-trade models is dened in
a compact space which promotes numerical preciseness.
As pointed out by Eckey and Kosfeld ([42]) the formal structure of the New Economic
Geography models remains neo-classical as consumers strive for utility maximisation, rms
want to maximize their prots and intensive competition drives pure prots to zero.
To complete the set-up, we still have to introduce the cost functions and the cause of
agglomeration. These two characterizations di¤er across the di¤erent models as can be seen in
table 3.16.
4All southern varieties are denoted by .
5FEVL and FCVL-models, see later.
6w is the wage of the skilled workers, wL is the wage of the unskilled workers, x is production of a rm, F
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In 1991 Krugman ([72]) introduced a model based on labour dualism, the Core-Periphery
model (CP). There are two factors of production: industrial, skilled labourersH and agricultural
labourers L. The immobile agricultural labour is only employed in the A-sector and aa L-
employees are needed to produce one A-good. The H-workers form the xed and variable cost
of theM -sector. The homothetic cost function of rms in theM -sector is given by (F +amx)w,
where F is the xed input requirement, am is the variable input requirement, x is the output
of a rm and w depicts the wage of an industrial worker. The migration behaviour of the
H-workers is discussed in subsection 3.2.2.
In a European context, full labour mobility is a strong assumption. Martin and Rogers ([88])
introduced in 1995 a model that was not based on labour mobility. This model is called the
Footloose Capital model (FC). They make the cost function of the M -sector non-homothetic in
a xed capital requirement and a variable labour requirement as can be seen in table 3.1. There
is no longer a di¤erence between skilled and unskilled labour. They assume more realistically
that workers are immobile and capital is mobile. This means that capital can be employed in
any region but that the capital owner does not move.
Economic theorists noticed that the FC-model is much more tractable because of the non-
homothetic cost function. However there is a trade-o¤ with richness of features. As a conse-
quence they tried to compromise the richness of features of the intractable CP-model and the
the number of units of necessary of the xed input requirement, am the number of units of unskilled labour, n
the number of rms and PP the producer price index .
Model primary f.o.p. mobility cost function dynamics
CP unskilled labour L immobile
skilled labour H mobile (F + amx)w
:
sH = (!   !)sH(1  sH)
FC labour L immobile
capital K mobile (F + wLamx
:
sH = (   )sn(1  sn)
FE unskilled labour L immobile
skilled labour H mobile Fw + amxwL
:
sH = (!   !)sH(1  sH)
CPVL labour L immobile (F + am)PP
:
n = n and
:
n = n
FCVL labour immobile
capital mobile F + amxPP
:
sn = (   )sn(1  sn)
FEVL labour immobile FPP + amxw
:
n = n and
:
n = n
Table 3.1: Overview of the discussed models.
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relatively easy FC-model without losing too many wanted properties. This was independently
done by Ottaviano ([95]) in 1996 and Forslid ([51]) in 1999. They introduce, just like the CP
model a labour dualism (unskilled labour L and skilled labour H) and adopt the idea of a
non-homothetic cost function in the M -sector (=Fw+ amxwL)7 from the FC model. Only the
skilled labour is mobile. It is clear from this set-up that F units of skilled labour are needed
to produce a manufactured good. As skilled labour is considered to be mobile, rms have to
move with these units of skilled labour. Because F is often normalized to 1, many interpret the
unit of skilled labour as the entrepreneur. This explains the often-cited name of this model,
Footloose Entrepreneur model (FE).
Note that unlike the tax competition models discussed in chapter 2, these NEG-models
contain, besides goods mobility, a second source of globalisation, whether it is the mobility of
capital, entrepreneurs or skilled labourers. The mobility of these factors of production also
constituted the agglomeration source. Because migration of a primary factor cannot always be
assumed to be reasonable, models with other agglomeration mechanisms were developed.
For instance, the market size could also be endogenized by introducing vertical input-output
linkages between an upstream suppliers sector and a downstream customers sector. This setting
introduced by Venables in 1996 in his seminal paper ([129]) is motivated by the growing impor-
tance of the services sector with its large business-to-business selling. The primary factor(s) of
production in the vertical linkage framework is (are) interregionally immobile but intersectorally
mobile. In 1995 Krugman and Venables ([73]) integrated this second cause of agglomeration
with the CP-framework in their CPVL-model. In 2002 Robert-Nicoud ([112]) did the same for
the FC-model in his FCVL-model. Ottaviano ([96]) modied in the same year the FE-model in
a VL-framework. Strictly speaking all these models exhibit horizontal linkages as the upstream
and downstream sector were collapsed into one sector to make things simpler. Nevertheless the
name vertical linkagesremained in the literature. A second simplication lies in the specic
modelling of the vertical linkages. For instance, the composite input of the M -sector in the
CPVL-model is Cobb-Douglas in labour and the usual CES aggregate of all M -sector varieties.
The Cobb-Douglas expenditure share on the CES aggregate is . This means that consumers
and rms (see expression 3.1) devote the same shares of expenditures on manufacture, that
7wL is the wage of an unskilled labourer and w of a skilled one.
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both value variety and that no additional distortions are created. More specically the price of
the composite input good can be described by the producer price index PP which is a Coub-
Douglas aggregate of labour costs and the price index of the manufactured goods. The exact
specication of the cost function of these and the previous discussed models can be found in
table 3.1.
A third class of agglomeration models based on capital accumulation also excluded mobility
of factors of production. The simplest model in this strand of literature is the constructed capital
model of Baldwin ([6]). One assumes that capital can be constructed by using a xed amount
of labour but that it also faces a constant probability of dyingat every instant (depreciation
idea). The equilibrium in each region is dened as the point where the long-run capital cost
equals the post-tax reward on capital. In this way agglomerative forces behind the post-tax
reward lead to a net creation of capital in the favoured nation and net destruction of capital
in the disfavoured nation. Since these models lack a clear dynamical specication, we will omit
them in the discussion of the dynamics of NEG-models. However, we will discuss some models
of tax competition based on constructed capital set-ups.
3.2.2 Dynamics of NEG-models
The dynamics of the above-mentioned models are kept as simple as possible. In four of the six
discussed models (CP, FC, FE, FCVL) the migration behaviour can be expressed by only one
di¤erential equation although the evolution in two distinct regions is considered. The reason
lies in the xed cost component of the increasing returns sector: the production of every M -
variety requires a xed amount of a primary factor of production. The endowments of these
factors of production are constant and given. In a Dixit-Stiglitz framework every rm produces
one variety and a single variety is produced by only one rm (see Baldwin et al. ([10]), p.
42-43). As a consequence the total number of rms nW is constant. So expressing the number
of northern rms n as a share of the total number of rms (sn = nnW ) does not change the
amount of information contained in n. This no longer holds for the CPVL- and FEVL-models
where the variation in the total number of rms (via PP in the xed cost component) prohibits
the reduction of two dynamic equations to one.
Under the right normalization conditions (F = 1 ) and applying a full employment condition,
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it can be shown that the number of rms in the CP-framework is equal to the number of
skilled labourers. This makes the notation sH , the share of the northern skilled labourers
in the total amount of skilled labourers interchangeable with sn, the share of northern rms.
Similar reasoning applies to the other models so that we can use the variable sn to describe the
transitional behaviour of all the above-mentioned models
The concrete formulations for the laws of motion in table 3.1 can be motivated as follows.
The mobile factor in the CP- and FE-model moves as soon as rms in the other region o¤er
a higher real wage. As a consequence the rate of migration sH is proportional to the real
wage gap !   !. Additionally it is ad hoc assumed that migration stops as soon as one
region has attracted the entire mobile factor of production. The FC and FCVL-model replace
the real wage gap in the migration equation by the di¤erence in nominal reward to capital in
both regions    . The capital owners are no longer interested in the real return because
all earnings of their capital are repatriated to their country of origin8. The dynamics of the
CPVL- and FEVL-model are even simpler than the other NEG-models: rms enter a market
as soon as there are positive prots and leave the market when the prots are negative (making
the non-instantaneous entry and exit of rms in FCVL and FEVL necessary).
It is clear that in the existing dynamical set-up of the discussed NEG-models all agents are
myopic. They are only interested in the current wage, prots or reward to capital and dont
care about the future. This lack of forward-looking rational behaviour avoids the di¢ culties
encountered in models such as the Ramsey model. Boucekkine, Camacho and Zou ([20]) studied
for instance a Ramsey model in innite and continuous time and space and encountered ill-posed
problems.
3.2.3 Main properties of NEG-models
A complete derivation and discussion of all properties of the NEG-models lies outside the
scope of this thesis. Instead we focus on the intuition behind some of the most important
characteristics of NEG-models.
Before we continue, it is necessary to mention that all characterizations of the NEG-models
8Strictly speaking one should continue to consider real returns as the capital owners are still interested in
maximizing their real income where this real income is dened as their nominal earning divided by the price
index of region where the capital owner lives!
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are derived under the assumption that two conditions continuously hold. The rst one, the no-
black hole condition, puts a limit on the strength of the increasing returns in order to prevent
creating models in which agglomeration always occurs independent of the trade freeness. This
condition can be shown to be equivalent to stating that  =  1 , the intensity of the preference
for variety in manufactured goods must be larger than 9. The second condition is necessary
to let the agricultural market clear. Without this non-full-specialization-condition the A-sector
would not allow for trade imbalances. The mathematical formulation of this condition depends
on the model (see ([10])).
Theorists are interested in nding the short-run and long-run equilibria of NEG-models.
These are steady states where all markets cleared and trade is balanced. In the long-run
equilibria, additionally, mobile factors have no longer an incentive to move. For instance, the
number of active rms in the south and north is exogenously given in the short run for the
CPVL-model and endogenized in the long run.
Alternatively one can dene these equilibria as the outcome of a dispersion force and two
agglomeration forces. The dispersion force can be understood by looking at the local competi-
tion. For instance, when a rm migrates from south to north, it intensies competition in the
north and thereby creates an incentive for northern rms to migrate to the south. This force
is present in all models discussed in this paper.
The rst agglomeration force looks at the e¤ect of a larger home market. Under imperfect
competition and trade costs, rms have an incentive to migrate to the larger market and export
to the smaller market. If this production shifting in turn leads to further expenditure shifting
as is the case in all models except for the FC-model10, the home-market e¤ect becomes self-
reinforcing. This demand-linked circular causality explains how a small temporary shock can
lead to a large permanent e¤ect. It can also be shown that an exogenous change in the location
of demand leads to a more than proportional relocation of industry to the enlarged region.
All models are characterized by this home market magnication e¤ect discussed by Krugman
9More formally, one has to impose that the break point (where the symmetricum falls apart) occurs at levels
of trade freeness  greater than 0.
10 Independent where the capital is used (or equivalently stated where rms are located), expenditures do not
move as the capital owners repatriate all of their earnings to their region of origin. The FCVL-model with
similar assumptions exhibits demand-linked circular causalities because in VL-models rms take part in regional
spending.
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Figure 3-1: Evolution of centripetal and centrifugal forces with trade freeness .
([72]).
The second agglomeration force is not demand-linked as the previous one but cost-linked.
The idea behind this force is neo-classical: rms want to minimize their costs and workers
want the highest possible real income. As trade costs serve as a pecuniary externality in NEG-
models, location plays an important role in minimizing costs. In the VL-models departing from
a symmetricum makes the input less costly for rms in the enlarged region. Mobile consumers
earn the highest real wage in regions where the cost-of-living is the lowest. This is in those
regions where most rms are located. This cost-of-production or -living e¤ect is self-reinforcing
because an increase in consumers (or rms in VL-models) further attracts rms to that region.
The only model without cost-linked circular causality is the FC-model because the repatriation
of all capital earnings eliminates the importance of price indices.
It can be shown that a reduction in trade costs weakens the dispersion force more rapidly
than it weakens the agglomeration force. This is graphically depicted in gure 3-1. As a
consequence, at low values of trade freeness only a symmetrical equilibrium occurs. At some
point of trade freeness agglomeration becomes overpowering and the model results in total
agglomeration. Krugman was able to derive the conditions under which the Core-Periphery
structure becomes locally unstable ([72]) and called it the sustain point. The point where the
local stability of the symmetricum breaks down is called the break point and was studied by
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Figure 3-2: Symmetrical tomahawk diagram: stability and bifurcation.
Puga ([104]). This bifurcation behaviour is summarized in the tomahawk-diagram 3-2 in case
the initial system is symmetric. Solid lines represent stable equilibria, dotted line unstable
equilibria. Note that this diagram holds for all models except the FC-model. In this case the
symmetricum is stable for all values of trade freeness, the core- and periphery equilibria are
unstable. When there are no trade costs location becomes irrelevant.
The analytical obstinacy of NEG-modelling makes it hard to prove these characteristics
formally. It took more than ten years after the reinventionof geography in economic modelling
to do this11. This was done by Robert-Nicoud ([113]). He proved the isomorphism of all
discussed models in a certain economically meaningful natural state space. He called this space
natural as it is closely linked to the three driving forces in the models. Based on this space he
could prove the following analytically for symmetrical set-ups:
 There are at most ve distinct equilibria, two of them being the corner solutions (core
and periphery).
 If interior asymmetric steady states occur, they are always unstable.
11 In the beginning of NEG the local stability of equilibria was studied purely numerically using wiggle diagrams.
These diagrams plot the driving force of migration (e.g. real wage gap in CP) against the migration variable
(e.g. share of mobile workers in north in CP). These graphs remain however useful to intuitively understand the
models.
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 Measured by trade freeness, the sustain point comes before the break point. If there is
no cost-based agglomeration e¤ect (e.g. FC), break and sustain point coincide.
 There exists a range of parameters where multiple equilibria coexist.
Baldwin ([6]) proved that regardless of initial conditions the system always converges to a
steady state. This global stability is valid under the same conditions under which local stability
holds.
The stability analysis highlights some other important characteristics of NEG-models be-
sides the before mentioned home-market magnication and circular causality. Contrary to the
HOS-framework where factors have an incentive to migrate in a pattern that tends to equalize
relative factor supplies, NEG-models are endogenous asymmetric: a progressive lowering of the
trade costs between two initially symmetric regions creates at the end regional asymmetries.
Moreover, it happens catastrophically. This bang-bang property as Thisse and Ottaviano call
it ([98]) is one of the most known properties of NEG-modelling. The fact that multiple stable
equilibria exist in a certain range of parameters makes the model path dependent. The reversal
of a temporary shock that changed the equilibrium of the model would not necessary imply a
returning to the original equilibrium. This history matters propertyis of great importance in
the policy implications of NEG-modelling. For other properties of NEG-models, we refer to the
book of Baldwin et. al. ([10]).
All the previous results hold under the assumption that regions are intrinsic symmetric. In
reality regions seldom can be assumed to have exactly the same endowments or trade barriers.
If we introduce asymmetry, the NEG-framework is enriched. For instance the bifurcation di-
agram12 when the southern region has a higher initial factor endowment (or exporting to the
south is more expensive than exporting to the northern region) is given in gure 3-3. Mirroring
this gure around the sn = 12 -line gives the case where the north has the largest endowments
or highest import tari¤s.
This gure shows that the symmetric equilibrium is no longer a straight line but inclines
slightly to the southern core-solution. The breaking of the handleof the tomahawk doubles
12This gure holds for small asymmetries. It can be numerically shown that for larger asymmetries the break
point lies between the two sustain points (see Baldwin et. al. ([10])).
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Figure 3-3: Asymmetrical tomahawk diagram: stability and bifurcation in case the southern
region has higher initial endowments or higher import tari¤s.
the sustain points: the sustain point for the south occurs at lower trade freeness levels than
the northern region. These changes enrich the pre-catastrophic behaviour of the model. The
full agglomeration in the south becomes more likely compared to the symmetrical bifurcation
diagram when trade freeness is increased. This region is now also capable to sustain its core
solution at higher levels of trade costs than the north.
The asymmetric bifurcation diagram for the FC-model di¤ers from gure 3-3. Baldwin et.
al. ([10]) show that as soon as asymmetry is introduced, the CP-outcome becomes stable in this
framework at levels of trade costs di¤erent from zero. The larger the asymmetry becomes, the
lower the trade freeness may be for the CP-equilibrium to be stable. At values of trade freeness
just below the threshold value (where CP-outcome becomes stable), the delocation elasticity is
extremely large. This behaviour is called near-catastrophic behaviour. A second di¤erence lies
in the fact that the symmetricum is no longer an equilibrium. The larger the northern market
size becomes, the larger the equilibrium value for the northern share of rms becomes.
We end this discussion of the main properties of standard NEG-modelling by noting that
most theorists have introduced many normalizations in order to make the expressions less
cluttered. For instance it is always assumed that F equals 1. Some of these assumptions
are model dependent. We refer to Baldwin et. al. ([10]) for a complete survey of these
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normalizations.
3.3 Simulated dynamics of some New Economic Geography mod-
els
3.3.1 Introduction
Dynamics is a subject often forgotten in NEG-papers. As mentioned before, theorists are mainly
interested in establishing the local stability of short- and long run equilibria. We look in this
section at the dynamics of six NEG-models (FC, CP, FE, CPVL, FCVL and FEVL). From a
political point of view, it is not only important to know which equilibrium (core or periphery)
can be attained but also how long it takes before the region actually ends up in that equilibrium.
Unfortunately it is not possible to study the dynamics of these models in an analytical way.
The main cause for this intractability does not lie in the fact that the dynamical equations are
too complex, far from, but in the embedded recursiveness of the equations. From an abstract
point of view, the dynamics are all described as (systems of) non-linear rst order di¤erential
equations
:
x = A(x)x, but with A implicit in x, making the systems solvable only numerically.
For instance, in the CP-model the dynamics are given by sH = (!   !)sH(1   sH). In this
expression the real wage ! can be written as the nominal wage w divided by the price index P .
Both numerator and denominator of the price index P depend in a transcendental way on the
nominal wage (that depends on the share of northern rms sn = sH) making it impossible to
express the real wage explicitly in function of the share of skilled labourers sH . The resulting
transcendental di¤erential-algebraic system must be simulated numerically. The only systems
escaping this intractability are the FC- and the FEVL-model. In these two cases, integrating
the dynamical equation(s) lead to complicated and implicit functions. Therefore we rely also
in these two cases on numerical simulations.
We try to assess how the di¤erent systems evolve toward an equilibrium starting from an
inequilibrium. As the initial condition of the systems is independent of the future, we can choose
them in such a way that they reect an extreme disequilibrium. We do this for symmetric and
asymmetric set-ups. In all these models13, we use the values 0.3 for  and 8 for the elasticity
13Of course it could also be argued that, since each model corresponds with a di¤erent economic scenario, we
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of substitution  (Brakman and Garretsen [21]), unless otherwise stated. This means that 30%
of the produced output of a region is subject to trade costs. In modern countries around 70%
of GDP stems from services. As they are harder to trade, the value for  seems reasonable.
Details about these simulations are given in appendix 8. We did all the the calculations and
simulations inMathematica 5.0. The three-dimensional graphs are drawn using theGraphics3D-
package. In the following subsections we discuss the results of the simulations with respect to
some dynamical characteristics.
3.3.2 Discussion of the dynamics
Shape of the transition process
In all the discussed models the transitional shape is similar. If the long-run equilibrium is
characterized by a lower share of northern industry compared to the initial condition, the
dynamics are concave in the beginning and convex at the end with the point of inection
roughly in the middle. If the northern region attracts more rms in the long run than it had in
the beginning, the curve is convex in the beginning and concave in the end. In most cases the
inclination is quite weak. This shape is independent of the fact that the system is characterized
by one or two dynamical equations. This results in a nearly linear evolution except for the
beginning and the end of the transition. In all cases a very long tail could be distinguished. For
instance (see A-4) the time necessary to bridge 90% of the gap between the initial state and
the nal state is three times smaller than the time necessary to cross the remaining 10% gap.
Inuence of initial condition and trade freeness on transition time
When trade costs fall, the time necessary to attain the long run equilibrium state increases.
This is a manifestation of the decreasing strength of the agglomeration and dispersion forces
when trade freeness increases. Besides this general phenomenon, the discussed models exhibit
specic dynamics. First of all, the break and sustain point di¤er. This means that the systems
do not evolve toward the same stable long run equilibria at the same levels of trade freeness. As
the agglomerative and dispersion forces are roughly equal around the break point, the transition
have to calibrate the parameters in each model di¤erently so as to reect optimally di¤erent base case scenarios.
42
Figure 3-4: Trade freeness dependence of transition times for a) CP- and b) FE-model (sn(0) =
0:05).
becomes asymptotically slow at these -values. Combining this result with the di¤erent break
points for the discussed models lets us conclude that the dynamical evolution at the same levels
of trade freeness can di¤er considerably across the models. Figure 3-4 illustrates this conclusion
for the CP- and FE-model. The humps in the graphs reect the occurrence of the break and
sustain point.
We also showed that the di¤erence between the initial condition and the stable long run
equilibrium serves as a measurement for the number of time steps necessary to attain this
equilibrium. The magnitude of this e¤ect compared to the trade freeness dependence, however,
is not the same. As can be seen in table 3.2, the impact of a change in trade freeness is many
times larger than the e¤ect a di¤erent initial condition has on the transition time. In this table
the change of the half life for all the discussed models is given in terms of percentage between
two extreme trade freeness or initial condition levels14, where the half life is dened as the the
time necessary to bridge 50% of the gap between the initial and nal equilibrium state. The
negative values in the second row stem from the fact that in the FC-, FE- and FEVL-model
the symmetricum is still not breached at =0.75. The break point in these models occurs at a
lower level of trade costs.
14As the models are intrinsically symmetric, we only have to consider initial values below 0.50.
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Impact of modelling set-up on transition time
From the point of view of a policy maker, it is important to know in which model the transition is
fast and in which model it is not. The appendix A-4 lists the transition times for all the discussed
models for di¤erent values of trade freeness and several initial conditions. The inuence of the
modelling framework is summarized in gure 3-5. Part A compares the CP-, FC- and FE-
set-ups, B depicts the same comparison but now for VL-based models and part C considers
the di¤erence in transition time for VL- and migrational models. In all three cases we used a
log-linear scale.
We see that the FC-model evolves much slower (10-30 times) toward the nal equilibrium
than the FE- or CP-setting, except around the break points of the FE- and CP-model. The
lack of circular causalities and a cost-based agglomerative force explains this behaviour. The
same slowness characterizes the FCVL-model but is explained di¤erently. The dynamics of the
FCVL-model are modelled di¤erently than those of the FEVL- and CPVL-model. An increase
of the number of varieties produced in the north necessarily means a reduction of the southern
varieties in the FCVL-model. The other two VL-models dont have this win-loose dynamics.
As a consequence the magnitude of all the forces is larger in the FCVL-model, making the ratio
of the dominant force over the smaller force smaller. This smaller ratio explains the slower
evolution over the whole trade freeness range.
The FE-setting goes faster (10 times) than the CP-setting toward the equilibrium state for
low values of trade freeness but it becomes slower for high values of trade freeness. The reason
lies in the di¤erent cost structure of both models. In a FE-setting you need the migrational
factor of production only for the xed cost requirement and not for the variable cost requirement
as is the case in a CP-setting. This means that, for the same number of people that migrates
interregionally, more rms and varieties can be produced in a FE-setting than in a CP-setting.
This enhances the dispersion force and the cost-linked agglomerative force relatively more in the
CP CPVL FC FCVL FE FEVL
%T1=2( =0:05 to =0:95, sn(0)=0:25) 1040 690 88108 1531 24600 8340
%T1=2(sn(0)=0:05 to sn(0)=0:45, =0:75) 384 280 -50 349 -50 -48
Table 3.2: Magnitude of trade freeness and initial condition e¤ect on transition time
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FE-setting. There is no divergence in the demand-linked agglomerative force. These elements
combined explain the behaviour.
Lastly we conclude that the dynamical evolution of migrational and VL-models is similar,
once accounted for di¤erent modelling set-ups (CP,FE, FC). Only the FC- and FCVL-model
evolve di¤erently but this behaviour is easy explained as the FCVL-model does have a break
and sustain point, the FC-model not.
Inuence of size asymmetries on transition time
Departing from the symmetrical division of labourers (or capital) has only in CP-setting a
reasonable impact. A 0.5% reduction in sL in these settings su¢ ces to let the system evolve
toward the southern core solution even if the northern region is given a small initial advantage.
Of course the change of the share of labourers or capital makes the stable symmetrical long run
equilibrium no longer stable. This is depicted in the typical asymmetric tomahawk diagrams.
In the other set-ups more than 5% of the labourers has to move between the regions before the
dynamical evolution starts to change. In these cases, we conclude that, although the stability
of equilibria changes, a change in the share of labourers has no inuence on the dynamical
evolution of the systems.
3.3.3 A tentative attempt to estimate time steps
Until now we only discussed the dynamics of the models in relative terms, not in absolute
terms. For a policy maker it is not only important to know that labour mobility leads to
faster agglomeration outcomes than capital mobility, unless he or she also knows how many
years there are left before the (un)wanted outcome is reached. To fully answer this question
one could regress changes in agglomeration data on several factors that can be pointed to one
specic modelling set-up. Based on the coe¢ cients, one could get time estimates of transition
times.
Because this empirical research lies outside the scope of this thesis, we tried to get a (very)
rough time estimate based on data in the literature. We considered a European framework.
As labour mobility is low in Europe and trade between rms accounts for a large share in the
intra-European trade, we suggest a FCVL-model to reect the European case. Its a matter of
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Figure 3-5: Inuence of modelling set-up on transition times.
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debate to which extent some European regions can be considered as core regions or not. We
suppose that 65% of industry is located in the European core.
One can nd many di¤erent values for trade freeness in the literature. For instance, An-
derson and Van Wincoop ([4]) nd a trade cost of 170%. Given the fact that the elasticity of
substitution between varieties is 8 in our set-up, this gure corresponds to a trade freeness of
0.02. We believe that such prohibitive trade costs dont reect the European border free case.
Instead, we used the minimal estimation of transport costs of Ederington, Levinson and Minier
([81]). They used import data from the 15 largest importers of the U.S. at a 10-digit HS code
level to calculate transport costs, controlled for distance and found a trade freeness around
0.8515.
We looked at the convergence literature to nd an estimate of the transition time. Magrini
([87]) used the distributional approach of Quah ([105]) to study whether there is a European
income convergence. This means that he divided the European NUTS2-population in di¤er-
ent income categories at di¤erent time steps (1980-1995) to construct a transition probability
matrix. Under the assumption of an invariant transition mechanism, the eigenvalues of the
ergodic matrix reect the time dimension of the con- or divergence. This leads to a half-life of
approximately 100 years. As Magrini pointed out, these values are subject to changes if other
income discretisations are taken. For instance, Claerhout ([31]) found a half-life of 150 years.
Using all these data, we found that 1 time step coincides with 1,78 months. Based on this
result, we conclude, although preliminary, that in most models the transition time is quite long.
It varies between 10 to several thousands of years.
3.4 New Economic Geography: a denite farewell to the race
to the bottom?
All the tax competition models discussed in chapter 2 were smooth models. Small changes
lead to small e¤ects. As made clear in section 3.2, economic geography models are lumpy by
their very nature and this will have a huge impact on tax competition results. The amount of
15They estimated that the transport cost  is equal to 1.009082 or otherwise stated that  = 0:93 ( = 8).
One standard deviation (= 0.034) further away leads to a trade freeness of 0.72. Averaging this out, gives the
result of  = 0:85.
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research done in this domain is still quite limited. The rst papers concerning tax competition
in an economic geography framework appeared around the year 2000. Probably the rst one to
be published was the paper of Ludema and Wooton ([83]) who showed the potential positive
e¤ects of globalisation on tax competition albeit in a non-standard new economy geography
framework16. Soon several other papers appeared that came to the same conclusions but now
in a standard new economic geography framework (Anderson and Forslid ([3]), Baldwin and
Forslid ([9]), Baldwin and Krugman ([11]), Kind, Knarvik and Schjelderup ([66])). A good
survey of this literature can be found in Baldwin et. al. ([10]). Note that all these models are
classictax competition models, thus without social insurance.
The discussion of NEG-modelling in section 3.2.3 indicated that there are two di¤erent
locational equilibria. As it turns out, competition for taxed mobile factors hinges strongly on
the nature of the locational equilibrium. In order not to obfuscate matters, we look at both
cases separately. We start with symmetrical locational equilibria in subsection 3.4.1, followed
by tax competition models under CP-equilibrium in subsection 3.4.2.
Since this literature is new, there arent many extensions to this strand present in the
literature. In subsection 3.4.3 we present two of them. The rst one, by Borck and Püger
([19]) focuses on richer locational equilibria. The second extension, made by Seidel and Egger
([117]) is very interesting since it introduces unemployment and an unemployment benet in a
NEG-framework.
After the review of the standard neo-classical tax competition models in chapter 2 and
NEG tax competition models in this section, we are able to give a short resume of the di¤erent
attitudes that governments can adopt to cope with the possible detrimental e¤ects of tax
competition. This is done in subsection 3.4.4.
3.4.1 Tax competition starting from a symmetric equilibrium
In this section we will use three di¤erent NEG-models to illustrate that in an economic geog-
raphy framework it becomes possible to have a race to the bottom with and without capital
mobility but that you can also have a race to the top. On the one hand, the mechanisms
16They used a framework of homogeneous good oligopoly and moving costs instead of a Dixit-Stiglitz-Spencer
framework with iceberg transportation costs.
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behind the race to the top or bottom remain the same as in the BTCM set-up. This illustrates
the importance of the nature of the public good and the tax instruments. On the other hand,
agglomeration causes some e¤ects that are totally unexpected in a BTCM framework.
Footloose Capital model and a public consumption good: Race to the bottom
The model of Martin and Rogers ([88]) is the easiest model to work with17. It is also the only
NEG-model that is fully tractable. The essence of their model lies as seen in the previous
section in the cost function of the manufacturing sector. The xed cost of this sector is made
up by mobile capital. Labourers form the variable cost of the M-sector. These labourers are
immobile and also work in the agricultural sector. As explained before the capital owners (in
casu the labourers) are immobile and all capital earnings are repatriated. This means that
the self-reinforcing cost- and demand-linkage are lacking in this set-up. As a result only the
symmetricum is a stable equilibrium in the whole range of trade freeness. We dont have to
fear a catastrophic agglomeration.
The government uses a head tax on the residential income (labour and capital income) to
nance a public good that is produced using goods from the A-sector. The government is
benevolent and maximizes the welfare of the residents. Given the basic nature of the footloose
capital model, it is not that di¢ cult to show that the Nash equilibrium between the two regions
results in a race to the bottom. The taxes drop as trade freeness increases. This result critically
depends on the fact that the capital reward is repatriated since it is the cause for the scal
externality. The tax payer does not benet from the public good paid by his taxes.
Footloose Entrepreneur Model and a public input good: Race to the top.
In the Footloose Entrepreneur model of Ottaviano and Forslid ([97]) the set-up of Martin and
Rogers is retained except for one detail. One interprets the capital now as entrepreneurs who
move with their rm. This means that the delocation of the entrepreneur also leads to an
expenditure shifting. This puts the demand-linked and cost-linked circular causalities back on
track. The tomahawk diagram is that of gure 3-2.
17The model described here which can be found in Baldwin et. al. ([10]) actually used a quasi-linear variant
of the original model. By doing this one avoids all income e¤ects.
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Baldwin and Forslid ([9]) and Anderson and Forslid ([3]) incorporate tax competition in this
set-up. They introduce a benevolent government who levies head taxes on residents (labourers
and entrepreneurs) to provide a public good for both factors of production (a public consumption
and input good). For simplicity, they assume that the public good is produced by the means
of the average consumption basket, that is, with the same composite of A- and M-goods as in
the consumersutility function. This means that the taxation does not inuence the demand
patterns and there is no interaction between the level of spending and the demand of the
di¤erentiated good.
For this set-up, one nds that the Nash equilibrium equals the rst best equilibrium where
there was no entrepreneurial mobility. In conclusion, there is no race to the bottom. Intuitively
this result is easy to understand since the entrepreneur has no reason to run away from the tax
because he or she benets from it.
We can also look at the e¤ect of public good provision on the agglomeration. Migration
implies that the receiving nation can a¤ord better public goods while the other region can o¤er
only a poorer set of public goods. Hence migrants create a force that tends to promote further
migration since they derive utility from the public good provision. This amenities linkage
destabilizes the symmetricum. Andersson and Forslid ([3]) called this e¤ect the bright lights,
big city e¤ect.
Constructed Capital model: race to the bottom without capital mobility
The results of the last two paragraphs could also be attained in a BTCM set-up since they were
basically based on public good assumptions. The next model we discuss allows us to derive a
result that cant be attained in a basic tax competition model.
The model used for this is the constructed capital model of Baldwin ([6]). As seen before in
section 3.2, this model assumes that neither labourers (variable cost of M -sector) nor capital
(xed cost ofM -sector) is mobile. The agglomeration is now rooted in the fact that capital can
be constructed and destroyed.
The government in this model only cares for the labourers and provides them public goods
with the same cost structure of the model of Ottaviano and Forslid ([97]). Tax revenues are
collected using a source-based head tax on labour and capital.
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In equilibrium tax rates are too low from the perspective of the social planner. This can
be explained as a hidden scal externality. Capital does not want to pay taxes as it derives
no benet from it. The fact that it cant move physically does not mean that capital stocks
cant respond to the fact that capital investments abroad are more attractive. The capital
construction sector plays the same role as capital mobility did in the basic tax competition
model.
If one allows capital to become mobile in a footloose capital sense in this set-up, one nds
a positive correlation between capital mobility and tax rates. Globalisation is good for social
welfare! The reason behind it lies in the fact that capital owners dont move with their capital.
This acts as a strong dispersion force just as the amenities linkages acted as an agglomerative
force in the footloose entrepreneur model. The locational symmetric equilibrium becomes more
stable and less changeable by tax rates. Tax competition is attenuated. This shows that
agglomerative forces can have an inuence on tax competition results. Normally one would
expect that in a model where the public good provision is excluded for capital, increased
capital mobility would lead to lower taxes. But by making capital mobile one also created an
additional dispersion force which made the locational division more xed.
This result contrasts sharply with the BTCM where capital mobility was the key cause of
ine¢ cient tax competition and where removing capital mobility produced rst-best taxation.
However, the mechanism behind the underprovision result is the same. This model is a good
illustration of the fact that  although the agglomeration and tax competition still hinges on
the nature of capital  it is not the mobility of goods or factors that is crucial to the race to
the bottom but the nature of the public good is. It also shows how agglomerative e¤ects can
change tax competition results.
3.4.2 Tax competition and core-periphery equilibria
When trade is su¢ ciently free, agglomeration forces induce mobile factors to cluster geographi-
cally. In this case, mobile factors respond to tax di¤erentials in a manner that is quite di¤erent
than the one predicted by the BTCM. They become quasi xed. Baldwin and Krugman ([11])
investigated the consequences of core-periphery patterns for tax competition in a footloose en-
trepreneur model. They introduce in this set-up a benevolent government that only cares for
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Figure 3-6: Wiggle diagram for a BTCM model and a NEG-model.
the labourers and not for the entrepreneurs. Since the public good is reserved for the immobile
labourers but the tax is paid by the mobile and immobile labourers, we would expect a race to
the bottom result. It turns out that this is not the case.
Before we turn to their model, we rst look at the wiggle diagram 3-6. This diagram
plots the driving force of migration, the indirect utility ratio of the entrepreneurs against the
migration variable, the share of rms in the north. The diagram is handy for two reasons. First,
one can see the stability of the locational patterns: all points where the real return ratio equals
one and where the wiggle curve is downward sloping are stable internal equilibria. At these
points a further increase of the share of rms in the north would lower the northern return
rate compared to the southern return rate. This decrease of the real return ratio would deter
entrepreneurs from moving to the north. An analogue reasoning holds when rms move to the
south starting from the same stable situation. On the graph we depicted the real return ratio
of a neo-classical BTCM-model, of a symmetric and a core-periphery FE-equilibrium. It is easy
to see where which equilibrium is stable.
The wiggle diagram also graphically explains the di¤erent e¤ect a tax change has in a
symmetrical situation compared to a CP-situation. A tax increase in a region lowers the real
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return for the entrepreneurs in that region18 and makes the other region more attractive. This
means that the equilibrium line shifts from a real return ratio equal to one to the point where
the real return ratio 
 equals the tax di¤erence 1 tsouth1 tnorth
19. For symmetric situations (and the
BTCM case) asymmetric taxations will lead to moderate reallocations of entrepreneurs (point
A and B on the wiggle diagrams). The same tax change will not lead to any capital shifting
in a core periphery situation. The CP-point for the north (marked as CPN on the diagram)
is still above the new equilibrium line. It is only when the ratio of real rewards at CPN
becomes smaller than the tax gap, that all entrepreneurs would move. Until that moment, all
entrepreneurs behave like xed factors of production because of the net positive real reward
ratio. This ratio is called agglomeration rents and one can prove that they are hump-shaped.
Baldwin and Krugman ([11]) proposed a three-stage limit taxing game. In the rst stage the
core sets its tax rate, followed by the south in the second stage. In the last stage entrepreneurs
migrate and the locational equilibrium is established. This game is solved by backwards in-
duction. After having determined the real wage gap that determines the locational equilibrium
pattern in the third stage, one considers the problem facing the south in the second stage and
the north in the rst stage. Both cases have been depicted on graph 3-7.
The rst quadrant depicts the southern problem. The vertical axis plots the value of the
governments objective function and the horizontal axis depicts the southern tax rate. The south
has two options. If the core stays in the north, the problem of the government is unrestricted and
sets is tax rate accordingly (tsouth;eq on graph). However the south could also try to undercut the
northern rate enough in order to become core itself. If the south becomes the core it could tax
away the agglomeration rents which results in a higher welfare (see graph). To attain this, the
south has to set its tax rate equal to the following tax break rate tsouth;break = 1  (1  tnorth)
.
This tax rate depends on the northern tax rate set in the rst stage. Two possibilities have
been shown on the graph: if the north sets a relatively high tax rate, the south can levy the
tax T1, if the north has a low tax rate, the south has to set its tax rate below T2. Only in the
former case, it is protable for the south to steal the core from the north.
18Contrary to the FE-model discussed in subsection 3.4.1 entrepreneurs only derive utility from their remu-
neration , not from public good consumption. This means that tax increases unilaterally decrease welfare of
entrepreneurs.
19This is based on the equalization of the after-tax rewards to capital across regions: north(1 t) = south(1 
t).
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Figure 3-7: Second and rst stage of tax limiting game
The northern region in the rst stage is aware of the southern problem. Because the welfare
of the north is higher when it remains the core (a symmetric set-up), it will set its tax rate at
that level that would make the south indi¤erent between becoming the core or staying periphery.
The line FB B on the graph depicts this situation of equal welfare. The no deviation tax rate of
the south that follows from this calculation is used to determine the northern Nash equilibrium
rate. This is done by equating the tax gap and the real reward ratio of the entrepreneurs
(formula: see graph). This is graphically depicted in the fourth quadrant of the gure.
The lumpy character of the model made it necessary to use the sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium instead of the simultaneous Nash equilibrium as used before. The reason lies in
the discontinuity of the governments reaction functions. If the south took the norths rate as
given, it would not want to deviate; however, if the north took the souths rate as given, it
would wish to raise its tax rate. But if it raised its tax rates, the south would nd it optimal
to ´stealthe core and then the norths rate would no longer be optimal. As a result the static
Nash game has no pure strategy equilibrium.
For reason of simplicity Baldwin and Krugman assume that the public good is luxurious,
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Figure 3-8: Tilted bell tax competition
meaning that richer residents want more of them. Under this assumption it is easy to prove
that the northern tax rate is always higher than the southern. This is illustrated on gure 3-7
with the help of the bisector in the fourth quadrant. It also implicates that the southern tax
rate increases when trade freeness increases since the real income of people rises.
The hump-shaped agglomeration rents cause a race to the top followed by a race to the
bottom for the core if trade costs decline. As could be expected from the game set-up where
the south was given the maximal ability to compete scally, only the north is restrained by the
tax competition and runs the risk of a race to the bottom.
So, if the preferences for public goods rise with per capita income, globalisation may produce
a race to the top since the peripheral regions and core regions both raise their taxes with
increased trade freeness. The rich nation could increase the tax rate more quickly since it
not only becomes richer as the south does (reduced price index) but that it can also tax the
agglomeration rents away. For high levels of trade freeness the northern tax rate returns to the
southern tax rate. Baldwin et. al. ([10]) called this tilted bell tax competition. We depicted
this behaviour graphically in gure 3-8.
We can conclude that the introduction of a core-periphery structure in a tax competition
setting has far reaching consequences. It becomes not only possible to have di¤erent taxes
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between symmetric regions (determined by number of immobile residents), but agglomeration
rents can also create a race to the top where one would have expected a race to the bottom in
a BTCM set-up.
3.4.3 Extensions
The bifurcation behaviour of the standard NEG-literature as discussed in section 3.2.3 is
tomahawk-like (see gure 3-2). However, one could also create models where, besides CP-
and symmetrical equilibria, stable locational equilibria occur with only partial agglomeration
of rms in one of two regions. The clue to create these supercritical pitchfork-bifurcations, as
noted by Borck and Puger ([19]), lies in the fact that further centrifugal forces are introduced
or that centripetal forces are weakened. For instance, Püger ([101]) replaced the standard
Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility of expression (3.1) by a logarithmic quasi-linear utility. This
in e¤ect removes demand linkages in the manufacturing sector.
Borck and Püger ([19]) study tax competition in such a setting. They used a FE-model
with a government levying head taxes on the mobile entrepreneurs to nance a public good.
This good is absent in the utility function of the consumers (which leads to locational equilibria
independent from taxation) and only enters in an ad hoc governmental utility function. Just
as was done by Baldwin and Krugman ([11]), they use the sequential Stackelberg game to
tackle the tax competition. Based on these ramications, they are not only able to conrm
that the results of Baldwin and Krugman remain valid in a more advanced NEG-setting but
they also show that the partial core can maintain a positive tax gap even though in these cases
no agglomeration rents accrue to the mobile factor. In other words, agglomeration forces may
provide a tax shield in less extreme situations than studied by Baldwin and Krugman ([11]).
Recently an interesting addition to the literature that combines NEG models and tax compe-
tition has been made by Egger and Seidel ([117]). They introduce labour market imperfections
in a FC-model with tax competition. Unlike similar extensions of the standard tax competi-
tion literature (see subsection 2.3.7), they use a fair wage mechanism to introduce endogenous
unemployment instead of unionisation. The government raises taxes on the mobile capital to
provide a public good which enters in an ad hoc utility function of the government, not in
the utility function of consumers. This makes the driving force of agglomeration, the capital
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reward di¤erential between the two regions, independent from taxes. Based on this set-up,
they conrm the race to the bottom result. Capital evades higher taxes which leads to higher
unemployment rates in the regions compared to the Pareto situation. They also concluded that
the more rigid labour market are, the lower the Nash tax rates become.
3.4.4 Policy implications
Based on the literature review described in chapter 2 and section 3.4 , one can divide the policy
implications in two categories.
Unregulated tax competition
If the tax competition leads to an e¢ cient provision of the public good without wasteful tax
setting, there is no need to coordinate the tax setting. This is the case in all the models where
the beneciary of the public good is also the payer of the tax necessary to provide the public
good (Tiebout, public input goods,..). It also occurs in those models where the tax payer,
even if he doesnt derive utility from the public good, cant escape the taxation, e.g. residence-
based taxation. The same e¢ cient result can be obtained by using multiple tax instruments,
although the ine¢ cient choice between the di¤erent tax instruments can lead to redistributional
problems.
Secondly there is also no need for any regulation if the tax competition attenuates the
ine¢ cient governmental behaviour. Governments can act ine¢ cient if they are Leviathan or
when there is vertical tax competition. This last argument is often cited by defenders of the
neo-liberal thinking.
Tax coordination
Tax coordination is wanted from a social planners point of view if there is a race to the bottom.
Generally spoken, this happens as soon as the taxpayer is not the beneciary of the public good
paid for by him or her. This behaviour is not only limited to the BTCM, but can also happen in
a New Economic Geography framework (see FC-model). Some of the extensions we discussed
can reduce the importance or size of the race to the bottom. For instance, large regions who can
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a¤ect the after-tax capital return rate face less detrimental e¤ects of tax competition. The same
holds for small regions or when public goods have positive spill-over e¤ects to other regions.
A central government acting as a social planner can overcome the ine¢ cient outcome in two
ways. She can forbid or impose restrictions on some of the tax policies of the regions. Secondly
she can use corrective subsidies to neutralize the ine¢ ciencies of local tax competition. These
policies have been suggested and discussed by Wildasin ([136], [137], [138]) and DePater and
Meyers ([40]).
Tax harmonisation Contrary to popular belief, tax harmonisation is only applicable in a
very limited number of cases: only when the regions are perfectly symmetric and have the same
preferences, tax harmonisation achieves the rst-best allocation. For instance, an equalisation
of tax rates between a large and a small country would lead to an overprovision of the public
good in the small country due to the small region advantage. Also when a region has a higher
preference for equality between the di¤erent factors of production, a tax equalisation does not
work as discussed by Cremer and Pestieau ([38]). Depending on the level of the shared tax rate,
there is an overprovision of the public good in the low preference region or an underprovision
of the public good in the high preference region.
And even in those cases were a tax harmonisation could be benecial from the point of
view of a social planner, there still may be two other problems. The rst problem lies in the
enforceability of the tax harmonisation scheme. If there are regions that deliberately set their
taxes lower than agreed upon, the whole scheme becomes useless. Recent research however
partially counters this problem. For instance, Konrad and Schjelderup ([68]) showed that
a harmonisation amongst a subset of regions increases the welfare for all regions under the
assumption that taxes are strategic complements. Another problem is the possible substitution
e¤ect between several policies. It becomes protable for regions under a tax harmonisation
agreement to change some other policies in order to attract the mobile factors. Cremer and
Gahvari ([37]) developed a model where governments lower the probability that rms will be
checked on their tax payments when the regions have agreed upon a tax harmonisation scheme.
Tax oors Baldwin and Krugman ([11]) show that a special form of tax coordination, namely
tax oors may be welfare improving in a core-periphery situation. As explained in section (3.4.2)
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peripheral regions set their taxes rst-best, while the core regions are constrained and set their
taxes suboptimally low. This means that the small country only wants to deviate from its
chosen tax rate if it is compensated for it substantially. The large region only wants higher tax
rates. This problem can be solved by agreeing that the communal tax rate should be set just
below the optimal tax for the south. The north can now base its optimal tax on this tax rate
that is higher than the no break tax rate. As a result the north can increase its tax rate. This
scheme is obviously only a weak Pareto improvement as the southern region does not gain from
the tax coordination. And the same caveats mentioned in the paragraph before hold.
Corrective policies The use of corrective subsidies in a BTCM framework haven been in-
vestigated by Wildasin ([136], [137] and [138]) and DePater and Meyers ([40]). Typically this
corrective subsidy consists of a lump sum transfer combined with a corrective subsidy on the
tax revenue of each region. This subsidy is region dependent meaning that two regions levying
the same tax can have di¤erent subsidies. These corrective policies solve the underprovision
problem of the BTCM.
Unfortunately corrective policies face a number of problems. The rst problem lies in infor-
mational asymmetries. Central governments often have less information than local governments.
As Bucovetsky, Marchand and Pestieau ([27]) showed this can lead to an over- or undercor-
rection of the central authority. The second problem lies in the vertical tax competition that
may occur as soon as the central government levies taxes on the same factors as the local gov-
ernment. This problem has already been discussed in section 2.3.6. And of course, in order to
impose a central government subsidy, one needs a central government and local governments
who are willing to renunciate their sovereignty to a supranational level.
3.5 Conclusion
Recently location and agglomeration received a lot of attention in economic literature. Al-
though this growing literature is still quite new, there have been made some theoretical e¤orts
to study tax competition in a framework of these New Economic Geography settings. While in
the classical tax competition literature everything evolves continuously, NEG models are dis-
continuous by their very nature. This created the scope for some new and exciting contributions
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to the tax competition literature.
For instance, detrimental tax competition can occur in models without any mobility of
factors of production. This indicates that it is not the mobility of goods or factors that is
crucial to the race to the bottom but the nature of the public good is. Secondly, some of the
newly developed models also showed that increased globalisation (via capital mobility) in a
symmetrical locational equilibrium leads to higher tax rates, which is a result never obtained
in tax competition models where the beneciary of the public good is not the mobile payer
of the public good. Thirdly and perhaps the most well-known result of this literature, is the
possibility that core regions can tax agglomeration rents without risking any delocation.
Although these features are denitely new, most contributions still conrm a race to the
bottom result. As it turns out, it is not that easy for governments to overcome this result. Tax
coordination schemes such as full tax harmonisation or corrective subsidies face many problems.
Often they are not enforceable or they lead to substitution e¤ects between vertical organised
governments or between di¤erent policy options. Sometimes they are even not applicable. For
instance, a tax harmonisation for small and large regions is destined to fail. An interesting way
of thinking is the introduction of tax oors by Baldwin and Krugman. This can lead to a weak
Pareto improvement in a core-periphery situation.
Besides reviewing these recent contributions to the tax competition literature, we also inves-
tigated an often neglected aspect of New Economic Geography models, namely their dynamics.
A rst investigation of the dynamics of NEG-models seems to a¢ rmatively answer the question
whether these dynamics are important. All models exhibit strong trade freeness dependence in
their dynamical behaviour. The lower the trade costs are, the longer it takes before the system
starts to evolve toward the long run equilibrium state.
The dynamical behaviour of the discussed models also di¤er greatly. In general the evolution
toward the long run stable equilibrium is faster in CP- and FE-based models than in FC-models.
For values of trade freeness below the CP-sustain point, the FE-like models evolve faster toward
the nal equilibrium than CP-models. For high values of trade freeness the reverse is true. The
VL-models have the same transitional evolution as the migration-based models. We showed
that the inuence of regional asymmetries through a deviation in labour or capital share is
di¤erent in the discussed models. The only models that are strongly inuenced by a realistic
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change in the labour share are the CP-based models.
A policy maker wants to avoid that his region becomes a periphery. The above conclusions
give indications for the time he or she has to intervene in order to change the unwanted evolution.
They also indicate the importance that the initial condition and the trade freeness have on this
transition. For instance, a policy maker of a core-region in a FEVL-setting has very little time to
take action for values of trade freeness below the sustain point. The same policy maker but this
time in a FC-setting and for high values of trade freeness disposes over a huge amount of time
to change the evolution. In some cases a timely increase of trade freeness su¢ ces to maintain
the core solution. In other cases (CP-model) measurements to attract southern workers are
e¢ cient decisions.
One can draw two general policy warnings based on the results of this section. First, the
di¤erences between the models clearly show that one cannot freely interchange the NEG-models
although they are mathematically similar as Robert-Nicoud proved ([113]). Secondly we advise
some caution if one wants to use the FC(VL)-model as an analytical tractable variant of the
FE- or CP-model, especially if one draws conclusions for regions with low interregional trade
costs. This is often done in the study of NEG policy implications (and as we will do also).
This means not that we cannot use the simpler models, but it stresses the importance of using
a factor in the migrational equation of the FC(VL)-model to adjust its dynamical evolution to
the other models as the shape of the transitional process is similar for all the discussed models.
We emphasize the fact that policy implications based on the dynamical analysis performed
in this chapter remain very tentatively. Firstly the model badly reects the reality because in
real life more than two regions exist, labour markets arent perfect, regions dont have identical
technologies, ... Secondly the calibration of the time steps remains very tentatively. It could
well be, for instance, that 1 time step coincides in reality with 5 years or 50 years. Further
research could try to calibrate empirically the time scale in the above-mentioned models.
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Chapter 4
Motivation of the set-up
We model the tax setting behaviour of a government that might care for the unemployed and
that is constrained by the other governments tax setting behaviour in its ability to set un-
employment benets at a level it feels is right. In other words, we determine the condition
for social security competition (seen from the expenditure side) in a standard Dixit-Stiglitz
framework of international trade in which we included endogenous unemployment and govern-
ments that want to redistribute between the employed and the unemployed. In this way we
di¤er in three respects from a rst-best case. There are product market imperfections (mo-
nopolistic competition), labour market imperfections (unemployment via e¢ ciency wages) and
governments taxing labourers to raise revenue for an unemployment benet.
The tax competition literature discussed in chapters 2 and section 3.4 serves as a benchmark.
The dominant strand in the large neo-classical literature concerning tax competition is a race to
the bottom result. The same holds, although less unambiguously, for the NEG tax competition
literature. The model that resembles most closely our set-up is the recent work of Egger and
Seidel ([117]) of 2008. However, their model still lacks the presence of a government that
provides insurance against that social risk.
We opt for a social security competition model in the framework of the new economic
geography instead of the perhaps more simpler standard neo-classical set-up of Zodrow and
Mieszkowski ([144]). The reasons for this are fourfold. Besides the purely academic interest
to expand further the modelling framework of the NEG-models, this set-up also allows us to
introduce a race to the bottom result in a model without any mobility of factors of production.
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In other words, goods mobility su¢ ces to create strong negative pressures on our social welfare
states. This intuitive idea already appeared in the work of Ottaviano and Forslid ([97]) but for
the rst time, it no longer hinges upon factors of production1. International goods competition is
enough. Thirdly we believe that including agglomeration e¤ects in this set-up better reects the
European economic reality with core and peripheral regions. Lastly, we are able, by introducing
unemployment via e¢ ciency wages, to construct a New Economic Geography model that is as
tractable as the footloose capital model of Martin and Rogers but that has almost the same
characteristics of analytically more di¢ cult models like the CP-model of Krugman or the FE-
model of Ottaviano and Forslid.
We now discuss subsequently the specic assumptions of our model that lead to the three
deviations from the rst-best world, namely the product market imperfections via the Dixit-
Stiglitz-Spencer framework, the labour market imperfections via an e¢ ciency wage mechanism
and the government facing an Atkinson equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤.
4.1 A Footloose Capital Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competitive
framework
In a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competitive framework ([41]) consumers maximize a constant
elasticity of substitution utility function that is symmetric in a bundle of di¤erentiated goods.
This reects the varietas delectat of consumers. In the formulation of Martin and Rogers ([88])
the non-homothetic cost function associated with these di¤erentiated goods has a xed capital
cost component (ensuring increasing returns to scale) and a variable labour cost component
(linear technology). The absence of economies of scope and simple parsimony creates the
bijective relation between rms and varieties: each variety is produced by only one rm and
one rm only produces one variety.
In maximising their prot, rms are considered to act atomistically by neglecting the impact
their decision has on the overall market conditions. This Chamberlinian large group assumption
is one of the main reasons for the tractability of the Dixit-Stiglitz framework. Trade between
the regions is, in a non-autarkic case, inhibited by iceberg trade costs. This means that a certain
1Ottaviano and Forslid came to this conclusion based on a constructed capital model of Baldwin.
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fraction of the transported good meltsaway during transport (hence iceberg). Under free
entry and exit of rms on the market, these assumptions will lead to a demand system where
the equilibrium prices are a constant mark-up over marginal costs. With imperfect competition,
the optimal price-marginal cost mark-up depends inversely on the degree of competition. As a
consequence these forms of modelling imperfect competition become analytically highly com-
plex. A second reason for the widespread use of Dixit-Stiglitz models  and again an outcome
of the invariance of the mark-up  is the mill pricing by rms. Firms fully pass on the trans-
portation costs to the consumers. A rms producer price is the same for sales to all markets.
Thirdly the elasticity of substitution  is an easy indicator of the degree of competitiveness in
the market. The higher  becomes, the closer the market structure starts to resemble perfect
competition.
The above mentioned reasons explain the widespread and dominant use of the Dixit-Stiglitz
model in international trade. But the analytical workability of a Dixit-Stiglitz set-up comes
at a price. The price elasticities of demand are constant and identical to the elasticities of
substitution and equal to each other across all varieties. This entanglement of demand and
supply parameters makes it di¢ cult to assess the impact of demand or supply separately on
the equilibrium. The constant elasticity of substitution also means that people have the same
substitution behaviour independent from the amount consumed of the goods. Besides the lack
of identication in comparative static analysis, the modelling set-up also leads to prices that
are independent of the spatial distribution of rms and consumers which conicts results in
spatial pricing theory (Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, [2]). Finally, the iceberg assumption
implies that trade costs increase as the price of the transported good increases which is highly
unlikely. Sometimes one also nds it more convenient to ignore the income e¤ects present in a
Dixit-Stiglitz setting.
A possible answer to these critics lies in the use of other utility functions. For instance the
Ottaviano-Thisse utility function ([98]) lacks income e¤ects and has a perhaps more realistic
denition of the trade costs. Unfortunately as it turns out this set-up does not lead to work-
able solutions2. Simulations of the model, although the analytical results seemed promising,
2The full analytical working out of the Thisse model is available upon request. These calculations follow the
same path as described in the following chapters 6 to 8.
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encountered parameter problems. It was impossible to nd parameter values that allowed for
a well-behaved economical system.
The footloose capital framework of Martin and Rogers is the analytically most simple model
of the New Economic Geography models. The main reason for its analytical workability is
threefold. First, the only mobile factor is the xed factor of production (capital) whereas in
other models such as the core periphery model of Krugman ([72])) the variable and xed factor
of production are mobile. Secondly there is a dichotomy between the ownership of the mobile
factor and the use of it. The owner does not relocate, the capital itself can relocate. This implies,
contrary to the footloose entrepreneur model of Ottaviano and Forslid ([97]), that there are no
circular causalities in the FC-model. Besides the analytical tractability of the footloose capital
model, it also reects best, in our opinion, the European context where full labour mobility
is a very strong assumption (Krieger and Fernandez, [71]). The third reason for choosing this
set-up and perhaps the most important one, lies in the fact that we can simplify our model
by abolishing the traditional A-sector of NEG-models without destroying the agglomerative
characteristics of our set-up. In most NEG-models a second Walrasian sector is needed to
ensure that in core-periphery equilibria, each region preserves the possibility to consume. Since
the owners of the mobile factor do not move and receive the rewards to capital irrespective
of the location of the employment of the capital each region always has a certain expenditure
level. Moreover, it would be di¢ cult to introduce endogenous unemployment in a model with a
second perfect Walrasian sector without making additional strong assumptions about the nature
of the production factors in that sector. This is for instance the problem that Egger and Seidel
([117]) face. When labourers inelastically supply labour and when there is a Walrasian sector
with constant returns to scale that can accommodate all labourers, unemployment becomes
unnatural.
As stated above, one of the drawbacks of using a non-homothetic cost function as in the
footloose capital model lies in the loss of some of the core-periphery features such as circular
causality, locational hysteresis and endogenous asymmetry. However, as it turns out, some of
these features are restored in our asymmetric tax competition model by introducing unemploy-
ment via e¢ ciency wages. Another possible shortcoming lies in the transitional behaviour of
the footloose capital model. Although all New Economic Geography models have an identical
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mathematical structure as Robert-Nicoud ([113]) proved, that does not mean that all exhibit
similar dynamical results. This has been discussed in section 3.3. Finally by reforming the
footloose capital model from a two-sector to a one-sector model, we expose the whole economy
of a region to international trade. All goods produced are tradables. As non-tradable services
form a dominant share of GDP in modern western economies3 this assumption is quite strong.
A possible way to correct for this in our model, is reducing the level of the trade freeness. We
act as if the traded and non-traded goods and services are reshaped to traded goods but subject
to higher transaction costs.
4.2 Unemployment via e¢ ciency wages
The second deviation from a rst-best case in this model is the introduction of unemployment
via e¢ ciency wages (Stiglitz, [123]). The main idea behind the e¢ ciency wage hypothesis is
that the net productivity of a worker depends positively on the workers net real income albeit
at a decreasing rate. This approach has achieved recently increasing support in the literature
(e.g. Kreickemeier and Nelson ([70]) and Grossman and Helpman ([59])) as it is a simple tool
to endogenise unemployment.
We use the formulation of Summers ([126]) of e¢ ciency wages where the delivered e¤ort
by a worker is positively correlated with the di¤erence between the net wage w(1   z) and a
reference wage wR:
a(w) = (w(1  z)  wR), (4.1)
in which z represents the tax rate set by the government on the gross wage w. The strength of
the productivity enhancing e¤ect of higher wages is characterized by  and lies between 0 and
1. The reference wage wR represents the outside option for the worker. In conclusion, labourers
inelastically provide labour and their e¢ ciency depends on the wage o¤ered by the rms.
As pointed out by Stiglitz ([124]) one could motivate the link between wages and workers
productivity for at least ve reasons. First, rms dont want to lower wages even if there
370% or more of GDP stems from services in EU, Japan and U.S.
(http://www.ecb.int/mopo/eaec/html/index.en.html).
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is an excess supply of labour because high wages reduce labour turnover and hence, training
costs. Other theories are based on imperfect and asymmetric information. Firms could have
di¢ culties to assess the characteristics of workers or could face problems in monitoring the
labour e¤ort of workers. In the former case, labourers get a higher wage in order to defer
lower skilled persons to apply. In the latter case the increased cost of shirking induces the
desired behaviour from the workers. The fourth theory stems from the development literature
and states that higher wages allow for a level of nutrition above the subsistence level which
promotes e¤ort. The last justication for the e¢ ciency wage hypothesis is called the fair wage
hypothesis (Akerlof, [1]) or the gift exchange hypothesis (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, [75]).
These reciprocity-based voluntary cooperation arguments imply that, if the employee perceives
the action of the employer as kind or fair, he will value the employers payo¤ positively and
as a consequence will deliver a higher e¤ort level. Experiments indicate that employees indeed
respond to higher wage o¤ers, combined with higher expected e¤ort, with higher e¤ective e¤ort
(Falk and Fehr, [49]).
As could be expected these di¤erent explanations give di¤erent purports to the reference
wage. The traditional approach in choosing the reference wage wR in e¢ ciency wage models
consists in taking the immediate alternative for the worker who may be red, which may be
the unemployment benet or the weighted average of the wage and unemployment benet.
This approach is thus mainly based on the third motivation of e¢ ciency wages. However,
Danthine and Kuman ([39]) argue that this denition of the external wage reference is unable
to explain why wage rigidities generate unemployment, since the reference wage is correlated
with labour demand. As a consequence, the reference wage can be put by the government at a
su¢ ciently low level such that the labour market clears. Hence, we propose a denition of the
reference wage that is independent from the actual market wage or unemployment allowance. A
reference wage based on the gift exchange hypothesis is in line with this critique: the reference
wage is the wage that would apply if all the workers behaved selshly, i.e. the market-clearing
wage4. Or in other words, we dene the reference wage in a normative out-of-the-box way as
the worst-case scenario for the workers. This denition of the outside option also avoids the
4This also implies that the tax rate set by the government equals zero as there are no unemployed people who
need an unemployment benet.
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contradiction of a government able to do the rst-best chooses for the second-best options. A
purely redistributing government is no longer able to remedy any unemployment occurrence by
setting the unemployment benet low enough to ensure that everybody is willing to work. The
use of e¢ ciency wages to introduce the social risk of unemployment instead of the mechanism
of wage bargaining between employers and trade unions (eg. Lejour and Verbon ([78]) and
Leite-Montero et al. ([77])), also resides in the same reason since the government (or median
voter) that anticipates the behaviour of the private economic agents (sequential game), could
also have restored the rst best equilibrium in this case, e.g. by deciding a su¢ ciently low
unemployment benet in order to restore full employment.
4.3 A government facing an equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤
The presence of a redistributing government constitutes the third deviation from the rst-best
situation. She compensates one market distortion (unemployment) by granting benets to the
unemployed. In order to do so, she has to raise taxes which creates additional distortions in the
economy. We assume that the government only raises taxes on labour, not on capital. In most
EU countries the tax base consists primarily of immobile production factors, labour in the rst
place. Mobile factors are largely exempted from taxation, either because of tax competition or
because of economic e¢ ciency reasons. E.g. Lindert ([82]) argues that the di¤erence between
the welfare state in Europe and the US is not matched by di¤erences in economic e¢ ciency
because the structure of taxation in Europe is less distortionary, considering the greater share
of labour taxation and consumption taxes in the European government revenue.
The amount of taxes and redistribution is determined by maximising an Atkinson abbrevi-
ated social welfare function
R
x1 e
1 e f(x)dx, when e 6= 1 and
R
log(x)f(x)dx when e = 1. f(x)
represents the probability density function of (real) incomes x in society and 0  e is the in-
equality aversion parameter. This formulation has many desirable characteristics. The utility
of each individual x
1 e
1 e is symmetric (anonymity) and only depends on the income of that
individual, thereby asserting the self-interest of people. This average utility expression for the
social welfare also encompasses the principle of transfers (negative second order derivative) and
the principle of diminishing transfers (positive third order derivative): a xed income transfer
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from a poor person to a rich person decreases the social welfare and this decrease is stronger
the lower the income of both persons is. Lastly this representation of social welfare also has the
property of equiproportionate income growth neutrality as the coe¢ cient of relative inequality
aversion (the elasticity of marginal utility) is constant.
To see that the Atkinson abbreviated social welfare function includes an equity-e¢ ciency
trade-o¤, it su¢ ces to rewrite it in terms of the equally distributed equivalent income , which is
dened as the income that, if distributed equally, would generate the same welfare as the existing
income distribution ( 
1 e
1 e =
R
x1 e
1 e f(x)dx)
5. Since the Atkinson index of relative inequality is
dened as the fraction of income that could be sacriced with no loss of welfare if all income
was distributed equally (I(e) = 1   ), the Atkinson abbreviated social welfare function can
be rewritten as 11 e((1  I))1 e if e 6= 1 and log((1  I)) otherwise. More e¢ ciency (average
) increases the social welfare as more equity does (inequality index I(e)). Based on this new
formulation of the Atkinson abbreviated social welfare function, it is straightforward to show
that the elasticity of social welfare with respect to equity equals the elasticity of social welfare
with respect to e¢ ciency and that both are equal to 1  e.
Although this concept of social welfare is analytically more complex than an ad hoc social
welfare function (e.g. SW = U(unemployed)+(1 )U(employed)), we prefer this formulation
because it has the main advantage of allowing all possible attitudes towards inequality. If e = 0
the government behaves Benthamite and only wants to maximize total sum of (indirect) utilities
of its citizens. If, on the other hand, e = 1 the Rawslian government only cares for the well-
being of the poorest person of society and devotes no attention at all to e¢ ciency. It also avoids
the use of more than one inequality aversion parameter as soon as there are more than two
subgroups in society.
In our model there are three individual sources of (real) income: labour income w(1 z)P ,
unemployment benets bP and capital rewards
CR
P
6. We assume that the capital rewards are
evenly distributed between each individual whether he or she is employed or unemployed. This
simplies the interpretation of the governmental choice since we dont have to introduce a third
5 If e = 1, this becomes ln() =
R
log(x)f(x)dx.
6We divided the nominal incomes (net wage w(1  z), unemployment benet b and capital reward CR) each
time by the price index P to express everything in real terms. Note that labourers dont receive their gross wage
but only their wage net of taxes, hence w(1  z).
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class of people, namely the capital owners who lead a life of leisure and whose income solely rely
on some xed exogenous parameters on which the government has no inuence7. As it turns
out, the expression for the capital rewards that are evenly distributed among the labour force in
a Dixit-Stiglitz setting with e¢ ciency wages is also a constant. This further simplies the model
by reducing the capital rewards to a scaling factor in the indirect utility of the employed and
the unemployed. Taking these income assumptions into account, we can restate the Atkinson
social welfare as:
SW =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1
1  e
"
2X
i=1
f(xi)x
1 e
i
#
=
1
1  e

(1  u)(w(1  z) + CR
P
)1 e + u(
b+ CR
P
)1 e

for (e 6= 1)
2X
i=1
f(xi) log(xi) = (1  u) log(w(1  z) + CR
P
) + u log(
b+ CR
P
) for (e = 1).
(4.2)
In this denition u stands for the unemployment rate. If e = 1 the government acts in a
Rawslian way and wants to maximize the income of the poorest individual, in casu the income
of the unemployed SW = (b+CR)P . A survey of empirical methods to evaluate the inequality
aversion parameter empirically (see Stern [122] and Lambert [74]) reveals a wide range of
possible values ranging between almost 0 and 10.
In the next chapter we start with the derivation of a model in an autarkic situation based
on these assumptions. While this set-up is not very interesting, it enables us to form an
analytical workable benchmark for the following chapters. In chapter 6 we introduce social
security competition when there is no capital mobility, followed by a model under capital
mobility in chapter 7. In this chapter we also derive the locational equilibria in this specic New
Economic Geography framework with endogenous unemployment. We look at social security
competition in an internal and in a CP-equilibrium.
7Except for the evident inuence via the price index.
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Chapter 5
Autarkic situation
5.1 Consumerschoice
The region is endowed with a xed number of consumers L and a xed amount of capital K.
Each consumer j consumes an amount cij (at the price pi) of a good i. The preferences of
these consumers exhibit varietas delectat and are represented by maximising the following CES
utility function:
Uj = (
Z n
0
c
 1

ij di)

 1 . (5.1)
The integral runs over the exogenously given number of produced goods (n in total) and (> 1)
represents the elasticity of substitution between goods which is equal for all goods. Consumers
are constrained by their budget. They cannot spend more on goods as their total income which
equals their expenditures ej as there are no savings in our static model:Z n
0
picijdi = ej . (5.2)
Standard utility maximisation and aggregating the individual demand of all consumers lead to
the following result for the market demand of a variety i:
ci = (
pi
P
) (
E
P
). (5.3)
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where E =
PL
j=0 ej stands for the total expenditures of the region and P = (
R n
0 p
1 
i di)
1
1  is
the price index. Hence EP is the regional real income. The consumption of a good i decreases
as the price of that good increases ( @ci@pi < 0) as could be expected. It also increases as the real
regional income increases.
Indirect utility Vj of a consumer j is determined by substituting cij in 5.1 with (
pi
P )
 ( ejP ):
Vj =
ej
P
. (5.4)
Observe that P is a perfect price index in that real income dened with P is a measure of
(indirect) utility.
5.2 Producerschoice
Each manufacturer i produces an amount xi of only one good using a xed amount of capital
(k units) and a variable amount of labour li. The production function of a rm is given by:
xi = a(wi)li. (5.5)
Note that the productivity parameter a(wi) depends on the wage (see section 5.3.1). Given the
wage cost wi and capital cost i, the total cost function TCi is equal to:
TCi = ki + liwi. (5.6)
Under the Chamberlinian large group assumption prot maximisation with respect to the price
leads to the typical Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competitive price that is a xed mark-up over
marginal labour costs wia(wi) :
pi =

   1
wi
a(wi)
. (5.7)
The mark-up over the marginal labour costs of the price,  1 decreases when the elasticity
of substitution  increases. When markets are perfectly competitively ( = 1), price equals
marginal cost and the producers surplus is minimal.
We will show in the following section that the labour remuneration is independent from
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rm-specic parameters. This result allows us to determine in an easy way the price index P ,
the equilibrium rm scale xeq and the reward to capital i. Integrating expression 5.7 over all
varieties leads to the following expression for the price index:
P = n
1
1 

   1
w
a(w)
. (5.8)
Because there is free entry and exit of rms the zero-prot condition (p  ci  w  li   k  i = 0)
has to hold. As a consequence, the sales S of a rm that are equal to pc can be written 
using expression 5.3 and 5.8 as En .
Using the market clearing condition (consumption ci equals production xi) and expression
5.5 the zero-prot condition can be written as:
(p  w
a(w)
)  xi   k  i 5:7= p  x

  k  i = 0. (5.9)
Based on this expression, we can easily derive the equilibrium rm scale xeq and the reward
to capital i. Re-using expression 5.7 in 5.9 gives the following result for the equilibrium rm
scale xeq:
xeq = (   1) kw
a(w)
. (5.10)
Firms become bigger as the xed cost reward increases relative to the variable cost reward and
become smaller when the operating prot margin decreases. By realizing that px equals the
sales of a rm S = En in the expression 5.9, the capital reward i is given by:
i =  =
E
nk
. (5.11)
The capital reward depends inversely on the elasticity of substitution  which should come as
no surprise since the producers surplus diminishes when markets become more competitive.
Secondly, since the right-hand side of equation 5.11 is independent of i, the left hand side is also
independent of i: all rms pay the same capital reward. The capital reward in our economy is
thus determined as the Ricardian surplus of a typical variety.
Since each rm utilizes k units of capital, the total capital reward TCR of all rms is equal
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to TCR = nk = E . Dividing the TCR by the total number of inhabitants L in the region,
gives us the constant capital income CR of each citizen in terms of :
CR =
E
L
. (5.12)
5.3 Labour markets
5.3.1 Determination of the wage
A rm i determines the wage w employees receive by maximising their prot:
max
w
(pi  xi   wi  li   k  i). (5.13)
With the help of the envelop theorem ( @x@w = 0
1), the rst order condition leads to the well
known Solow condition:
wi
@a(wi)
@wi
a(wi)
= 1. (5.14)
This condition states that the elasticity of the e¢ ciency function with respect to the wage
equals one. The rm keeps hiring additional people as long as the wage per unit of e¤ort is
falling.
The nal expression for the employees remuneration is given by combining expression 5.14
and the Summers expression for the e¢ ciency wage a(w) = (w(1  z)  wR), with 0 <  < 1.
We nd that the paid wage increases when the reference wage wR or the e¤ect of higher wages
on the productivity increases ():
wi(z) = w(z) =
wR
(1  )(1  z) . (5.15)
Two interesting conclusions can be formed based on this reward to labour expression. First,
the labourersremuneration is independent of rm-specic parameters. As a consequence all
northern rms behave identically. They pay the same rewards to the factors of production,
produce at the same price and sell the same quantities. Secondly, while the gross wage increases
1Since the capital reward is the Ricardian surplus, the envelop theorem also applies to the capital reward.
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when the tax on labour increases, the net wage does not. Any tax rise is fully passed through
in price increases as the taxation needed for the social security benets doesnt a¤ect the e¤ort
delivered by the labourers.
Substituting the optimal wage 5.15 set by the rms in the Summersexpression of e¢ ciency
wages lead to the optimal level of e¤ort procured by the workers:
aopt = wR(

1   )
 . (5.16)
5.3.2 Unemployment
We are now able to determine the level of unemployment in the region. Substituting expression
5.7 and 5.5 in the zero prot condition (p  xi w  li  k  i = 0) lets us determine the amount
of labour each rm employs:
li = l =
(   1)k
w
. (5.17)
Each rm recruits less people when the wages rise. Since the capital reward 5.11 is constant
in the autarkic case, the total amount of wages paid by all rms to their employees
Pn
i=1 lw is
also invariable. This means that, as could be expected, the tax set by a government does not
have any inuence on the tax base.
Since in our model all consumers belong to the active population, we can use expression
5.17 to derive an expression for the unemployment level u(z):
u(z) = 1  nl
L
5:17
= 1  n(   1)k
Lw
5:15;5:11
= = 1  (   1)E(1  )(1  z)
LwR
. (5.18)
5.3.3 Reference wage
The reference wage is dened as the wage that would apply if all the workers behaved selshly,
i.e. the market-clearing wage. At this wage level, there is no unemployment (nl = L) and the
government does not have to raise any taxes (z = 0). Using expressions 5.17 and 5.11, this
denition leads to the following expression:
wR =
(   1)

E
L
. (5.19)
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The reference wage increases as the GDP per person rises but decreases when people appreciate
varieties less. Substituting 5.19 in the expression 5.18, greatly simplies the unemployment level
in our model:
u(z) = 1  (1  )(1  z) =  + (1  )  z. (5.20)
A simple look at this expression reveals that the unemployment increases when taxes increase
and when people are less willing to put more e¤ort into their work given a certain wage level.
5.4 Government
5.4.1 Price index and unemployment benet in function of taxes
Our model is static and as a consequence, the government has to run a balanced budget. The
total amount of taxes raised on the labour income (nlwz) must be equal to the total amount
of benets handed out to the unemployed ((L   nl)b). We use this balanced budget to write
the unemployment benet in terms of the tax rate set by the government:
b(z) =
1  u(z)
u(z)
w(z)  z 5:20;5:15= wR  z
 + (1  )  z . (5.21)
In the simple autarkic model, the unemployment benet always increases when the tax rate
increases. The unemployment benet is also automatically lower than the reference wage and
the net wage in the autarkic case. More formally the income of an inactive person is given by:
b+ CR
5:21;5:12;5:19
=
   (1  )(1  z)
(1  (1  )(1  z))
E
L
(5.22)
Since the average income of a citizen is given by EL we conclude that an inactive person has
a lower than average income2. We also see that, contrary to the labourer whose income was
independent from the tax rate, the income of an inactive person rises from CR when z = 0
to the average income for z = 1. This also validates our previous statement that Rawslian
governments only care for the welfare of the unemployed. They always have the lowest income.
The price index 5.8 can be written in function of the tax rate with the help of 5.7 and 5.15:
2At the same time a labourer gets a higher than average income: wR
1  + CR
5:19;5:12
=  
(1 )
E
L
, since  > .
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P (z) = n
1
1 

   1
wR
aopt  (1  z)  (1  ) . (5.23)
The derivative of the price index with respect to the tax rate is positive as could be readily
veried using 5.23. Higher tax rates mean higher nominal wages which cause a price rice and
hence a higher price index. We will use this result later on.
5.4.2 Benthamite case (e = 0)
When the government only has e¢ ciency considerations, the social welfare the government
wants to maximize is (see 4.2):
SW (e = 0) = (1  u(z))  w(z)  (1  z) + CR
P (z)
+ u(z)  (b(z) + CR
P (z)
). (5.24)
Using the balanced budget constraint, the wage denition 5.15 and unemployment denition
5.20, this can be simplied to:
SW (e = 0) =
CR+ wR
P (z)
. (5.25)
The rst order derivative of (5.25) with respect to z equals:
dSW (e = 0)
dz
=
 (CR+ wR)
(P (z))2
n
1
1     wR
(   1)  (1  )  aopt
1
(1  z)2 , (5.26)
which is clearly always negative because 0 <  < 1 and  > 1. Since the only way in which
the utilitarian government can exert an inuence on the social welfare is via the price index
and since the e¤ect of a tax raise on the price index is negative, a Benthamite government will
always choose for the corner solution of a zero tax rate. As a consequence there will be no
unemployment benet while wages are equal to wR1  and unemployment becomes constant at
the level .
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5.4.3 Rawslian case (e =1)
The other extreme is the situation of a Rawslian government. Now the government is only
concerned with the welfare of the poorest, in casu the unemployed:
SW (e =1) = b(z) + CR
P (z)
. (5.27)
The optimal tax rate for the government in this case will depend on a comparative assessment
between the positive e¤ect a tax raise has on the unemployment benet and the negative e¤ect
the same tax increase has on the purchasing power of the unemployed person. Both e¤ects are
easily determined via dSWdz =
dSW
dz

P=cst
+ dSWdz

b=cst
, where the rst term on the right-hand
side of the equation represents the benet e¤ect and the second term the price e¤ect. Simple
calculus leads to the following expressions for these e¤ects:
dSW
dz

P=cst
= benet e¤ect =
wR
( + (1  )z)2  P (z) (5.28a)
dSW
dz

b=cst
= price e¤ect =
 (b(z) + CR)
(1  z)  P (z) . (5.29)
The rst order derivative dSWdz =
dSW
dz

P=cst
+ dSWdz

b=cst
is equal to zero in the optimum. This
leads to a quadratic equation in z of which the (largest) root is given by3:
zopt =
   (wR + (1  )  CR) +
p
  wR  (wR + (1  )  CR)
(1  )  (wR + (1  )  CR) . (5.30)
Simplifying this expression by substituting the reference wage wR by its denition 5.19 and
the constant capital income of each individual CR by 5.12, shows that the corner solution of
a zero tax rate only becomes possible if  >    1. Or in other words, it becomes more likely
for a Rawslian government to opt for a zero tax rate the higher the productivity enhancing
e¤ect of higher wages becomes or the stronger people prefer variety. The reason for this lies in
a dominant price e¤ect. For these extreme values of  and  the price index approaches zero
which makes everybody almost equally rich. As a result the government no longer sees the need
3The smallest root is always negative.
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to redistribute. One can understand this more intuitively by realizing that these extreme values
for  and  coincide with a very high value for the capital reward per capita (CR > WR ).
This high value in e¤ect means that all people become (in the limit) equally rich. In this case,
governments should focus on the real income of people and the best way to maximize the real
income of their citizens is by setting taxes equal to zero.
5.4.4 General case
We already know that on the one hand, a utilitarian government will choose for a zero tax rate
since any tax increase will reduce the e¢ ciency of the economy. On the other hand a Rawslian
government normally chooses for a positive tax rate as she is only concerned in the welfare
of the unemployed person. In this subsection we generalize these conclusions by considering
the general social welfare function. An inspection of 4.2 reveals that besides the e¤ect a tax
increase has on the purchasing power (the price e¤ect) and the benets (benet e¤ect), there
is now also a third e¤ect, namely the unemployment e¤ect. Any tax increase will increase the
unemployment and hence reduce the e¢ ciency of the economy. Taking the total rst order
derivative of the general social welfare function with respect to the tax rate z and keeping
the relevant variables constant (dSWdz =
dSW
dz

P;u=cst
+ dSWdz

b;u=cst
+ dSWdz

b;P=cst
) gives the
expressions for the three e¤ects:
dSW
dz

b;u=cst
= price e¤ect =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
 1
1  z (e = 1)
 (P (z))e 1
1  z

(1  )  (1  z)  ( wR
1   + CR)
1 e+
( + z  (1  ))  (b(z) + CR)1 e (e 6= 1)
(5.31)
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dSW
dz

P;u=cst
= benet e¤ect =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
  wR
(b(z) + CR)  u(z) (e = 1)
wR  
u(z)  P (z)  (
b(z) + CR
P (z)
) e (e 6= 1)
(5.32)
dSW
dz

b;P=cst
= unemployment e¤ect =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1  )  log( b(z) + CRwR
1   + CR
(e = 1)
1  
1  e 
1
(P (z))1 e


(b(z) + CR)1 e   ( wR
1   + CR)
1 e

(e 6= 1).
(5.33)
The sign of these e¤ects in the general case are unambiguously determined. The price e¤ect
and the unemployment e¤ect4 are always negative, while the benet e¤ect is always positive.
If we equate the sum of these three e¤ects to zero, we would be able to derive an expression
for the optimal tax rate. Unfortunately this is not analytically possible in the general case and
therefore, we rely on simulations.
The parameters in this simulation are calibrated in such a way that comparability between
the simple autarkic model and the subsequent more complicated models is facilitated. It also
serves intuition. We set the non-crucial parameters L = n = k equal to 1 and take the value
0.6 for : Calibration in the two-country case made us choose this relatively high value for
the leap-frogging e¤ect compared to the value Summers suggest ([126]) since lower values of
 (e.g. 0.1) lead in the two-country simulations to values of the unemployment benet which
were signicantly higher than the net wage. We wanted to exclude these cases from our model.
The elasticity of substitution is taken to be equal to 2.5. An alteration of these parameters will
shift the curves but will not change the nature of the solutions.
As a rst step we determine the optimal tax rate in function of the inequality aversion e.
4This can be seen by realizing that the net wage w(1   z) = wR
1  always exceeds the unemployment benet
b(z):
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Figure 5-1: Elasticities of the real income of the employed, unemployed and unemployment rate
with respect to the tax rate.
This is represented in graph ??. We clearly see that as governments take greater care for the
worse o¤persons in society, the tax rate increases. Only for low values of the inequality aversion
parameter, the strongly utilitarian inclined government chooses not to levy any taxes. Table
5-2 gives some tax rates in function of the inequality aversion parameter e.
This result is general and can be understood be looking at a positive analysis of the e¤ects
of a tax change on the constituents of the social welfare function. In gure 5-1 we plot the
elasticities of the real income of the unemployed (green dotted line), of the employed (full
red line) and of the unemployment rate (blue dotted line) with respect to the tax rate. It is
clear from this graph that a tax increase results in a positive e¤ect on the real income of the
unemployed while the e¤ect on the real income of the employed is negative. The unemployment
rate elasticity with respect to the tax rate is positive but small in absolute terms. When the
inequality aversion increases, governments care more for the unemployed in the society. Since
the weighting factor of their real income in the social welfare function (the unemployment rate)
increases when the tax rate increases and since the elasticity of their real income with respect
to the tax rate is positive, governments will choose for higher tax rates.
In our set-up the government with an inequality aversion parameter larger than 10 mimics
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Figure 5-2: Optimal tax rate in function of inequality aversion e.
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Figure 5-3: Unemployment rate u (full line) and the replacement ratio bw(1 z) (dotted line) in
the optimum.
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e 0 1 2 3 5 10 15 25 1
zopt 0 0 0.107 0.17 0.19 0.207 0.212 0.215 0.221
Table 5.1: Optimal tax rates in function of inequality aversion
the Rawslian behaviour, formally dened at e =1. We also plot two important economic vari-
ables, the unemployment rate u and the replacement ratio bw(1 z) in the optimum for di¤erent
values of the inequality aversion e. This is done in gure 5-3 where the left Y-axis gives the
values for the unemployment rate and the right Y-axis measures the replacement ratio. We
see that the unemployment rate is always high but increases steadily the more the government
behaves in a Rawslian way. At the same time, the replacement ratio increases. Note however
that this ratio remains quite small even for very high values of the inequality aversion. This
can be explained by the minimal tax base remaining for Rawslian-like governments. Too much
people need benet funded by taxes from too few labourers remaining. It also stresses the
importance of the price e¤ect in the governments choice of the optimal tax rate. High values
for the unemployment benet lead to high values of the price index which causes in time a drop
in the real income (= indirect utility) for the unemployed.
When  is increased in the simulation, the optimal autarkic tax rates will also increase (e.g.
zopt(e = 1) = 0:346 at  = 5 and zopt(e = 1) = 0:384 at  = 8). An increase in  will
increase the competition on the goods markets and hence, make the economy more e¢ cient
(a higher tax base). The income of the unemployed and the employed increases by the same
amount (via the reference wage wR). So the inequality index does not change. But given her
xed equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤, the government decides to raise her taxes. A rising elasticity
of substitution  also means that the capital reward CR given by 5.12 decreases. The share
of capital income in the total income of an average resident EL becomes less important which
makes deviations in the labour income (or unemployment benet) more important.
The total expenditures level E and the number of inhabitants L in a region dont have any
inuence on the optimal tax rate. Both parameters only appear combined (as E=L) in the
expression for the reference wage 5.19 and the capital reward 5.12 and hence dont inuence
the unemployment benet or the net wage di¤erently5. They only a¤ect the price index and the
5Recall that a change in the reference wage has the same impact on the unemployment benet b and the wage
w.
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average capital reward and a change in these can only lead to equiproportional changes in the
social welfare function which dont a¤ect the optimal choice of the tax rate (the SW -function
only shifts up- or downwards) . On the other hand, a raise in the number of rms n and the
units of capital required as a xed cost k has a positive impact on the chosen tax rate. The
reason for this lies in the combination of the decrease in the average capital reward and the
increase (for n) or the status quo (for k) of the price index. The other constituents of the social
welfare function, namely the unemployment benet and the unemployment rate are invariant
to a change of these two parameters as can be easily seen from 5.20 and 5.21. This causes a
non-homothetic shift of the social welfare function. Otherwise said, the real increase of the
indirect utility due to an increase of n or k is less strong for the unemployed than the employed
and as a result of this, the government raises her taxes. Since this divergent evolution of the
relative utility between the unemployed and the employed can only occur through the average
capital reward and we dont focus on this constant term, we will assume in the subsequent
chapters that the values of the parameters remain constant at L = n = k = E = 1:
5.5 Conclusion
The autarkic model in this chapter highlighted the underlying mechanisms present in our set-
up. Governments equilibrate three mechanisms in choosing their optimal tax rate. Tax rate
increases positively a¤ect the unemployment benet (benet e¤ect) but they have also two
negative e¤ects on the welfare of their residents. It not only increases the unemployment rate
(unemployment e¤ect) which reduces the tax base but it also increases the price index (price
index e¤ect). This last e¤ect will reduce the indirect utility for labourers and non-labourers by
reducing their purchasing power.
Secondly, we also illustrated the e¤ect of the inequality aversion on the chosen tax rate. The
more government value equity, the more they shift from Benthamite to Rawslian behaviour,
the higher the optimal tax rate becomes. Since government in our general framework care for
the indirect utility and hence also have to consider the price index e¤ect, they will not opt for
maximal tax rates even if they are Rawslian. Replacement ratios remain limited to maximal
15%. Under some extreme conditions it is even possible that government with e =1 still opt
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for a Benthamite zero tax rate.
Thirdly we also investigated the role of some parameters on the optimal tax rate. For
instance, higher values for the elasticity of substitution  lead to higher chosen tax rates.
Markets become more e¢ cient but the equity of society does not change. Hence, government
facing a given equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ will opt for higher tax rates in this situation.
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Chapter 6
Two-country case without capital
mobility
6.1 Consumerschoice
There are two regions, called the north and the south. We assume that both regions are
symmetric in terms of consumers tastes, technology, openness to trade and factor supplies.
The northern region is endowed with a xed number of consumers LN , the south has LS
inhabitants. We also assume that the inhabitants of the northern region have an endowment
of KN units of capital while the south has KS units of capital at its disposal. The worldwide
capital endowment is denoted as KW = KN +KS . We will often work with the capital shares
instead of simple endowments: sK = K
N
KW
and 1   sK = KSKW . For reasons of expositional
simplicity, we will limit the exposition to the northern region.
The constrained optimisation problem for the northern consumer j with an expenditure
level ej who consumes an amount cij (at the price pi) of a good i is now equal to:
Uj = (
Z n+n
0
c
 1

ij di)

 1 (6.1)
s.t.
Z n+n
0
picijdi = ej . (6.2)
The integral runs over the exogenously given number of produced goods (n northern goods and
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n southern varieties summing up to nW ).
Standard utility maximisation and aggregating the individual demand of all consumers lead
to the following result for the northern market demand of a variety i:
ci = (
pi
P
) (
EN
P
). (6.3)
where EN =
PLN
j=1 ej
1stands for the total northern expenditures and P = (
R n+n
0 p
1 
i di)
1
1 
is the northern price index2. The consumption of a good i decreases as the price of that good
increases ( @ci@pi < 0) as could be expected
3. It also increases when the income of the region
increases.
Indirect utility Vj of a consumer j is determined by substituting cij in (5.1) with (
pi
P )
 ( ejP ):
Vj =
ej
P
. (6.4)
Observe that P is a perfect price index in that real income dened with P is a measure of
(indirect) utility.
6.2 Producerschoice
6.2.1 Prices
The production function xi and the total cost function TCi of a northern manufacturer i are,
just as was the case in autarky given, by:
xi = a(wi)li (6.5)
TCi = ki + liwi. (6.6)
1For the south we have a similar expression ES =
PLS
j=1 ej . The sum of the northern and southern expendi-
tures, the world expenditures is denoted as EW .
2The southern price index is equal to: P  = (
R n+n
0
p1 i di)
1
1  .
3 dcij
dpi
= ej  p  1i  P 1  (  + (   1)  ( piP )1 )
This is negative i¤ ( pi
P
)1  < 
 1 , which is always the case.
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Contrary to the autarkic case, a rm now sells in two regions. The export to the southern region
is inhibited by iceberg trade costs  (> 1). The total production of a rm xi is in equilibrium,
when the markets clear, equal to the sum of the consumption of the good i in the north ciN
and the consumption of the good in the south ciS multiplied by the trade costs:
xi = ciN +   ciS . (6.7)
Under the Chamberlinian large group assumption prot maximisation with respect to the price
that the northern rm applies in the north piN and in the south piS , leads to the typical Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competitive price that is a xed mark-up over marginal labour costs:
piN =

   1
wi
a(wi)
, (6.8)
piS =

   1
wi
a(wi)
 = piN . (6.9)
Comparing 6.8 and 6.9, it is clear that rms nd it optimal to engage in mill pricing. The full
shipping costs to the southern region are passed on to the southern consumers.
We will see in paragraph 6.3.1 that, similar to the case in autarky, the labourers remu-
neration is independent of rm-specic parameters4. This means that prices (a xed mark-up
over marginal labour costs) and the consumption of a certain variety ci are non-specic to rm
characteristics (albeit region-specic). All northern varieties are hence produced in the same
amounts and also sold in the same amounts on each market. This allows us in the subsequent
elaboration of the model to introduce four kindsof goods: a northernvariety sold in the
north, a northern variety sold in the south, a southern variety sold in the south and a south-
ern variety sold in the north. The prices and amounts consumed of these types of goods are
respectively given by:
pNN =

   1
w
a(w)
; cNN = (
pNN
P
) 
EN
P
; (6.10)
pNS =

   1
w
a(w)
 ; cNS = (
pNS
P 
) 
ES
P 
; (6.11)
4The optimised labour productivity aopt will also become independent from the wage w.
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pSS =

   1
w
a(w)
; cSS = (
pSS
P 
) 
ES
P 
; (6.12)
pSN =

   1
w
a(w)
 ; cSN = (
pSN
P
) 
EN
P
. (6.13)
6.2.2 Price indices
Based on the previous four expressions for the prices, we can work out the northern and southern
price index as follows:
P = 
w
a
(sn + (1  sn))
1
1  = 
w
a

1
1  (6.14)
P  = 
w
a
((1  sn) + sn)
1
1  = 
w
a
()
1
1  . (6.15)
We grouped the constant parameters in  =  1  (nW )
1
1  . We also redened the number of
rms in each region (n and n) in terms of shares: sn = nnW is the share of northern rms, 1 sn
the share of the southern rms. Note that in a two-country model without capital mobility
the share of capital employed in the northern region sn, is per denition equal to the initial
endowment of capital sK .  = 1  represents the well-known freeness of trade which can
also be described as the economic distance between the two regions. That is, the freeness of
trade rises from  = 0, with innite trade costs, to  = 1, with zero trade costs. In this way we
dened two important variables in our model in a compact space. This is handy for inspection
of the expressions and also makes the numerical simulations later on more reliable. The last,
yet to explain variable is , which is equal to the northern relative production costs raised to the
power (1   ): ( w=a(w)w=a(w))1 . When the north has lower (higher) production costs than the
south,  is larger (smaller) than 1. So  can serve as a measure of the relative competitiveness
of the northern region versus the southern region and varies in principle between 0 and 1.
By writing the price indices in function of  and , we can see that each price index is
composed of a part stemming from the sales of the domestic rms and a part stemming from
imports, weighted by the economic distance between the two regions , the relative competi-
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tiveness  or both.
6.2.3 Sales and the equilibrium rm scale
In a next step we determine the sales of a rm in function of the share of expenditures sE . We
will use this later on when we focus on the capital reward. The total sales of a northern rm
S equal the sum of his sales in the north (pNN  cNN ) and the sales in the south (pNS  cNS).
This can under the market clearing condition be written as:
S = pNN  cNN + pNS  cNS = pNN  (cNN + cNS) = pNN  x. (6.16)
Using the denition of the consumption and prices of northern goods sold in the north 6.10 and
the south 6.11, we can rewrite the northern sales as:
S =

   1
w
a
EW (
(  1
w
a )
 sE
P 1 
+ (1  sE)
(  1
w
a )
 
(P )1 
).
In this expression we used the new notation sE that stands for the share of expenditures which
is also equal to E
EW
.Substituting the northern and southern price indices with the appropriate
expressions 6.14 and 6.15 allows for the following simplication of the sales in terms of the share
of expenditures:
S =
EW
nW


sE

+
(1  sE)


=
EW
nW
B. (6.17)
The southern sales S are similarly derived:
S =
EW
nW

sE

+
(1  sE)


=
EW
nW
B. (6.18)
By realizing that sn  B + (1   sn)  B = 1, it is easy to interpret the Bs in 6.17 and 6.18
as the biases in sales, as the extent to which the sales of a variety exceeds the world average
per variety sales. This is a familiar way of writing sales in a NEG-framework. A closer look at
6.17 and 6.18 shows that a price increase always reduces the sales of a rm ( @S@pNN < 0) which
should come as no surprise since the elasticity of substitution (> 1) equals the elasticity of
demand in a Dixit-Stiglitz framework. Secondly, it is easy to derive that an increase of the
share of expenditures in the home country of the rm always increases the sales of the rm
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( @S@sE > 0, 1 > 
2, which always holds5).
To determine the equilibrium rm scale, we apply the zero-prot condition which equates
the operating prot to the total capital reward. The operating prot of a northern rm equals
S w  l, which can be written as pNN x  wa x = pNN  x using 6.5 and 6.10. As a consequence
the equilibrium rm scale of a (northern) rm is equal to:
xeq =
(   1) k
w
a
. (6.19)
Firms become bigger as the xed cost reward increases relative to the variable cost reward and
becomes smaller when the operating prot margin decreases. This mimics the autarkic case
result.
6.2.4 Capital reward
Since physical capital is only used in the xed cost component of industrial production, the
reward to capital is the Ricardian surplus of a typical variety, that is, the operating prot of a
typical variety divided by the units of capital k used to produce one di¤erentiated good6. We
get the following expressions for the capital reward of the north  and the south :
 = 

sE

+
(1  sE)


= B; (6.20)
 = 

sE

+
(1  sE)


= B. (6.21)
Due to the symmetry of our model (k = k), the regrouping of a string of constant parameters,
 = E
W
knW ; is the same for both regions. Since 0 < sn < 1 and  > 0,  and 
 will always be
positive. This lets us conclude that, if sE lies between 0 and 1 (as it will), both the prot in
the north and in the south are positive. The positivity of both expressions is important for the
numerical simulations later on.
5 @S
@sE
= E
W
nW

1

  


is positive if and only if 1

> 
 , which can be rewritten using the denition of  and
 as 1  sn > (1  sn)2.
6The reward to capital would be bid up to the point where it equalled the operating prot as noticed by
Baldwin et. al.([10]).
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6.3 Labour markets
6.3.1 Determination of the wage
A rm i determines the wage wi employees receive by maximising their prot:
max
wi
(piN  ciN + piS  ciS   wi  li   k  i). (6.22)
With the help of the envelop theorem ( @x@w = 0), the rst order condition leads to the well known
Solow condition that is exactly equal to the autarkic case:
wi
@a(wi)
@wi
a(wi)
= 1. (6.23)
This condition states that the elasticity of the e¢ ciency function with respect to the wage equals
one. The rm keeps hiring additional people as long as the wage per unit of e¤ort is falling.
Just as in the autarkic case, we nd the nal expression for the employees remuneration by
substituting the expression of Summers for the e¢ ciency wage a(w) = (w(1   z)   wR) in
expression 6.23:
wi(z) = w(z) =
wR
(1  )(1  z) . (6.24)
This proves our previous statement that the wages are set rm-independently. As a consequence
all northern rms behave identically and sell the same amount of goods to each market. An
inspection of 6.24 also reveals that, once again, the gross wage increases when the tax on labour
increases but the net wage does not. It also shows that the wage setting is independent from
the foreign tax setting7. The expression for the optimal level of e¤ort procured by the workers
is the same as in the autarkic case:
aopt = wR(

1   )
 . (6.25)
7Under the condition that the northern tax rate does not depend directly on the southern tax rate and vice
versa. We are only considering rst-order e¤ects in the model.
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The symmetry between the two regions entails the identity between the northern e¢ ciency
parameter  and the southern one : Owing to this, the southern equivalents for 6.24 and 6.25
are easily derived to be equal to:
w(z) =
wR
(1  )(1  z) ; a
;opt = (wR)
(

1   )
 . (6.26)
6.3.2 Unemployment
We are now able to determine the level of unemployment in the region. Substituting expression
6.10 and 6.5 in the zero prot condition (pNN  x   w  l   k   = 0), lets us determine the
amount of labour each rm employs:
l =
(   1)k
w
. (6.27)
Each rm recruits less people when the wages rise. Although this expression is identical to the
autarkic one, there is a big di¤erence between the two frameworks. While in the autarkic case
the total amount of wages paid by all rms to their employees
Pn
i=1 lw is constant, this is no
longer the case in the two-country case. Tax changes will change the capital reward and as a
consequence inuence the tax base.
From expression (6.27) it is only a small step to the unemployment level u(z):
u(z; z) = 1  nl
LN
6:27
= 1  n(   1)k(z; z
)
LN  w
6:24;6:20
= 1    sn  (1  z)  (z; z). (6.28)
We grouped all the constant parameters in a new parameter  which is equal to ( 1)(1 )n
W k
LN wR .
Note that this expression for the unemployment 6.28 does not guarantee that the unemployment
rate is always equal to or larger than zero. We will have to impose an additional restriction on
the social welfare optimisation later on in order to ensure meaningful results.
6.3.3 Share of expenditures
The capital reward of a region depends on the expenditure shares of the regions (see 6.20 and
6.21) and the expenditure shares of a region hinge on the capital and labour rewards earned
in the same region. This means that we have to solve this circularity before we can introduce
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a government choosing a tax rate. We do this by nding a closed expression for the share of
expenditures in terms of the tax rates. We start by looking at the total reward TLR stemming
from labour income (employed and unemployed):
TLR = n  l  w  (1  z) + (LN   n  l)  b. (6.29)
Using the same budget balance of the government as in the autarkic case (nlwz = (LN nl)b)
and expression 6.27, expression 6.29 can be written in terms of the capital reward:
TLR = n  l  w = (   1)  k  nW  sn  . (6.30)
People not only earn income from working (or receiving an unemployment benet) but also from
having a certain amount of capital. Just as before we assume that each individual has an equal
share of the total capital income of a region, TCR. However, determining the total capital
reward of a region is a lot trickier in comparison to the autarkic case, since we normally would
have to know where the capital owned by the northern residents is working. The introduction of
supplementary variable8 can be overcome by assuming that a xed amount of (northern) capital
is working in either region. The most logical assumption in the model without capital mobility
would be the case where all northern capital is working in the north (and southern capital in
the south)9. However, we dont opt for this assumption and instead assume, as Martin and
Rogers did in their footloose capital model ([88]), that half of the capital used in each region
belongs to the northern capital owners regardless of sn. This implies at the same time that each
region owns half of the worldwide capital (sK = 12). In this way, the comparability between
the model without capital mobility and with capital mobility is enhanced, while keeping a link
with the existing literature. Under the Martin and Rogers assumption, each unit of capital,
independent of the ownership of it, earns the world average reward to capital ACR . This is
8Namely, the amount of the northern-owned capital that is working in the north. The amount of the northern-
owned capital working in the south would be equal to 1 minus the previous amount.
9Under this assumption the TCR would be equal to sn E
W

B and the share of expenditures would simplify to
sE = snB.
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given by:
ACR =
TCR+ TCR
KW
=
nk + nk
KW
6:20;6:21
= (6.31)
knW(snB + (1  sn)B)
KW
snB+(1 sn)B=1
=
EW
KW
.
Multiplying the average capital reward ACR with the total number of units of capital owned by
the north K gives us the total northern capital reward TCR = sK E
W
 . Given both components
of income (or expenditures) in a region, the share of expenditure is easily derived as:
sE(z; z
) =
TCR+ TLR
EW
=
1
2
+
   1

snB. (6.32)
Substituting B by (6.17) and solving for sE gives a closed-form expression for the northern
share of expenditures:
sE(z; z
) =
(   1)sn+ 12
   (   1)sn(   ) . (6.33)
Note that although we started from a classical footloose capital set-up, we didnt obtain a share
of expenditures that is independent from sn. This result even holds when capital is immobile.
Due to the introduction of endogenous unemployment via e¢ ciency wages we have that 
in the case that capital is mobile  production shifting (sn) leads to expenditure shifting
(sE). This linkage will put the demand-linked circular causality back on-line as we will discuss
in chapter 7. As a nal remark, it is important to realize that the share of expenditures in a
region depends on the tax of the home country but also on the tax rate of the foreign country.
Since the capital reward depends on sE , all the variables depending on the capital reward
such as the unemployment and the unemployment benet also depend on the tax rates of both
countries.
Before we go on and determine the reference wage, we assess the conditions under which
the share of expenditures given by formula 6.33 always lies between 0 and 1. This in order to
make sure that the numerical simulations we will rely on later on dont give unrealistic results.
As it turns out the share of expenditures automatically fulls this restriction. The restriction
sE > 0 can be rewritten using the denition of  (6.14) and (6.9) as follows:
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2s2n + (1  sn)2+ 2(1  sn) + (1  sn)sn(1  2) + 2sn(1  sn) > 0, (6.34)
which always holds because the exogenous parameters sn and  in here have the right sign
restrictions: 0 < sn < 1 and  > 1. The other side of the inequality, sE < 1 can be rewritten as
sn(
1
2   1) < (1  sn)(   12), which under the same parameter restrictions on the exogenous
parameters and given the fact that the denominator of 6.33 is positive (sE > 0) , evidently
holds.
6.3.4 Reference wage
The reference wage is dened as the wage that would apply if all the workers behaved selshly,
i.e. the market-clearing wage. At this wage level, there is no unemployment (nl = LN ; nl =
LS) and the government does not have to raise any taxes (z = 0; z = 0). Given the symmetric
nature of our regions, this means that the share of rms in each region also equals 1/2. Using
expressions 6.27, the northern denition of the reference wage becomes:
wR =
nR(   1)kR
LN
, (6.35)
with nR equal to 1
nW 2 : The capital reward in this benchmark case is given by (6.20). Given the
fact that sn = sK = 12 , the share of expenditures sE in the region is equal to
1
2 which allows us
to rewrite the prot R as . As a result, we can write the reference wage as:
wR =
1
2
nW
LN
(   1)k =    1
2
EW
LN
. (6.36)
Under the additional assumption that LN = LS , the reference wages of both regions are equal.
Just as in the autarkic case, the reference wage increases when the GDP per person rises.
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6.4 Government
6.4.1 Unemployment benet, unemployment rate and price index in func-
tion of taxes
The balanced budget constraint of the government allows us to determine the unemployment
benet in function of the tax rate:
b(z; z) =
1  u(z; z)
u(z; z)
 w(z)  z 6:28;6:24=   sn  wR  (z; z
)  z
(1  )  (1    sn  (z; z)  (1  z)) . (6.37)
Replacing the capital reward in the denominator by  B(z; z) (see 6.20) and using the den-
itions of the parameters  and , we can simplify this expression further as follows:
b(z; z) =
(   1)  EW  wR  sn B(z; z)  z
LN  wR     sn B(z; z)  (1  z)  (   1)  (1  )  EW . (6.38)
In the simple autarkic model, the unemployment benet always increases when the tax rate
increases. The (positive) unemployment benet was also automatically higher than the reference
wage. Contrary to the autarkic case, the complexity of formula 6.38 makes it impossible to
analytically guarantee that the unemployment benet is always lower than the net wage people
receive. This means that we have to impose a second extra restriction on the social welfare
optimisation by the government.
The term B(z; z) in expression 6.38 is equal to its denition given by 6.20 with the share of
expenditures sE substituted by 6.33 and with  and  in this substituted expression replaced
by their denitions 6.14 and 6.15 respectively. This leads to:
B(z; z) =
(z; z)  (1  sn + 2sn(z; z) + (1  sn)(2   1)2)
2+ 2sn((sn   2)+ sn((z; z))2+ (1  sn)(z; z)(1 + (2   1)2))
.
(6.39)
After these substitutions in B(z; z) one still has to substitute the competitiveness (z; z)
with ( w=a(w)w=a(w))
1 , which can be simplied using the wage denitions 6.24 and 6.26 and the
assumption that each region has the same number of inhabitants to (1 z

1 z )
1 .
We can use the above expression 6.39 together with (z; z) =  B(z; z) in 6.28 to derive
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the unemployment rate in function of the optimising variable for the government z:
u(z; z) =
2+ sn(2 + (sn   2)+ 2sn(1 + (z   1))((z; z))2
2(+ sn((sn   2)+ sn  ((z; z))2+ (1  sn)  (z; z)  (1 + (2   1)2)))
+
(1  sn)(2  (1  z))  (z; z)  (1 + (2   1)2))
2(+ sn((sn   2)+ sn  ((z; z))2+ (1  sn)  (z; z)  (1 + (2   1)2)))
(6.40)
Again we still have to substitute (z; z) with (1 z

1 z )
1  which we omitted in order not make
the expression too cumbersome.
The last important determinant of the social welfare yet to express in function of the tax
rates is the price index 6.14, which is done using the denition of the wage 6.26 and of the
competition  that is, again under the same assumptions as above, equal to (1 z

1 z )
1 :
P (z; z) =
wR
(1  )a;opt
((1 z

1 z )
1 sn + (1  sn))
1
1 
(1  z)(1  ) : (6.41)
6.4.2 Benthamite case (e=0)
The government chooses a tax rate by maximising the social welfare function given by 4.2. The
only analytical solvable case is the Benthamite case. For all other attitudes towards inequality,
we have to rely on numerical simulations. Just as in the autarkic model, the social welfare
function for a government with only e¢ ciency considerations is given by:
SW (e = 0) = (1  u(z; z))w(z)  (1  z) + CR
P (z; z)
+ u(z; z)(
b(z; z) + CR
P (z; z)
). (6.42)
Using the balanced budget constraint and the denition of the gross wage 6.24, expression 6.42
can be simplied to:
SW (e = 0) =
(1  u(z; z))w(z) + CR
P (z; z)
. (6.43)
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Substituting the unemployment rate and the gross wage by their denitions 6.28 and 6.24 and
taking the rst order derivative leads to:
@SW (e = 0)
@z
=
snwR
(1  )P (z; z)
@(z; z)
@
@(z; z)
@z
  snwR(z; z
) + CR  (1  )
(1  )(P (z; z))2
@P (z; z)
@z
.
(6.44)
The derivative of the capital reward  = B(z; z) (given by 6.39) with respect to the indicator
of the competitive e¤ect , the derivative of  = ( w=a(w)w=a(w))
1  to the tax rate z and the
derivative of the price index P (z; z) also with respect to z (see 6.41) are respectively given by:
@(z; z)
@
= 
(   sK)s2n(1 + 2) + 2sn(1  sn)+ 2(1  sn)2 + sK(1  2) + sK(1 + 2)2s2n
(+ sn((sn   2)+ sn2+ (1  sn)(1 + (2   1)2)))2
;
(6.45)
@(z; z)
@z
=
1  
1  z ; (6.46)
@P (z; z)
@z
=
snP (z; z
)
(1  z) . (6.47)
Expressions 6.45 and 6.47 are always positive, while the second expression 6.46 is unambiguously
negative. As a consequence, the rst order derivative of the Benthamite social welfare function
6.44 is always negative. The only possible solution in this case is the corner solution of a zero
tax rate as could be expected given the result in the autarkic model.
Note that the fact that 6.45 is positive, also means that in the two-country model without
capital mobility, higher tax rates always lead to lower capital rewards and since the taxable base
nlw can be written as kn( 1) (see 6.27), it also follows that any tax reduction automatically
leads to higher tax revenues under the assumption that only positive values for z are allowed.
6.4.3 General case
Only for the specic case of a utilitarian government we were able to explicitly derive the
optimal tax rate chosen by the government. For all the other cases we rely on simulations.
We will discuss the results of the two-country model without capital mobility in three steps.
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Firstly we will look at the e¤ects which determine the optimal tax rate set by a government
given the foreign tax rate. Secondly we will identify the channels through which a southern
tax rate a¤ects the northern social welfare and vice versa. This gives intuition to the observed
Nash equilibrium between the two countries. Finally we will shortly discuss the inuence of the
choice of the parameter , sn and  on the Nash equilibrium.
Benet, unemployment and price e¤ect
A government wants to maximize social welfare by choosing an appropriate tax rate given its
inequality aversion. In the rst order condition of this optimisation problem, the tax rate,
just as we observed in the autarkic model, works through three channels. Firstly, higher taxes
induce higher unemployment benets. This positive e¤ect is o¤set by two negative e¤ects in
equilibrium. Higher taxes lead to a reduced purchasing power of the economic agents and they
also induce higher unemployment rates, thereby gnawing the tax base. The absence of the
benet e¤ect evidently explains the corner solution of the zero tax rate in the Benthamite case.
The strength of these e¤ects are found by taking the rst order derivative of the social
welfare function with respect to the tax rate z and keeping the relevant variables constant
(dSWdz =
dSW
dz

P;u=cst
+ dSWdz

b;u=cst
+ dSWdz

b;P=cst
). After simple but cumbersome calculations
these three e¤ects are equal to:
dSW
dz

b;u=cst
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
 sn  (z; z)
(1  z) (z; z) (e = 1)
 sn  (z; z)
(1  z) (z; z)  (1  e)  SW (z; z
) (e 6= 1)
 sn  (z; z)  (b(z; z) + CR)
(1  z) (z; z)  P (z; z) (e =1)
(6.48)
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dSW
dz

P;u=cst
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
snwR
(b(z;z)+CR)u(z;z)(1 ) 
(z; z)  (1    sn  (z; z)) + z @(z; z
)
@
@(z; z)
@z

(e = 1)
  wR  sn
(1  )  u(z; z)((z; z
)(1    sn  (z; z) + z @(z; z
)
@
@(z; z)
@z
)
(b(z; z) + CR) e  (P (z; z))e 1 (e 6= 1)
  wR  sn
(1  )  (u(z; z))2  P (z; z)  ((z; z
)  (1    sn  (z; z))+
z  @(z; z
)
@
 @(z; z
)
@z
) (e =1)
(6.49)
dSW
dz

b;P=cst
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
  sn  log(b(z; z
) + CR
wR
1  + CR
)  ((z; z) 
(1  z)  @(z; z
)
@
 @(z; z
)
@z
) (e = 1)
  sn
1  e 
1
(P (z; z))1 e
 ((z; z)  (1  z)  @(z; z
)
@
 @(z; z
)
@z
)
h
(b(z; z) + CR)1 e   ( wR1  + CR)1 e
i
(e 6= 1)
0 (e =1).
The derivatives @(z;z
)
@ and
@(z;z)
@z in these three denitions are given by the expressions
6.45 and 6.46 respectively.
Competition and real income e¤ect
In the previous paragraph we analyzed the e¤ect the home tax rate has on the home social
welfare. In this paragraph we look at the externalities that the foreign tax rate (in casu the
southern) has on the own (northern) social welfare. We do this by considering the rst order
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derivative of the (northern) social welfare with respect to the southern tax rate. We can
distinguish two channels. The rst one is analogous to the previous paragraph, namely the
price index. A tax drop in the south will decrease the southern gross wage w which shifts
the marginal costs downwards. Due to mill pricing, the prices for the southern goods will also
decrease while the northern goods wont change in price. The result is a lower price index in
both regions. Since the Atkinson index of relative inequality is independent of equiproportional
income changes, the northern inequality does not change. However, the real average income
(the measurement of e¢ ciency) increases. Given the constant inequality-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ of
the government, this means that she has to raise taxes to increase the equality between the
working and unemployed people in its society. The real income e¤ect leads to tax rates that
are substitutes between each other.
The second mechanism through which the southern tax rates a¤ect the northern region
is called the competition e¤ect. The price drop of southern goods from the decrease of the
southern tax rate will increase the southern sales and decrease the northern sales since the
northern rms ask the same prices as before and because the elasticity of demand, equal to the
elasticity of substitution between goods, is larger than 1. This also implies that the northern
reward to capital decreases while the southern one increases. The reason for this lies in the
zero-prot condition10. But a lower (northern) reward to capital has as a consequence that
the tax base in the north decreases because the tax base is equal to a fraction of the capital
reward (again zero prot condition!). So we can conclude that a southern tax decrease creates
a negative externality on the northern region: the northern tax base shrinks because of the
increased competitiveness of the southern region. The northern government is thus faced with
higher unemployment rates and a smaller tax base to collect taxes to pay for the unemployment
benets. This not only lowers the e¢ ciency of their economy (lower average income) but also
negatively a¤ects the equity (more unemployed). The government with a given equity-e¢ ciency
trade-o¤ tries to counter this by also decreasing its tax rate. As a result, the competition e¤ect
leads to tax rates that are complements between each other.
10More formally this mechanism can be understood as follows. A drop in the southern tax rate z lowers w
and hence the north looses competitiveness (lower value for ). By 6.33 this means that sE drops which, by 6.20
also implies lower levels of  and also of l (by 6.27). This in turn leads to a lower tax base but also to higher
levels of unemployment (by 6.28).
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Figure 6-1: E¤ects of foreign tax on SW at  = 0:6, e = e = 3,  = 5, sn = 0:5, z = 0:106 and
 = 0:5.
We plotted both e¤ects in a characteristic case. We calculated the rst order derivative of
the northern social welfare with respect to the southern tax rate and plotted this value against
the southern tax rate. The inequality aversion of both regions is assumed to be equal to 3. Each
region has also the same number of rms and the trade freeness is set to be equal to 0.5. For
the northern tax rate value we took the Nash equilibrium value corresponding to these values
of the parameters. The other parametric values are EW = 1; LN = 1 = LS ; sK = 12 and k = 1.
Figure 6-1 clearly shows that the competition e¤ect from an increase in the foreign tax
increases the social welfare of the north, while the real income e¤ect decreases the social welfare
of the north. We also see that the competition e¤ect outweighs the real income e¤ect although
both forces become less strong for increasing values of the foreign tax rate. This can also be
seen by representing the reaction curves of both regions. We represented the reaction curves for
a given value of trade freeness ( = 0:5) and with the same parametric values as before ( = 3;
 = 0:6; EW = 1; LN = 1 = LS ; sn = sK = 1=2 , k = 1).
The vertical (red) lines in gure 6-2 represent the northern optimal tax rate given a southern
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Figure 6-2: Reaction curves in function of inequality aversion at  = 0:5 and  = 0:6.
tax rate (on Y-axis). The horizontal (green) lines are the reaction curves of the south given a
northern tax rate (on the X-axis). The intersection of both curves is the Nash equilibrium. As
illustrated on the graph this Nash equilibrium shifts towards higher tax rates when the inequality
aversion of the regions increases. This is intuitively quite clear since a higher inequality aversion
means that governments care more about the unemployment, hence want higher unemployment
benets and, as a result, set higher tax rates.
Based on this graph we can conclude that the tax rates set by each government act as
strategic complements: any tax reduction of the foreign region will lead to a tax reduction in
the home region. The negative externality imposed by a foreign tax reduction on the home tax
base outweighs the positive real income e¤ect and as a result of this, the home region also lowers
its tax rate. There is, in other words, social security competition between the two regions.
The severity of the social security competition can also be seen by looking at the optimal
tax rate a social planner would choose compared to the separate regions. We dene the social
planner as the government that sets a single tax rate in both regions to maximize the sum
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of the indirect utilities over the inhabitants of both regions11. In table 6.1 the second row
represents the optimal tax rate set by two regions with the same inequality aversion (allows us
to compare it with the social planner), the third row represents the optimal tax rate set by the
social planner. We used the same parameter values as in the previous simulations (= 2.5).
It is clear that the social planner opts for higher tax rates because he or she will internalize
the e¤ects we discussed before. This is an illustration of the regulatory chill e¤ect. Although
a government would like to increase social security protection, it is afraid to do so due to the
fear of losing competitiveness.
e = e = 0 e = e = 1 e = e = 2 e = e = 3 e = e = 4 e = e =1
z = z 0 0 0.075 0.126 0.151 0.208
zSP 0 0 0.107 0.157 0.179 0.221
Table 6.1: Optimal tax rates of social planner and two equally inequality averse regions for
several values of the inequality aversion
.Note also that the choice of the social planner nearly mimics the choice of the autarkic
region. This should come as no surprise as both optimisations are identical except for some
minor parametric values (e.g. L = 1 versus LN = LS = 1). This again illustrates the social
security competition in our model.
Inuence of ;  and sn
As a nal step we discuss the impact of some parameters on the Nash equilibrium. We start with
the elasticity of substitution . The e¤ect is mixed. The elasticity of substitution characterizes
the erceness of the competition on the goods market and as a consequence will lead to a
stronger negative externality, a stronger competition e¤ect. Thats why higher values of  are
coupled with lower tax rates set by individual governments. The loss of taxable base associated
with a tax rise increases when the elasticity of substitution increases. At the same time a social
planner that internalizes the externalities associated with trade will opt for higher taxes since
the average income of the people increased (see autarkic case). The Nash rates chosen by the
social planner are depicted in table 6.2 for three di¤erent values of the elasticity of substitution
11This means that we exclude a priori a social planner that chooses a di¤erent tax rate in each region. This is
a not illogical assumption in our symmetric model.
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Figure 6-3: Reaction curves in function of the inequality aversion for a high value of the elasticity
of substitution ( = 8).
and in function of the inequality aversion.
e = e = 0 e = e = 1 e = e = 2 e = e = 3 e = e = 4 e = e =1
 = 2:5 0 0 0.107 0.157 0.179 0.221
 = 5 0 0.151 0.261 0.301 0.321 0.351
 = 8 0 0.206 0.311 0.344 0.357 0.383
Table 6.2: Inuence of sigma
To show the inuence of  for the regions, we plot the reaction curves of both regions for
a high value of (= 8). Other parameters have the same values as before ( = 0:5;  = 0:6,
EW = 1, LN = 1 = LS , sn = sK = 12 , k = 1). The reaction curves intersect at lower values of
tax rates. Note that the shape of the reaction curves in this case can be explained by referring
to gure 6-1. The overall positive e¤ect of the foreign tax rates on the northern social welfare
function changed most heavily for intermediate values of the foreign tax rate. This is exactly
the zone where the second order derivative of the reaction curves is highest.
Secondly, we look at the inuence of the share of rms in a region sn. When the share
of rms in a region increases, the price index in that region drops. Normally, the number of
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employed people will also increase. This means that given a xed tax rate, the inequality will
rise, besides a further increase of the average income. The only way a government can overcome
this unwanted straddle is by raising the tax rate to increase the equality between the people.
This e¤ect can be seen by looking at the northern Nash rates in table 6.3. Due to the symmetric
set-up, the southern Nash tax rate when sn = 0:1 is equal to the northern Nash tax rate for
sn = 0:9. To illustrate this e¤ect we plot the reaction curves for sn=0.9 in gure 6-4. A higher
share of rms for a region shifts the reaction curves of that region to the right12. Note also
that for the region with the high share of rms the tax rate is almost independently set from
the foreign tax rate.
e = e = 0 e = e = 1 e = e = 2 e = e = 3 e = e = 4 e = e =1
sn= 0:1 0 0 0 0.021 0.056 0.126
sn= 0:5 0 0 0.075 0.126 0.151 0.208
sn= 0:9 0 0.021 0.101 0.146 0.171 0.241
Table 6.3: Northern Nash rates for di¤erent shares of rms
Lastly, we look at the e¤ect of lower trade costs. We plotted the reaction curves in function of
the trade freeness in graph 6-513. We can see that the Nash rates decrease until the trade freeness
lies around 0.25. After that, the optimal tax rates start to increase again and even surpass the
optimal taxation level associated with high trade costs. To illustrate this phenomenon better,
we depicted the optimal Nash rates together with the optimal tax rate chosen by the social
planner in function of the trade freeness for the same parametric values as before. This is
done in gure 6-6. For high values of trade costs, the Nash tax rate is always lower than the
Pareto tax rate of the social planner, while, at the high end of trade freeness, the regions will
want to have higher tax rates than the social planner who always chooses the same tax rate in
function of . Based on this gure, one could come to the conclusion that sustained lowering of
trade barriers would lead to a world with less social security competition and higher tax rates.
However, as explained in the motivation of the set-up (see chapter 4) one could reasonable
12The parameters in this simulation are the same as in the previous graphs:  = 0:5,  = 0:6, EW = 1,
LN = 1 = LS , sK = 12 , k = 1,  = 2:5.
13We took the following parametric values e = e = 3,  = 2:5,  = 0:6, EW = 1, LN = 1 = LS , sn = sK = 12 ,
k = 1.
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Figure 6-4: Reaction curves for sn=0.9.
assume that the realistic range of the trade freeness lies in the lower half of possible values for
 since the whole economy (including services) are subject to trade in our model.
To explain the evolution of the regional Nash rates in function of the trade freeness , we
look at the change in the costthat a tax shift of the own tax rate has on the social welfare.
As seen before, the home tax rate works through three channels on the social welfare function.
On the one hand there is the price index e¤ect, on the other hand one can also distinguish
the unemployment and benet e¤ect. Since the latter two basically cause a change in the tax
base, we will group these two e¤ects into a single e¤ect, namely the tax base e¤ect and we will
focus, without any loss of generality, on the e¤ect that a change in the trade freeness has on
the sensitivity of the tax base to the tax rate. The price index e¤ect will have a restraining
e¤ect on the optimal tax rate since a tax raise increases the price index and hence reduces the
real income of the economic agents. The decrease in the tax base caused by an increase in the
tax rate will increase the social welfare since it provides the basis for an unemployment benet.
So the smaller the loss of the tax base associated with a tax increase becomes, the higher the
chosen tax rate will be.
We start by looking at the evolution of the price index e¤ect in function of the trade freeness.
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Figure 6-5: Reaction curves for di¤erent trade freeness values at e = e = 3.
When trade costs decrease, all imported goods become cheaper and this will have a positive
impact on the real income of active and inactive persons. As a consequence a social welfare
maximising government with a xed equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ will choose for a higher tax rate
to let the equity keep pace with the increased e¢ ciency. Or stated otherwise, the negative e¤ect
associated with a home tax raise (namely the drop in real income) will become less powerful for
higher values of the trade freeness. We captured this phenomenon by looking at the elasticity of
the price index with respect to the tax rate in function of the trade freeness. This is illustrated
in graph 6-7 where we see that the elasticity of the price index with respect to the tax rate is
positive but that it decreases when the trade costs decrease.
The evolution of the second e¤ect is less straightforward due to the non-linearities present
in the model. We now look at the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate in
function of the trade freeness14. This elasticity is again represented in graph 6-7. We see that
this elasticity sharply diminishes until the trade freeness lies around 0.25 after which there is no
signicant change any more in the elasticity. So, the same tax rate change will induce a much
larger decrease in the tax base for values of the trade costs at the high end. As a consequence,
14Remember that the tax base n  l  w equals n  (   1)  k   (see 6.27).
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Figure 6-6: Nash tax rates for the region and the social planner in function of trade freeness
for two values of the inequality aversion.
the government will decrease its chosen tax rate (if it only looks at this e¤ect) when  evolves
from 0 to 0.25. For lower values of the trade costs, the government will, based on this tax base
e¤ect, see no reason to change the tax rate any longer.
To understand this phenomenon better, we split d log()d log(z) into three parts using expression
6.20 for the northern prot:
d(log()
d log(z)
=
z

@
@z
+   ( z
sE
@sE
@z
  z

@
@z
) + (1  )  (  sE
1  sE
z
sE
@sE
@z
  z

@
@z
). (6.50)
The weighting factor for the second and third term of this expression is equal to the share of
the total sales done in the north:
 =
sE

sE
 + 
1 sE

.
The tax base (or sales) in a country decreases when that region increases its taxes because the
prices of home-made goods increase relative to the foreign goods (rst term of 6.50,  > 1) and
because the northern consumers have less money to spend. The latter e¤ect, the home market
e¤ect, is described by the second term on the right-hand side of expression 6.50. Since capital
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Figure 6-7: The unequal inuence of the trade freeness on the tax base and the price index (at
z = z = zOPT (e = e = 3)).
and rms are immobile between regions (sn = 12), the increased share of expenditures in the
south will inevitably lead to an increased demand of northern goods by southern consumers.
The increased export demand for northern goods is described by the last term of 6.50. The
change in the expenditures in both regions can only a¤ect the northern sales to the extent that
the regional demands weigh in the total northern sales which is depicted by the weighting factor
. The loss in the sales or prot of a northern rm due to the decrease in the northern share of
expenditures, zsE
@sE
@z , by the fact that all northern rms loose competitiveness (  z @@z ) which
is an attenuating factor to the negative demand e¤ect. The same holds but in reverse for the
last term of 6.50. We plotted all three e¤ects in gure 6-8 in function of the trade freeness.
Only the home demand and the export demand e¤ect are inuenced by a change in the trade
freeness. The export demand e¤ect increases less than the home demand e¤ect decreases since
each region has a home bias (B > 0). The combined e¤ect leads to the evolution of the tax
base elasticity with respect to the tax rate in function of the trade freeness as depicted in gure
6-7.
By combining both e¤ects, we are able to explain the evolution of the Nash tax rates. For
low values of the trade freeness, the tax base e¤ect dominates the price index e¤ect and this
will lead to a decrease of the Nash rate. After  = 0:25 the tax base e¤ect ceases to have a
111
Figure 6-8: Splitting up of the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the home tax rate in 3
e¤ects.
noticeable impact and the only remaining e¤ect present, namely the price index e¤ect will cause
a gradual increase of the Nash rate when the trade costs further decline.
A social planner will set its optimal tax rate invariant of the trade freeness. This is again
explained by looking at the two e¤ects as discussed just now: the rst e¤ect, the price index
e¤ect will become invariant to the trade freeness and the second e¤ect will cease to exist.
This can easily be seen by looking back at the expressions of the price index 6.14 and the
tax base 6.20. These expressions reduce for a social planner ( = 1, z = z, sn = sE = 12)
to   wa  (1+2 )1=1  and  respectively. As a consequence the price index e¤ect d log(P )d log(z) is
equal to z1 z and the tax base e¤ect
d log()
d log(z) becomes zero. The latter can intuitively easily
be understood since both (symmetric) regions are per denition always equally competitive.
The rst e¤ect can graphically be restated as a homothetic shift of the social welfare function
under trade freeness changes. The parabolic social welfare function in function of the tax rate
z shifts upwards when the trade freeness increases without a horizontal shift. More intuitively
this can be understood by realizing that a social planner internalizes the partial shifting of the
welfare burden induced by a tax increase on the real income of people. Each time a government
increases its taxes, a part of the burden, namely the proportion of imported goods in the foreign
price index, is shifted on to the foreign country since they also become poorer in real terms.
This e¤ect no longer plays for a social planner.
112
We can conclude that for high values of trade costs the regional governments overestimate
the positive e¤ect of a tax reduction on the competitiveness of the own region. This is because
governments neglect the fact that the foreign region will also lower its tax rates as a response.
For low values of trade costs, this e¤ect fades out and governments are now underestimating the
negative e¤ect that a tax increase has on the price index since they dont consider the side-e¤ect
of their own tax increase, namely a foreign tax increase. A social planner will internalize these
e¤ects and will as a consequence not change its tax rate to a changing level of trade freeness.
6.5 Conclusion
Tax rates set by governments in a model of social security competition without capital mobility
behave like strategic complements. In other words, goods mobility su¢ ces for a race to the
bottom result. Social security competition is possible without the introduction of any form of
mobility of factors of production. This stresses the equivalence of the several dimensions of
globalisation.
Just as was the case in autarky, the behaviour of the governments in the static Nash game is
steered by three e¤ects. Any tax rise leads to one positive e¤ect, namely higher unemployment
benets but also to two negative e¤ects. Not only there is a negative e¤ect on the employment
but the regions are also faced with a loss in purchasing power of the people. It is the relative
weight of these three e¤ects that determine the value of the chosen Nash rates. Of course, higher
values of the inequality aversion lead to higher unemployment benets and labour taxation
levels.
This behaviour can also be understood by looking at the e¤ect that a foreign tax change
has on the home region. We distinguished two channels. The rst mechanism works through
the price index. A tap drop in the south will decrease the southern gross wage which shifts
the marginal costs downwards. Due to the mill pricing present in our model, the prices for the
southern goods will decrease relative to the northern goods. The subsequent reduction in the
price levels in the northern region will increase the e¢ ciency of that region. Given the constant
inequality-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ of the government, she wants to raise her taxes to increase the
equality between the working and the unemployed. This mechanism leading to tax rates that are
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strategic substitutes is dominated by the second e¤ect, the competition e¤ect. The same drop
of southern prices will decrease the northern sales and hence, given the zero-prot condition,
also the northern tax base. So the unemployment will rise and the unemployment benet will
decrease. The only way a government can react to this is by also lowering its own tax rates.
As a result, tax rates behave like strategic complements.
We also looked at the inuence of some model parameters on the results obtained. The
elasticity of substitution has a mixed e¤ect on the Nash equilibria since a higher value of 
leads to higher tax rates set by the social planner but to lower tax rates at the regional level.
Broadly spoken, the elasticity of substitution characterizes the strength of the competitiveness
on the markets. As a result, the same tax rate change will induce a larger loss of competitiveness
at the regional level. A social planner that internalizes these e¤ect, will only see an increased
e¢ ciency to which it will respond by creating more equality between the unemployed and the
labourers.
A second model parameter that interested us, was the share of rms sn in a region. When a
region exogenously gets a higher share of the rms, that region will increase its tax rates. The
real income e¤ect explained this result.
Lastly we also looked at the inuence of the trade freeness on the reaction curves. As it
turns out this behaviour is quite intricate. When trade costs decrease, starting with prohibitive
trade costs, the optimal tax rates set by the governments will decrease but after a while they
will increase again and at the high end of trade freeness they even will surpass the level of
taxes set by a social planner. Decreasing trade costs will increase the purchasing power of
people which will lead to higher taxation levels given the constant inequality-e¢ ciency trade
o¤ of the governments. But on the other hand, higher trade freeness also makes the economy
more susceptible: the tax base will respond in a increasingly manner to changes in the relative
tax rates. This last e¤ect is inherent asymmetrical in a model without capital mobility and
fades out (in elasticity terms) at an intermediate value of trade freeness. This is because the
two e¤ects that a tax increase has on the tax base evolve di¤erently in function of the trade
freeness. The rst e¤ect, working via the reduction in the purchasing power of the consumers,
becomes less important at a steady rate when trade freeness increases. The second e¤ect, the
export demand e¤ect, increases less than the home demand e¤ect decreases. The reason lies in
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the home bias of regions and in the fact that the share of rms in this set-up remains constant.
How promising the results may be that increased globalisation leads to less severe social
security competition, we believe that the real impact of it remains limited. All the goods in
our model are subject to trade. As a consequence, high levels of trade freeness, will become
unrealistic since most goods in Western economies are non-tradable services.
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Chapter 7
Two-country case with capital
mobility
7.1 Locational equilibrium
7.1.1 Determining the steady states
Previously we looked at social security competition in a context of no capital mobility. In this
section we broaden the model by introducing economic geography e¤ects. As already explained
in the motivation of the set-up in chapter 4, we assume that capital migrates to the other region
as soon as it can get a higher nominal reward in that region. The owners of the capital dont
move (a footloose capital setting) which is why we only have to look at the nominal capital
reward, not the real reward of capital. In accordance with the standard NEG-models we use
the following ad hoc migration equation for the interregional capital ows:
dsn
dt
= (   )(1  sn)sn. (7.1)
As explained in Baldwin ([10]), this formulation encompasses two desired characteristics of
(capital) migration. Not only is the rate of migration proportional to the (nominal) capital
reward gap, the last two terms on the right-hand side also indicate that the capital migration
will not happen at once although all capital is identical. By modelling the capital ows in this
way, we neglect (and simplify) the possible forward-looking behaviour of capital (owners).
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Equation 7.1 shows that there are two types of long-run equilibria1. Interior equilibria are
characterized by equal capital rewards in the north and the south ( = ). The second kind
of equilibria are the core-periphery equilibria when all the capital is located in either region
(sn = 0 or sn = 1). Note that the concept of equilibrium used here does not mean that all
agents cant gain by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium. It is merely a concept of a
steady state, the only relevant long-run equilibria are the stable long-run equilibria.
We can rewrite the prot in each region by substituting 6.33 in the expressions 6.20 and
6.21 as follows:
 = 
(+ 12(
   )
   (   1)sn(   ) ; (7.2)
 = 
(   1)sn(2   1) + + 12(  )
   (   1)sn(   ) .
Equating both expressions of (7.2) and substituting  by 6.14 and  by 6.15, we obtain a
closed-form expression for the share of rms in the north:
sn =
(1  ) + 12(2   1)
(  )(  1)  (   1)(2   1) . (7.3)
This means that the model has the desired characteristic of having a closed-form expression of
the share of rms while at the same time, it does not lose the circular causality as was the case
in the footloose capital model.
In a next step we assess the locational choice in function of  and  where expression 7.3 is
valid. By equating expression 7.3 to 0 and 1 respectively and solving for , it is easy to establish
that internal solutions are only possible if and only if:
0 < sn < 1,

 <
1 + 
2
^ 0 <  < 1

_

 >
1 + 
2
^ 1 <  < 0

. (7.4)
In this expression, 0 and 1 stand for:
0 =
2
1 + (2   1)2 , 1 =
1
0
. (7.5)
1 In the NEG-literature one makes a distinction between short-run equilibria where sn is xed and long-run
equilibria which are the steady states of migration equation 7.1.
117
To sharpen the intuition, we calculate the maximal allowed tax gap between the two regions in
order to make an internal solution possible, whether it will be stable or not. The tax gap 1 z

1 z
is given by 1=(1 ) under the assumption of equal reference wages and is given in table 7.1.
We also gave the border values for the competitiveness in brackets. We see that in general the
regional tax rates cant diverge too much if an internal solution has to occur. Only for very small
values of the trade freeness and the elasticity of substitution the allowable tax gap in an internal
equilibrium can be quite considerable. This is an illustration of the strong agglomerative forces
present in our model.
 = 0:1  = 0:5  = 0:9
 = 2:5 63% (0:48 <  < 2:08) 16% (1:25 >  > 0:8) 4.0% (1:06 >  > 0:94)
 = 5 2.2% (0:91 <  < 1:09) 11% (1:53 >  > 0:65) 2.0% (1:08 >  > 0:92)
 = 7:5 4.2% (1:31 >  > 0:76) 8.2% (1:6 >  > 0:6) 1.4% (1:09 >  > 0:91)
Table 7.1: Maximal allowed tax gap for internal solutions.
Analogously we investigate the range of trade freeness wherein the share of rms lies between
0 and 1. We have to make a distinction between cases where the northern country has a
competitive disadvantage ( < 1) and where it has a competitive advantage ( > 1). In both
cases there are two zones of internal equilibria albeit they are not the same:
0 < sn < 1, 0 <  < 1 ^
"
 < 0A _ f1A <  < 1B ^  >
1 +
p
1  2
2
g
#
(7.6)
0 < sn < 1,  > 1 ^
h
 < 1A _ f0A <  < 0B ^  > 2(1 +
p
2   1)g
i
. (7.7)
In these expressions we dened the following parameters:
0A =
  p2   22 + 2
2    , 0B =
 +
p
2   22 + 2
2    ,
1A =
  p1  2 + 22
2   1 , 1B =
  p1  2 + 22
2   1 .
(7.8)
Note that for  = 1 , 0A = 1A and 0B = 1B.
Again we give some numerical values for the introduced parameters. These are depicted in
table 7.2. The zones of internal equilibrium are again very limited which illustrates the strong
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nature of the agglomerative forces in this model.
0A 0B 1A 1B
 = 2:5 0.10 >1 / /
 = 12  = 5 0.05 >1 / /
 = 7:5 0.03 >1 0.25 0.28
 = 2:5 0.25 0.25 1 1
 = 1  = 5 0.11 0.11 1 1
 = 7:5 0.07 0.07 1 1
 = 2:5 / / 0.14 >1
 = 32  = 5 0.21 0.53 0.06 >1
 = 7:5 0.12 0.59 0.05 >1
Table 7.2: Values for 0A, 0B, 1A, and 1B.
7.1.2 Stability of the steady states
After establishing the zones of internal equilibrium, we are ready to analyze the stability of the
found steady states by applying Krugmans informal stability test ([72]) which is, as proven by
Baldwin ([8]), equal to the formal standard mathematical stability tests. An internal equilibrium
is stable when a northward migration reduces the northern capital reward gap (   ) since
the migrated capital would be better o¤ if it had stayed in the original region. A core-periphery
pattern is stable as soon as the level of the capital reward in the core exceeds the capital reward
in the periphery. Mathematically this means that we should check the negativity of d( 
)
dsn

int
for internal equilibria and the sign of    jsn=1 for stable northern core solutions. The point
where the former equals zero is called the break point, the point where the latter becomes
negative is denoted as the sustain point.
In function of trade freeness
We start with the stability analysis in function of the trade freeness. The before mentioned
rst order derivative d( 
)
dsn

int
is calculated by substitution 6.14 and 6.15 in equation 7.2 and
taking the rst order derivative with respect to sn:
d(   )
dsn

int
=
4(+ ( 1 + ( +   2)))
2(1  2)(1 + (2   1)22) . (7.9)
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By equating the numerator of 7.9 to zero, we get a quadratic equation in trade freeness which
has two roots as possible break points:
B1 =
(1 + 2) p42(1  2) + 2(1 + 2)2
2(2   1) ; (7.10)
B2 =
(1 + 2) +
p
42(1  2) + 2(1 + 2)2
2(2   1) . (7.11a)
Under the valid restrictions of  > 0 and  > 1 it is easy to establish that 0 < B1 < 1 and that
B2 > 1. Since the sign of the quadratic term (
2(1   2)) in 7.9 is negative, stable internal
equilibria only occur for values of trade freeness below B1. This also means that we dont have
to impose a no-black hole condition as is required normally in NEG-models.
The discussion of the sustain points in function of the trade freeness is more intricate since
not only we have to make a distinction in function of the competitiveness , but also because
we have to consider the core in the north and in the south separately. The di¤erence between
the capital rewards if sn = 1 and sn = 0 is respectively given by:
   jsn=1 =
( 1 + (2 + (1  2)))
2
; (7.12)
   jsn=0 =
(  2 + (2   1)2)
2
. (7.13)
Equating both expressions to zero gives us four sustain points. We denote the sustain points
for the northern core with SN1 and SN2, the southern core sustain points are depicted by
SS1 and SS2 :
SN1 =
1
 +
p
1 + (2   2)) ; SN2 =
1
  p1 + (2   2)) ; (7.14)
SS1 =

 +
p
2(1  2) + 2 ; SS2 =
 +
p
2(1  2) + 2
(2   1) . (7.15)
For equally competitive regions we see that SN1 equals SS1 and that SN2 coincides with
SS2 and that both are equal to 1. For this situation, the core in the north and in the south
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becomes stable as soon as the trade freeness exceeds SN1 = SS1.
For cases where the north has a competitive advantage over the south ( > 1), the northern
core is stable for values lying between SN1 and SN2. However, it is easily checked that the
second northern sustain point SN2 always exceeds one, so we can simplify matters by stating
that the northern core is stable as soon as the trade freeness becomes larger than SN1. The
square root in the denominator of 7.15 only gives cause to real solutions2 for values of the
elasticity of substitution higher than 2(1 +
p
2   1). It should come as no surprise that this
condition on the elasticity of substitution coincides with the condition 7.7 for having a core in
the south solution if  > 1. The higher the elasticity of substitution becomes, the larger the
area (delimited by SS1 and SS2 ) where the southern core is stable, becomes.
Lastly, if the south has a competitive advantage, we nd that 7.13 is negative for values of
trade freeness between SS1 and SS2 . Similar to the previous case, the second sustain point
always exceeds one, as a result of what stable southern cores always occur for values of trade
freeness exceeding SS1. Expression 7.12 is only positive and real for values of trade freeness
between SN1 and SN2 and for values of the elasticity of substitution higher than
1+
p
1 2
2
3.
We conclude this discussion on the stability of the steady states in function of the trade freeness
by noting that the stable core in the south (north) solution for values of  > 1 ( < 1) never
can span the whole trade freeness range. Even for very high values of the substitution elasticity
and almost evenly competitive regions, this stable region stays relatively small.
In function of the competitiveness
In order to determine the break points in terms of the competitiveness, we equate expression
7.9 to zero and solve for the competitiveness . There are, just as before, two possible solutions
for the break points:
B1 =
1 + (2   1)2  
p
1  2
q
1  (1  2)22
2
(7.16)
2The square root is also real if  < 2(1 p2   1), but this value for  is always smaller than 1. Hence, we
omit this.
3The square root in the denominator of 7.14 is also real if  < 1+
p
1 2
2
, but this value is always smaller than
1.
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B2 =
1 + (2   1)2 +
p
1  2
q
1  (1  2)22
2
. (7.17a)
The second root in the numerator of both expressions is positive if and only if the substitution
elasticity lies between  1+2 and
1+
2 . Since
 1+
2 < 0,  has to lie between 1
4 and 1+2 in order
to have non-imaginary values for B1 and B2. Under this restriction, it is also easy to show
that the rst break point always lies between 0 and 1 and that the second break point lies in
the region where the north has a competitive advantage over the south ( > 1). The sign of the
quadratic factor in  of expression 7.9 is positive as a result of which the internal steady states
are always stable between the two break points as long as  < 1+2 .
Contrary to the previous section 7.1.2 the discussion of the sustain points is a lot easier. The
solution in terms of the competitiveness of equating 7.12 and 7.13 to zero, leads to the following
two sustain points for the core in the north and the core in the south solution respectively:
SN =
1 + (2   1)2
2
; SS =
1
SN
. (7.18)
For values of  > SN the northern core becomes stable, for values of  < SS the south becomes
a stable core. Both sustain points coincide when  = 1+2 as could be expected.
7.1.3 The tomahawk diagram revisited
We now know how the locational equilibrium shifts when the trade costs shift or when the
competitiveness changes between the two regions. We also know where which equilibrium is
stable. By combining both results, we are able to draw two tomahawk diagrams, one in
function of , one in terms of .
We start with the tomahawk diagram in function of the competitiveness. Under the as-
sumption that  < 1+2 it is possible to show
5 that the rst break point B1 comes before the
start of the internal zone at 0 and that the second break point always lies at values of the com-
petitiveness higher than 1. For values of  >
1+
2 , the internal zone is always unstable. Since
4A Dixit-Stiglitz framework assumes that  > 1:
5Analytical proofs are somewhat tedious but not di¢ cult. In order not to burden the text too much, we
omitted therefore the proofs of the di¤erent statements done in subsequent paragraphs. The proofs are available
upon request.
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Figure 7-1: Tomahawk diagram in function of competitiveness.
SN coincides with 1 and SS with 0 we conclude that the core solutions are always stable.
We can summarize the locational behaviour of the model in function of the competitiveness in
diagram 7-1. In this diagram the solid lines represent the stable steady states, the dotted lines
the unstable equilibria.
The integration of the results of the two previous sections is a little bit more complex for
the behaviour in terms of the trade freeness since we have to make a distinction whether 
exceeds, is equal to or is smaller than 1. It is possible to show that B1 exceeds 1A when
 > 1 and that 1A < B1 when  < 1. When both regions have the same competitiveness, the
rst break point always coincides with OA = 1A. The rst zone of internal equilibria is as a
consequence, regardless of the value of the competitiveness, always stable. The second zone of
internal equilibria only occurs for values of  that are high enough6. When the north is more
competitive than the south, the second zone of internal steady states is always unstable since
OA > B1 and OB < B2. The locational equilibrium is unstable for values of trade freeness
that lie between B1 and between B2. When the south has a competitive advantage, it is
6For  < 1 ,  > 1+
p
1 2
2
, and for  > 1;  > 2(1 +
p
1  2).
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Figure 7-2: Tomahawk diagram in function of  for  = 1.
again easy to show that the second zone of interior equilibria is always unstable (1A > B1,
1B < B2). We now only have to look into the concurrence between the core-periphery
zones and their stability. By realizing that, 1A = SN1, 1B = SN2, 0A = SS1 and that
0B = SS2, we can safely conclude that the core-in-the-south solution for  6 1 and  > 0A
is always stable. The same holds for the core-in-the-north solution when  1 1 and  > 1A.
These results are again elucidated by plotting the tomahawk diagram. The rst diagram 7-2
gives the situation when both regions are equally competitive, the following, gure 7-3 gives
the case when the north has a competitive disadvantage and the last gure 7-4 represents the
possibility where the north has a competitive advantage.
7.1.4 Discussion of agglomeration forces and properties of the model
Agglomerative and dispersion forces
There are two driving forces in this agglomeration model. The rst one is the market access
e¤ect. It describes the tendency of monopolistic rms to locate their production in the big
market and export to the small markets. When the share of expenditures in a region increases,
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Figure 7-3: Tomahawk diagram in function of phi for  < 1.
Figure 7-4: Tomahawk in function of  for  > 1.
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the sales of the rms located in that region also increases. As a consequence the operating
prot of those rms also increases (the total labour cost to a rm didnt change). Under the
zero-prot condition higher operating prots lead to a higher capital reward which will attract
rms to locate in this region. The second force is not an agglomerative force, but a dispersive
one. It reects the fact that imperfect competitive rms have a tendency to locate in regions
with relatively few competitors. A small movement of rms from the south to the north raises
sn. As a result  in 6.17 will rise while  will decrease. Under a constant share of expenditures
and degree of competitiveness, this will lead to lower sales for a northern rm7. Owing to the
simultaneous reduction of the operating prot, the northern capital reward has to decrease
under the zero-prot condition. The resulting dispersion force is called the local competition
e¤ect or the market crowding e¤ect. In many NEG-models a third force is also present, namely
the cost-of-living e¤ect. Since the driving force in our model is the nominal capital reward gap,
not the real one, this e¤ect is absent in our model.
Our model is analytically tractable enough to explicitly derive closed-form expressions for
both forces in play. The agglomerative and dispersion force can be calculated by deriving
the driving force     at the internal equilibrium with respect to sE and sn respectively.
Substituting 6.14 and 6.15 in equation 7.2 and taking the rst order derivative with respect to
sn and sE respectively gives:
@(   )
@sE

sn; int
=
8(   1)((1 + 2)(1  2 + 22)  4)((1 + 2   2)  (1  2))
2(  (2   1))(1  (2   1))(1  2)2(1  (1  2)22) ,
(7.19)
@(   )
@sn

sE ; int
=
4(  )(1  )((1 + 2   2)  (1  ))
2(1  2)2(1  (2   1))((2   1)  ) . (7.20)
It can be proven that under the conditions 7.4 for an internal equilibrium the agglomerative
force is always positive while the second force is always negative. To illustrate both forces more
clearly, we plotted 7.19 and 7.20 when  = 1. Note that we plotted the inverse of the negative
dispersion force in order to compare the relative strength of both forces better. For low values
7Starting from symmetry (sn = se = 12 ;  = 1) the derivative of the sales with respect to sn equals   2(1 
2)
(1+2)
,
which is clearly always negative.
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Figure 7-5: The agglomerative (solid) and dispersion (dotted) force ( = 1).
of trade freeness the dispersion force is still stronger than the agglomerative force and we end
up in an interior steady state. For high values of the trade freeness, the core-periphery situation
prevails. Since we reasoned from the interior equilibrium, the equality in strength of both forces
coincides with the (rst) break point. The fact that the dispersion force drops more sharply
with trade freeness can be understood if one looks back at the expression of the (northern)
sales 6.17. Lower trade costs mean that a larger share of the sales becomes independent of the
location of the competitors while at the same time it becomes easier for a rm to increase its
market share abroad.
Circular causalities
Unlike a standard footloose capital model, our model does have a cost-linked circular causality.
An increase of capital (=rms) in a region will reduce the unemployment in that region and
hence, increase the regions share of expenditure. This will make the region more attractive to
further migrate capital to since the increased sales lead to higher capital rewards in that region.
Thus, the main reason, why this model  although it has the same migrational behaviour as
the model of Martin and Rogers  has circular causalities lies in the endogenous presence of
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unemployment via the reference wages.
Home market e¤ect and magnication
We calculate the home-market derivative dsndsE . In order to do this we equate 6.20 and 6.21,
substitute the expressions for  and  (given by 6.14 and 6.15 respectively) and solve for
sn. This leads to the following expression for the share of rms sn in function of the share of
expenditures sE :
sn =
sE    + (1  sE)    2
(  )  (1    ) . (7.21)
Taking the derivative of 7.21 with respect to sE gives us the home-market derivative:
dsn
dsE
=
(1  2)
(  )(1  ) . (7.22)
When both regions are equally competitive, this expression reduces to the standard FC-expression,
namely (1+)(1 ) from which it is clear that an exogenous change in the location of demand leads
to a more than proportional relocation of industry to the enlarged region. When the south
has a competitive advantage, the home market derivative is larger than 1 as long as the trade
freeness remains smaller than . For values of  > 1, there can only be a home-market e¤ect
as long as  < 1 . It can be easily checked that these restrictions on the trade freeness are less
strict than the restrictions we derived for an internal equilibrium (7.8). So we conclude that
the home-market e¤ect is always active for interior equilibria.
Secondly, by deriving 7.22 to the trade freeness, it is easy to show that the home-market
derivative gets larger when trade costs decline. This is the home-market magnication e¤ect of
Baldwin ([7]) and can be captured by:
d2sn
dsEd
= (
1
(  )2 +
1
(1  )2 ). (7.23)
Freer trade makes industry become more footloose as could be expected.
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Figure 7-6: Delocation elasticity in function of trade freeness for three values of competitiveness.
Endogenous asymmetry and near-catastrophic agglomeration
A gradual lowering of the trade costs, starting from prohibitive trade costs, will only have a
slight locational impact, with some of the industry moving to the region with the competitive
advantage. However, as the level of trade freeness comes into the range of the break point,
the delocation will go faster and faster. After the break point, all industry is agglomerated in
the region with the competitive advantage. Since there is a gradual shift of stable locational
equilibria in function of the trade freeness, full-blown catastrophic agglomeration is not possible
between regions where one has a competitive advantage. All possible locational equilibrium
states become possible between full symmetry and core-periphery. This behaviour can be
captured by the delocation elasticity dened as the percent change in sn with respect to a
percent change in the trade freeness. This elasticity is found by deriving 7.3 with respect to
the trade freeness and multiplying this result with sn :
dsn
d

sn
=
(1  2)(1 + (1  2)2
(  2+ (2   1)2)(+ ( 1 + (+ (1  2))) . (7.24)
We plotted the delocation elasticity for equally competitive regions and for the case where one
region has a slight competitive advantage ( = 0:95=1:05). We restricted the range of trade
freeness to values where there is an internal equilibrium (SN1 = SS1 = 0:23 at  = 2:5).
This gure also indicates that the delocation elasticity for equally competitive regions equals
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zero for values below the break point. If both regions are equally competitive, the symmetricum
will remain the stable steady state for a large interval of high trade costs. In this case, a standard
catastrophic agglomeration is evidently possible, which is still an important deviation from the
Martin and Rogers set-up.
Locational hysteresis
For intermediate values of trade freeness and high enough elasticities of substitution multiple
equilibria do exist. Both regions can sustain a core equilibrium at the same time. For instance,
when the north has a competitive advantage a lowering of the trade costs makes the core-in-
the-north solution stable starting from a stable interior solution. But in that range of trade
costs where the agglomerative forces are the strongest (see gure 7-5) the core-in-the-south
solution can become stable. Of course the competitive disadvantage of the south cant be too
large and the agglomerative forces have to be strong (high values of ). The range of values
for the elasticity of substitution and the competitiveness where this is possible are depicted in
graph 7-1. So our model does display locational hysteresis
This means that there is path-dependency in our model. It matters which starting point
you have in a policy analysis.
Hump-shaped agglomeration rents
The agglomeration rents are dened as the loss that a capital unit would incur by relocating
from the core to the periphery when full agglomeration is a stable equilibrium. These are given
by:
   jsn=1 =
1 + ((2   1)  2)
2
. (7.25)
These rents are concave in trade freeness since the second order derivative of the prot gap with
respect to the trade freeness is negative (d
2( )
d2
=   1
3
). It equals zero at the sustain point
and reaches it maximum at  =
q
1
2 1 . Accordingly, the agglomerative rents rst increase
after the sustain point and decrease towards complete trade freeness.
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7.2 Internal equilibrium
Contrary to the two-country case without capital mobility, we are no longer able to explicitly
derive the Nash tax rates in any scenario. Instead, we rely on simulations to describe social
security competition under capital mobility. In this section we discuss the optimal behaviour
of governments when the locational equilibrium is a stable internal equilibrium. In section 3 of
this chapter we give the results for a stable core-periphery situation.
As before, we start with a short description of the e¤ects through which a governments tax
setting inuences the social welfare. In a second step, we will discuss the reaction curves and
the way the foreign tax rate inuences the home tax rate. Finally we will analyze the e¤ect of
some parameters on the Nash equilibrium.
7.2.1 Benet, unemployment and price-index e¤ect
By focusing on internal equilibria, we have to restrict the freedom of action for a government
since the tax gap endogenously determines the locational equilibrium. Each government can
only choose a tax rate, given the foreign tax rate, such that 7.4 holds. In order not to limit the
range of possibilities for each government too much, we opt for a low value of the elasticity of
substitution  (= 2:5) and trade freeness  (= 0:05). This means in e¤ect that the competi-
tiveness may vary between 0.247 and 4.08 or otherwise said, that the north can undercut the
southern tax rate by more than 150 per cent which creates more than enough space for social
security competition. The fact that we are obliged to choose low values for the trade freeness
is an indication that the model has very strong agglomeration forces.
A second consequence of looking at internal equilibria is the invariability of the capital
reward. The expressions 6.20 and 6.21 are both equal to  under 7.3. But at the same time, a
new variability, namely via the share of rms in each region, is introduced. Without this second
e¤ect a foreign tax change would only have a¤ected the home region via the price index, no
longer via the tax base. It is not that di¢ cult to check that, under the restrictions given by
7.4, the sign of the derivative of sn with respect to z is negative.
This result simplies the interpretation of the rst order derivative of the social welfare
function with respect to the tax rate. As before, we can distinguish three channels through
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which the northern tax rate a¤ects the northern social welfare First, the unemployment, given
by 6.28 increases since a higher tax reduces the share of rms sn and also the term (1 z). This
will exert a negative inuence on the social welfare. Secondly, higher taxes will decrease the
share of rms in the home region and will increase the prices charged by the own rms. As a
consequence the price index will increase and the purchasing power of the people will decrease.
This again leads to a negative e¤ect on the social welfare. In equilibrium both e¤ects are in
balance with the third e¤ect, namely the benet e¤ect. It turns out that the combined e¤ect of
higher taxes on a reduced tax base still allows for a higher unemployment benet. The price,
unemployment and benet e¤ect can be consecutively written as:
dSW
dz

b;u=cst
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
 1
(z; z)


sn(z; z
)  (z; z)
1  z  
((z; z)  )
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@z
(z; z)

(e = 1)
  b(z; z
) + CR
(z; z)  P (z; z) 
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sn(z; z
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)
   1
@sn
@z
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SW (z;z)(1 e)
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(7.26)
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(z; z))
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; (7.28)
with
@sn
@z
(z; z) 7:3=
(   1)    (  2 + (sK   sn)  (1  2)  2  sn      (  )
(1  z)  (  (  )  (    1)  (   1)    (2   1) . (7.29)
7.2.2 Reaction curves
The reaction curves of both regions are given for di¤erent values of the inequality aversion e
in gure 7-7. When governments become more Rawslian-like, they opt for higher tax rates.
Comparing these curves with the result of gure 6-2, two di¤erences catch the eye. Firstly the
reaction curves become a straight line for foreign tax rates that are high enough (function of
the inequality aversion). Secondly, the chosen tax rate changes its behaviour from a strategic
substitute to a strategic complement when the foreign tax rate further reduces from the point
where the reaction curve simplied into a straight line.
We know from combining condition 7.4 and the tomahawk diagram 7-1 that stable inter-
nal equilibria can only occur for values of the elasticity of substitution that are smaller than
1+
2 (=10:5 for  = 0:05) and under the condition that the competitiveness lies between 0 and
1: Under the assumption that both regions have the same number of inhabitants  and hence
have the same reference wage  one could easily rewrite this condition in terms of the tax rates
z and z: 0 < sn < 1, 1  (1)1=( 1)(1  z) < z < 1  (0)1=( 1)(1  z). The straight lines
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Figure 7-7: Reaction curves in function of e under capital mobility and  = 0:05;  = 0:6;
sK =
1
2 ;  = 2:5.
on the reaction curve diagram are nothing else than the representation of these limits in which
the interior solutions are stable. Otherwise said, for high enough values of the foreign tax rate,
a government would opt for a tax rate that is just low enough to attract all the industry within
its borders.
To understand the shape of the reaction curves we consider the rst order derivative of the
(northern) social welfare function with respect to the southern tax rate. As before one could
distinguish two channels: a price index e¤ect and a competition e¤ect. These are respectively
given by:
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with
@sn
@z
(z; z) =  ( 1  z
1  z )
@sn
@z
(z; z) .
A tax increase abroad increases the import prices for the northern region (the term 11 z  (1 
sn(z;z)(z;z)
(z;z) in 7.30 if e = 1) and, at the same time, will increase the share of home goods
in the consumption basket of northern inhabitants (the term (z;z
) 
( 1)(z;z)  @sn@z (z; z) in 7.30
if e = 1). Under the condition of a stable internal equilibrium 7.4, it is possible to ascertain
analytically that the e¤ect via the increased import prices is always more than compensated by
the e¤ect that the increased share of domestic goods consumption has on the price index. The
lower price index will increase the average income of the people but will not alter the inequality
index (constant under equiproportional income changes). The only way the government can
react to this situation under a constant equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ is by increasing the home tax
rate. In other words, as soon as one introduces capital mobility in a model of social security
competition, the price e¤ect changes sign. When there was no capital mobility a foreign tax
increase would have lead to a decrease in the home tax rate.
The second e¤ect through which the southern tax rate a¤ects the northern region is called
the competition e¤ect. As can be seen in expression 7.31 the only way the foreign tax rate
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Figure 7-8: The e¤ect of the southern tax rate on the northern social welfare function.
could inuence the northern social welfare function is via the share of rms. It no longer works
via the capital reward. A southern tax decrease will reduce, as long as there is a stable internal
equilibrium, the share of rms in the northern region. This will, since the capital reward is
constant8, lead automatically to a decreased tax base. There are less people at work which
leads under an unchanging tax rate to lower unemployment benets for the unemployed. The
net result is a deterioration of the e¢ ciency and equity in the society. The government will
react to this by lowering her own tax rate. This and the previous e¤ect are given in gure 7-8
in function of the foreign tax rate. We assumed that e = e = 4 and that the home tax rate is
equal to the Nash tax rate (z = 0:089).
The combined e¤ect of both forces will lead to tax rates that are complements. The above
graph also illustrates that the impact of a foreign tax rate change greatly diminishes for high
values of the tax rate (near the sn = 1-line). So the tendency to increase the home tax rate as a
response to the foreign increased rate is weakened. At the same time, the secondary e¤ect that
a raise of the northern tax rate has on the northern social welfare function via the lower share
8Remember that the capital reward  equals lw
( 1)k .
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Figure 7-9: E¤ect of z on sn for a low value of z and a high one.
rms sn becomes more important. The increase in the price index and the loss in the tax base
(higher unemployment, loss of rms) becomes larger . This is illustrated in gure 7-9 where
sn is given for a low value of z (= 0:05) and a high one (z = 0:65). The e¤ect of the initial
reaction towards a foreign tax increase is more than undone by the e¤ect that that reaction has
for high values of the foreign tax rate. More intuitively, it is more than worthwhile to reduce
your tax rate for high values of the foreign tax rate since the reward you get in terms of the
increased share of rms more than outweighs the initial loss in equity. The dominance of the
sn-e¤ect explains why the northern tax rate behaves like a strategic substitute for high values
of the southern tax rate.
To end this section, we compare the optimal Nash tax rates for the regions and the social
planner with the Nash rate found under the same circumstances ( = 0:05;  = 0:6;  = 2:5)
in the model without capital mobility, and this for di¤erent values of the inequality aversion e.
This is done in table 7.3.
sn e; e
 = 0 e; e = 1 e; e = 2 e; e = 3 e; e = 4 e; e =1
endogenous z = z 0 0 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.13
zSP 0 0 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.22
exogenous z = z 0 0 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.20
zSP 0 0 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.22
Table 7.3: Nash tax rates for the regions and the social planner in a model with and without
capital mobility.
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These numbers conrm the result that the regional social security competition is reinforced
by introducing capital mobility. The regions will opt for lower Nash rates under capital mobility.
Secondly the social planner in both situations will choose the same tax rate. This should come
as no surprise since under the restriction that each region has the same tax rate, the share of
rms in the model with and without capital mobility always equals one half. This is the case
for a social planner. So again we can conclude that there are regulatory chill e¤ects.
7.2.3 Inuence of  and 
As a nal step we discuss the impact of two parameters: the elasticity of substitution  and the
trade freeness . Note however that in the discussion of both parameters we have to account for
the severe restrictions on these parameters for having a stable internal equilibrium. We start
with the impact of a change of the elasticity of substitution.
e; e = 0 e; e = 1 e; e = 2 e; e = 3 e; e = 4 e; e =1
 = 2:5 z = z 0 0 0.025 0.069 0.089 0.129
zSP 0 0 0.107 0.157 0.179 0.221
 = 5 z = z 0 0 0.022 0.044 0.053 0.075
zSP 0 0.151 0.261 0.301 0.321 0.351
 = 8 z = z 0 0 0 0 0 0.016
zSP 0 0.206 0.311 0.344 0.357 0.383
Table 7.4: Regional and social planner Nash tax rates for di¤erent values of  and the inequality
aversions.
For a low value of trade freeness ( = 0:05), stable internal equilibria are possible as long
as  remains smaller than 1+2 (=10.5 for  = 0:05). To illustrate the e¤ect of the elasticity of
substitution we give the Nash tax rates for a social planner and the regional government for
di¤erent values of  in table 7.4. As before, we see that the e¤ect is mixed. Local governments
will reduce their tax rates when  increases but a social planner will increase its optimal tax
rate. The elasticity of substitution characterizes the erceness of competition on the goods
market and thus also the agglomerative forces. Otherwise said, the change in the share of rms
due to a shift in the tax rates becomes stronger for higher values of  and as a consequence, the
impact on the tax base will also be strengthened. This increased strength of the agglomerative
forces explains the lower Nash rates for the local governments.
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On the other hand, a social planner will internalize these e¤ects and will in the end only
be faced with the same situation an autarkic social planner has faced. Higher values for the
elasticity of substitution mean that the economy becomes more e¢ cient without altering the
equity in the society. The social planner will amend this by increasing its tax rate. Note also
that the optimal tax rates for the social planner are the same in the model with and without
capital mobility for the same reason as discussed before.
The restriction imposed on the trade freeness is more severe than the one on the elasticity of
substitution, as could be seen in table 7.2. For small deviations from the equicompetitiveness,
the maximum allowed trade freeness (1A=OA) lies around 0:2 or smaller. The reason is again
the strong nature of the agglomerative forces present in this model. As depicted in gure 7-10,
the evolution in simple. A higher level of trade freeness means that the optimal Nash rate is
lower. So we no longer have the concave e¤ect as seen in the model without capital mobility.
We can explain this by referring to the dominance of the e¤ect of a change in the share of rms
in the price e¤ect and the competition e¤ect. When the trade freeness increases, an identical
change in the northern tax rate will lead to a much larger decrease in the northern share of
rms. As a consequence, the government will restrain her optimal choice of taxation. The
strength of this e¤ect is captured by the elasticity of the share of rms with respect to the
competitiveness9. This is depicted in graph 7-11. Since by denition the share of rms in each
region equals one half for a social planner, this e¤ect is absent in this case. As a consequence,
the chosen tax rate will be constant in function of the trade freeness. More, it will be the same
as the tax rate chosen by a social planner in a model without capital mobility.
7.3 Core-periphery situation
In this section we assume that the northern region is the (stable) core, the south is the periphery.
This means that there is no industry left in the south and that the only income of that region
stems from the transfer back of the remuneration for the southern capital employed in the north.
People can still consume (northern) goods but the government is unable to levy any taxes since
there are no wages paid to employees to levy them on. On the other hand, the northern region
9When the competitiveness increases, the northern tax rate decreases or the southern one increases.
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Figure 7-10: Inuence of trade freeness on Nash rate for di¤erent values of the inequality
aversion.
Figure 7-11: The elasticity of sn with respect to  in function of .
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faces a very comfortable point of departure. It has all the industry, does not have to import any
goods (P (z) = w(z)a ) and apparently can levy any tax it wishes. This resembles the autarkic
case which we started with10. As can be easily shown, the social welfare of the core region
becomes independent of the trade freeness and hence, the maximising government will choose
its tax rate independent of the trade freeness.
To describe this scenario, we use just as Baldwin and Krugman ([11]) did in their similar
model a three-stage tax game where the northern core sets its tax rate z in the rst stage,
the south sets its tax rate in the second stage, and migration and production occur in the third
stage. We solve this game by backwards induction. The last stage yields an economic outcome
that is described by the equilibrium condition laid out above, so we turn to the second stage.
Clearly this structure maximizes the ability of the south to engage in scal competition.
In solving the second stage, it is important to realize that in our scenario the south is a
destituted region with no industry left and residents (sur)viving on the reward to southern
capital working in the north. It becomes impossible and senseless to determine the optimal
southern tax rate since the southern social welfare will become invariant to the southern tax
rate. In order to solve this problem and because we are in a noncooperative setting, we assume
that the south will opt for a zero tax rate to make it as di¢ cult as possible for the northern
core region11.
In the rst stage the north determines its optimal tax rate. However, the northern re-
gion is not that free as it rst seems to set its tax rates. If it sets its tax rates higher than
the agglomeration rents can allow for, it becomes protable for a rm to relocate to the pe-
riphery. By looking back at the tomahawk diagram in function of the competitiveness, gure
7-1, this means that the competitiveness of the northern region has to stay above the value of
SN =
1+(2 1)2
2 , which clearly depends on the trade freeness. This corresponds with a certain
maximal (northern) tax rate: z < 1  1 z
(SN )
1
1 
. Using the result of the previous step, namely
z = 0 further simplies this expression. The concave (red) line on graph 7-12 represents this
10 If we substitute sn by 1 in the standard expressions, we arrive at the following formulas:  = ,  = ,
P = w
a
, P  = w
a
 ,
sE = 1  12 ,  = ,  = 0, u = 1  (1  )(1  z), u = 1, b = wRz+z(1 ) , b = 0.
11Sensu strictu this assumption makes it unnecessary to stick to the three-stage limiting tax game as proposed
by Baldwin and Krugman ([11]). In their model the south still had an inuence on the social welfare via their
tax setting.
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sustain tax rate for the north: if the northern region sets its tax rate below this threshold, it
will retain a stable core.
However, this value does not necessarily coincides with the tax rate that the northern social
welfare maximizes. These tax rates are depicted for di¤erent values for the inequality aversion
by the horizontal lines on the graph. Since the non-restricted optimalization mimics the autarkic
behaviour, the (non-restricted) chosen tax rates are equal to the tax rates a social planner would
choose in a model with (or without) capital mobility and at an internal equilibrium.
Since the northern region is always better o¤ by remaining the core, the northern Nash rate
is equal to the unrestricted tax rate if the sustain tax rate (the red line on gure 7-12) is higher
than the unrestricted rate. When the reverse is true, the Nash rate is equal to the sustain tax
rate. So imposing the restriction on the unrestricted tax rates lets us conclude that governments
become more restricted when they have a higher inequality aversion. For instance, a Rawslian
government will for any value of the trade freeness be restricted, while a government with an
inequality aversion of 2 will only be restricted in its optimal choice for low and high values of
trade freeness.
In the previous paragraphs we assumed implicitly that the northern core was stable. How-
ever, it could happen that for low values of trade freeness and the elasticity of substitution the
northern core is always unstable. The only choice the northern government has in this scenario
is abiding to a zero tax rate. In that way it can keep the core since any tax increase by the
south would restore a stable northern core.
Thus, for intermediate values of the trade freeness, the chosen tax rates by the core region
largely surpasses the Nash tax rates in an internal equilibrium and one could argue that there
is no social security competition at all anymore, at least from the point of view of the northern
region. Evidently, the southern region  but for low values of trade freeness also the northern
region  is restricted to set its tax rates substantially lower than a social planner would do.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we included a second dimension of globalisation into the model, namely capital
mobility. This is done using the standard New Economic Geography formulation. However,
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Figure 7-12: Unconstrained and core sustain tax rate for a core region for di¤erent values of
the inequality aversion ( = 2:5).
compared to the standard NEG-models, the properties of the locational equilibria and their
stability in our model with endogenous unemployment become much more appealing. We are
able to retain a closed-form expression for the migration variable which ensures a high degree of
analytical tractability. But this analytical tractability does not come at a price as is normal the
case in the NEG-framework. Almost all characteristics of the NEG-framework can be preserved.
We have circular causalities, the possibility of a CP-situation in cases without complete trade
freeness, etc. We also have locational hysteresis present in our model although not between an
internal equilibrium and a core-equilibrium but instead between two core-situations. Thus, the
introduction of e¢ ciency wages leads to a footloose capital setting with most of the properties
of a core-periphery or a footloose entrepreneur model.
The Nash tax rates set by governments under an internal equilibrium are lower than what
the social planner would opt for. We arrive again at the race to the bottom result. The social
security competition is even harsher compared to the case without capital mobility. As before,
we looked at the two channels through which the foreign tax rate a¤ects the home region.
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Contrary to the previous model, the real income e¤ect now also leads to tax rates that are
strategic complements. The reason lies in the migration of rms that follows a foreign tax
increase. The second e¤ect, the competition e¤ect, operates in the same way as in the model
without capital mobility.
The second main di¤erence between the model with capital mobility in an internal equilib-
rium with the model discussed in chapter 7 lies in the appearance of a limited zone where the
tax rates behave like strategic substitutes. This limiting behaviour occurs when there is a large
di¤erence between the regional tax rates. In this zone where small tax changes can have a large
delocation impact, it becomes more than worthwhile for the government to lower its taxes in
order to attract more capital in a response to increased foreign taxes. In that way the home
region nearly becomes a core region which reduces greatly the need to redistribute.
The elasticity of substitution plays the same role as in the model without capital mobility.
Higher values of  augment the chosen value of the tax rate by the social planner and intensies
the social security competition at the regional level. The trade freeness, on the other hand
interacts in a di¤erent way than before. Lower trade costs now unambiguously lead to more
intense social security competition with lower Nash rates since the e¤ect of the constant share
of rms present in the model of chapter 7 disappeared.
Besides looking at internal equilibria, we also investigated the behaviour of a government
that has the core. We applied the three stage tax limiting game of Baldwin and Krugman.
The agglomeration rents present in this setting can be taxed away by the government which
attenuates the social security competition. However, the more a government cares for inequality,
the less these rents su¢ ce to nance the redistribution need. The government also faces a
stronger restrictive environment for low or high values of trade freeness.
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Chapter 8
A denite answer?
Since the beginning of the European integration process in the early 1950s, social downscaling
concerns have been cropping up from time to time. In recent years this fear for the negative
e¤ects of globalisation pushed itself even more to the fore with the spurred expansion of the
European Union. In this thesis we investigated the possible occurrence of this race to the
bottom fear from a theoretical point of view.
The existing literature lacked real social security competition models. That is, models
that have one or several dimensions of globalisation and a government that provides a social
insurance against some social risks. However, there does exist some closely related (capital)
tax competition literature where governments compete with each other for mobile factors of
production in order to provide a general public good. We argued that the bottom line of this
literature can be summarized in the following intuitive way: public goods are underprovided
as soon as the beneciary of the public good is not the payer of the public good and if the tax
payer can evade taxation.
Recently a new strand in the tax competition literature emerged namely the New Economic
Geography literature that encompasses tax competition. Although the race to the bottom
result remains intact to a large extent, the introduction of this framework in tax competition
leads to some interesting considerations. Not only are these models inherently richer from a
theoretical point of view since they have besides the mobility of a factor of production also a
second mechanism of globalisation, namely international goods trade. But secondly, they also
incorporate agglomeration e¤ects which seriously can attenuate or even abolish the race to the
145
bottom result.
As a theoretical widening of the New Economic Geography models, we investigated also the
dynamics of these models. This lead to some policy warnings. Although it has been proved by
Robert-Nicoud that all di¤erent models in this strand are mathematical similar, that does not
mean that the dynamics of the models are identical. Some set-ups like the footloose capital
setting of Martin and Rogers lead to a much slower evolution towards the nal stable locational
equilibrium state. As a consequence, all concrete policy guidelines derived from a particular New
Economic Geography set-up, optimally should indicate the time framework within a government
has to take measurements.
A second extension in the New Economic Geography modelling we have undertaken lies
in the creation of an analytical tractable NEG-model that has almost all the characteristics
of the "di¢ cult" models such as a core-periphery model of Krugman. In other words, the
often mentioned trade-o¤ between analytical tractability and richness of features is mitigated.
Replacing the perfect labour market in the standard models with an e¢ ciency wage mechanism
lead to this result. Besides the reappearing of circular causalities and a home-market magni-
cation e¤ect in a borderline tomahawk diagram, the extension also allowed for an easy study of
near-catastrophic agglomeration and a "bright lights, big city e¤ect" of Anderson and Forslid
in case of regional tax asymmetries.
The literature review of the tax competition models in a New Economic Geography and a
neo-classical framework serves as a benchmark to see whether their results can be extended to
a social security competition model. The main model assumptions in our attempt to falsify the
race to the bottom result are threefold. We use a footloose capital set-up with only one sector
(the di¤erentiated goods sector) in which we introduce endogenous unemployment via e¢ ciency
wages and a government that provides an unemployment benet by taxing the immobile fac-
tors. The governments interact in a static Nash game and determine their optimal reaction
by maximising an Atkinson abbreviated social welfare function. The combined introduction of
these three deviations from a rst-best case leads to tax rates that are strategic complements
between each other. In other words, we do expect social security competition to happen.
This result does not depend on the mobility of a factor of production. Even in cases where
the only dimension of globalisation lies in the goods mobility, governments still opt to lower
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their taxes suboptimally low. The inclusion of capital mobility in this framework strengthens
the race to the bottom results. In other words, these results give reasons to believe that all the
di¤erent mechanisms are complementary and mutually reinforcing.
Due to the introduction of an Atkinson abbreviated social welfare function we are able to
condition the race to the bottom result on the inequality-equity trade-o¤ that a government
has. The more a government behaves in a Rawslian way, the higher it will set its tax rates. In
order words, shifts in the inequality aversion of a government have an impact that is as large
as a change in the trade freeness can have. This linkage could be of importance in an empirical
exercise since one could argue that the neo-liberal political revival from the 1980s onwards made
governments more Benthamite. Of course one could wonder what is cause and what is e¤ect.
The most important di¤erence between the model with and without capital mobility lies
in the inuence that a change in the trade freeness has on the Nash equilibria. Under capital
mobility, higher levels of trade freeness always lead to more intense social security competition.
But, when capital is immobile, this result no longer holds. When trade costs decrease in the
latter case, starting with prohibitive trade costs, the optimal tax rates set by the governments
will decrease but after a while they will increase again and at the high end of trade freeness
they even will surpass the level of taxes set by a social planner. In other words, there is a range
where increased globalisation could lead to less severe or even non-detrimental social security
competition. Although this result seems to be promising, we believe that the real impact of it
remains limited. All the goods in our model are subject to trade. As a consequence, high levels
of trade freeness, are perhaps a little realistic since many goods in Western economies are not
traded.
In the cases where capital mobility lead to stable core-periphery equilibria, social security
competition for the core region is  for a wide range of intermediate trade costs  seriously
attenuated due to the agglomeration rents that accrue to the core region. This result is con-
ditioned on the attitude that the government has concerning inequality and e¢ ciency. The
stronger the government cares for the poor, the more the government has to deviate from here
optimal unrestricted tax rate in order not to lose the core.
While core regions can escape to a large extent the harmful e¤ects of tax competition, our
model indicates that social security competition becomes more threatening between regions that
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are not in a core-periphery situation. This would mean that tax competition is more enacted
between the European core regions (West-Germany, Belgium, North of France, South of The
Netherlands, London-Oxford, North of Italy,...) than between these regions and the periphery
(Baltic states, etc.)
In conclusion, although the social security competition model we developed emphasizes a
race to the bottom in general, the model is rich enough to already provide some attenuating
factors such as the attitude of the government towards inequality and the presence of agglom-
eration rents. It could be interesting to extend the model further in this line of search. For
instance, it could well be that the equilibrium concept used here has a considerable impact on
the results. Instead of using a simple static Nash game concept (and the three-stage limiting
tax game in a CP-situation), innite games or cooperative game settings perhaps better reect
reality. Governments can cooperate (as they do in a European context) and they also realize
that their actions cannot remain unnoticed by the foreign governments which could lead to
tit-for-tat strategies.
Finally, the robustness of the model would be increased if we were able to show that the
same results apply under other model specications. Unfortunately this is not as simple as it
seems. For instance, as said before, changing the Dixit-Stiglitz set-up to an Ottaviano-Thisse
set-up already lead to unsurpassable parameter constraints. Finding other set-ups that conrm
the result of the developed model will constitute a challenging task for the future.
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Appendix A. Simulation of the dynamics of NEG-models
.
A-1 The FC-model
The FC-model is the only model where all the endogenous variables can be expressed as explicit
functions of the spatial distribution of economic activities. The lack of circular causality makes
it fully analytically tractable. The basic equations of the model are given by:
_sn = (   ?)sn(1  sn) (A-1)
 = bB
Ew
Kw
(A-2)
? = bB?
Ew
Kw
(A-3)
B =
sE

+ 
s?E
?
(A-4)
B? = 
sE

+
s?E
?
(A-5)
 = sn + (1  sn) (A-6)
? = sn + (1  sn) (A-7)
sE = (1  b)sL + bsK (A-8)
The worldwide expenditures EW and capital endowment KW are normalized to 1 in the
expressions for the northern and southern reward to capital  and . In this and the following
models b is a shorthand notation for  . Intuitively B can be seen as a measurement for the bias
in sales1.  can be interpreted as an indicator of the price index as the price index of a region
1One can show that the revenues R of a typically northern-based rm equal E
W
nW
B . In this expression E
W
nW
can be interpreted as the amount of money spent by consumers per manufactured variety. If there are no trade
costs ( = 1), B equals 1 and there is no bias in sales. If B > 1, the sales are biased toward the northern based
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Figure A-1: Simulation of dynamics in symmetric FC-model (sn = 0:99).
after normalizations is given by P = 
 
 1 . In the relative market size condition A-8 sL and sK
respectively represent the share of northern labourers and the share of capital ownership of the
northern region. This equation is derived under the assumption that half of the capital used in
each region belongs to the northern region. By assuming that capital earns the world average
capital reward, we dont have to know the fractions of the northern (or southern) owned capital
used in both regions. Contrary to the other NEG-models, the relative market size does not
depend on sn. This is the main reason for the analytic tractability of the model.
A-1.1 Symmetric case
We have a perfect symmetrical set-up. Each region has the same share of capital owners and
labourers. As a consequence (see equation A-8) every region accounts for one half of the total
expenditures. When trade is completely free, all possible locational divisions become equilibria.
As soon as there are trade costs, two unstable equilibria (core and periphery solution) and one
stable equilibrium (symmetricum) emerge.
Figure A-1 plots the share of norths industry in function of time and trade freeness. At
t = 0, we impose that 99% of the worldwide capital is used in the north. The rst thing
that strikes us, is the strong -dependence of the dynamical behaviour: the lower the trade
rm. More details can be found in Baldwin et. al. ([6]).
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Figure A-2: Time necessary to reach equilibrium given that sn = 0:99.
costs become, the longer it takes to deviate from the initial inequilibrium and the longer the
transition toward the nal equilibrium state takes. For this simulation we see that for values
of  above 0.7 the stable equilibrium is still not reached after 2000 time steps. The transition
time moves asymptotically to innity when trade costs become innitely small.
To better depict this dynamical bifurcation behaviour, we calculate, for each possible trade
freeness-level, the number of time steps it takes to reach equilibrium tequil. This is depicted in
gure A-2. The necessary number of time steps increases exponentially as trade costs diminish
and tends asymptotically to innity when  is close to 1. With an R2-value of 0.885, the trend
can be best expressed as: ln(tequil) = 5:9696e0:0008. Of course the coe¢ cients di¤er with the
initial condition.
The -dependence of the transition time and path can intuitively be understood by looking
at the two driving forces in the NEG-models: the agglomeration and the dispersion force. It can
be shown (see Baldwin et. al ([10])) that the dispersion force is larger than the agglomeration
force for small values of trade freeness but drops more sharply than the agglomeration force when
trade costs diminish. In the specic context of the FC-model where only one agglomeration
force is present (no cost-of-living-e¤ect), the intersection of both graphs occur when trade is
completely free.
Hence as trade become more freely, the relative strength of the tendency toward a sym-
metrical equilibrium weakens compared to the agglomeration forces. This implies that it takes
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Figure A-3: Transition paths of symmetric FC-model (sn = 0:99) in case a)  = 0, b)  = 0:25;
c)  = 0:5 and d)  = 0:75.
longer before the system reaches its nal equilibrium. When there are no longer any trade
costs, the dispersion force becomes equally strong as the agglomeration forces, meaning that
there can be no evolution at all anymore.
Figure A-3 depicts the shape of the transition process for a FC-model with a high initial
northern share of rms and this for di¤erent values of trade freeness. We see that in all cases
the system is characterized by a concave-convex shape with a long tail2. This means that
the northern share of rms at rst starts to decline progressively till the point of inection is
reached. After this point the transition starts to slow down. This shape naturally reects the
dynamical formulation of the model.
A-1.2 Asymmetric Case
Because the relative market size condition A-8 was derived under the assumption that the
ownership of the capital employed in every regions is equally divided between northern and
southern inhabitants, we can only vary the share of labourers in each region to make the model
asymmetric. We simulate in gure A-4 a FC-model with the following set-up: sn = 0:01 and
2 If one on the other hand started with sn < 0:5, the transition would be convex-concave with a long tail.
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Figure A-4: Simulation of dynamics in asymmetric FC-model:sL = 0:75974 and sn = 0:01.
sL = 0:75974. We chose this value for the share of northern labourers in order to have a
northern market size sE equal to 0.75. Di¤erent transition paths are depicted in gure A-5.
If there is no trade freeness, the share of rms in the north quickly rise to the value 0.75.
This value equals the share of northern expenditure as predicted by the model (see Baldwin et.
al. [10], p. 76). As trade costs start to decrease, the transition dynamics changes in two ways.
The time necessary to reach the equilibrium state increases (398 steps for  = 0 , 941 steps
for  = 0:15, innitely many steps for  = 13
3 and 101915 steps for  = 0:99). Secondly the
equilibrium value itself also increases till the value of 1 is reached at  = 13 (e. g. sn;equil = 0:75
at  = 0 and sn;equil = 0:838235 at  = 0:15). The rst evolution is already explained in the
previous section. The second evolution is an illustration of the near-catastrophic behaviour
of asymmetric FC-modelling4. The shape of the transition path is the mirror image of the
symmetric case. Di¤erent initial conditions account for this behaviour.
Other simulations show that if one keeps the initial share of northern rms at the symmet-
ricum and reduces the northern share of labourers slightly (e. g. 0.5%), no evolution at all
3At a break point the agglomerative force is as strong as the dispersion force. As a consequence it will take
innitely many steps to reach the nal equilibrium. However the system will evolve fast to values close to the
long run equilibrium after a few thousands steps as there is no other stable equilibrium.
4 In Baldwin et. al. ([10]) one derives the analytical expression for the trade freeness level beyond which all
industry is in the north ( = 1 sE
sE
). This is equal to 1/3 in our set-up.
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Figure A-5: Transition paths of asymmetric FC-model in case a)  = 0, b)  = 0:15; c)  = 13
and d)  = 0:99.
occurs. Only when more than 5 % of the people move from north to south, one can distinguish
a tendency toward the southern core solution at intermediate -levels.
Based on the previous graphs we conclude that the intrinsic dynamical behaviour of the
asymmetric case is identical to the symmetric one. Di¤erences that may arise between the two
only stems from a di¤erent long run stability behaviour. This result could be expected as the
migration equation does not change. In the following paragraphs well focus on assessing the
impact of a realistic change in the share of labourers (or capital) on the transition time.
A-1.3 Inuence of parameters  and 
We have used the same values for  and  as Brakman et. al. ([21]) did. Because, for instance,
they regressed NUTS-data to estimate the value for the elasticity of substitution, di¤erent
values can be assumed in other time frames or in other regions. Besides this empirical reason,
it is also theoretically interesting to see which inuence these parameters have on the dynamical
behaviour.
To test the inuence of both parameters we use the same set-up as in the symmetric case.
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Figure A-6: Symmetric FC-model with  = 0:9 and  = 8 (sn = 0:99).
Figure A-6 simulates the dynamical behaviour under the assumption that  = 0:9. This means
that people derive more utility from manufactured goods. Figure A-7 investigates the inuence
of a smaller  ( = 4), or otherwise stated the inuence of the fact that manufactured goods
become less substitutable.
We see in both cases a steeper transition. As a consequence, after 2000 time steps, the
stable equilibrium is reached for lower values of trade freeness compared to the simulation
done in paragraph A-1.1. This behaviour can be understood if one looks at the migration
equation 3.2.2. Substituting A-2 and A-3 gives us the dynamical equation in function of b:
:
sn = b(B  B)sn(1  sn). So increasing b =  augments the driving force and as a result, the
transition is faster.
A-2 The CP- and FE-model
We discuss the CP- and FE-model together because both have the same migration equation
and share the same source of agglomeration.
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Figure A-7: Symmetric FC-model with  = 0:3 and  = 4 (sn = 0:99).
The basic (northern) equations of the CP-model are5:
_sH = (!   !?)sH(1  sH) (A-9)
! =
w
P
(A-10)
w = b
Ew
Fnw
B (A-11)
B = (
sE

+ 
1  sE
?
)w1  (A-12)
 = snw
1  + (1  sn)(w?)1  (A-13)
P = p1 A (n
w) a (A-14)
5The symbol a stands for 
 1 in these expressions.
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Figure A-8: Symmetric CP-model with sn = 0:99.
sE = (1  )(sL + wH
w
wLLw
sH) (A-15)
We only give the expressions for the northern region as the southern formulas are isomorphic.
Several variables are normalized in the literature: F = 1, EW = 1 , L
W = 1  and pA = wL =
nW = HW = 1. These normalizations are discussed and motivated in Baldwin et. al. ([10]).
They also prove the equivalence of sH and sn.
After normalizations, the FE-model di¤ers only slightly in its formulations of some variables:
the nominal wage w (= bB), the bias in sales B (= sE +
1 sE
 ), the indicator of the price index
 (= sn+(1  sn)) and the relative market size condition sE (= (1  b)sL+ bBsH). As stated
before, the FE-model was much more analytical tractable than the FC-model. This can clearly
be seen by looking at equation A-11 and A-12. The nominal reward to the mobile factor is
removed in the same expressions of the FE-model. As a consequence the nominal wage in this
model can be expressed explicitly in function of the northern share of workers and the relative
market size. The only intractability that remains in the FE-model lies in the relative market
size condition. The circular causality is caused by introducing the term B in this expression.
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Figure A-9: Symmetric CP-model with sn = 0:99: evolution at  = 0:1.
A-2.1 CP-model
As before we use the initial condition to generate the most interesting dynamics. The CP- and
FE-model have, depending on the trade freeness, three di¤erent long run stable equilibria zones
(see tomahawk-diagrams). This leads to the use of di¤erent initial conditions: sn = 0:99 (or
= 0:01) for -values between 0 and the sustain point6 and sn-values around the symmetricum
for -values between the break point and 1.
The dynamical behaviour in the rst zone ( 2 0; S is simulated in gure A-8 and A-
9. The transition behaviour is similar to the FC-model. The transition path has the typical
concave-convex form. The transition time increases as we come closer to the sustain point, but
it takes never more than 1000 time steps, except for values very close to the sustain point as
the evolution becomes asymptotically near this point. The explanation for both phenomena is
already given in the previous section. Simulations done for values of trade freeness larger than
the break point show that also in this region an analogue transitional behaviour occur. For
instance at =0.60 and sn = 0:51 it took 849 time steps to end up in the long run northern
core solution.
6One can calculate the precise values for break and sustain point ( Baldwin et. al. ([10]), p. 31): BCP =
0:263502 and SCP = 0:234735.
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An interesting zone lies between the sustain and break point. In this zone multiple equilibria
exist. Of course if one of the regions had all the industry (or half of the industry) initially, no
evolution at all will be observed. The transition path and time will depend in this zone on the
value of trade freeness and the initial condition. We illustrate this in table 8.1.
 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
sn(0) to? time to? time to? time to? time to? time
0.1 sym 2632 sym 4181 CP 2982 CP 1476 CP 1271
0.2 sym 2414 sym 3673 sym 7038 CP 2170 CP 1496
0.3 sym 2286 sym 3438 sym 6337 CP 3428 CP 1799
0.4 sym 2133 sym 3195 sym 5863 sym 24096 CP 2415
Table 8.1: Transitional behaviour between break and sustain point depend on initial condition
and trade freeness.
The closer we get to the break point, the less we initially may deviate from the symmetricum
and still have a long run symmetrical equilibrium. At  = 0:27 (> B) we will always evolve
toward the CP-equilibrium. This can be interpreted as a clear illustration of the fact that,
when trade costs decrease, the agglomeration force weakens less compared to the dispersion
force. For instance, at = 0:26 and sn = 0:4 we need more than 24000 time steps before we
reach the nal equilibrium state. The dispersion force is in this case only a little bit stronger
than the agglomeration force. Secondly it can be easily understood that the di¤erence between
the initial condition and the nal equilibrium serves as a measurement of the time necessary to
reach the nal equilibrium.
Finally we assess the impact of a change in the share of northern labourers. The behaviour
of the asymmetric CP-system is illustrated in simulation A-10. If one starts very close to the
symmetricum and deviates the northern share of labourers with 0.5%7, the outcome changes
quite drastically compared to the symmetrical set-up8. For low values of trade freeness, the long
run stable equilibrium is attained after a few time steps. This equilibrium occurs at increasingly
lower values of sn as trade costs continue to decrease (see gure 3-3). As soon as the break point
is reached, the 0.5% reduction in sL su¢ ces to make the system evolve fast to the southern core
7Although a deviation of 0.5% may seem small, in reality it is large. For instance, this would mean a migration
of around 60 000 people between Belgium and The Netherlands.
8This is also a big di¤erence with the FC-model.
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Figure A-10: Asymmetric CP-model with sn = 0:51 and sL = 0:495.
solution9. If we further increase the trade freeness, the lower share of labourers becomes less
important than the initially higher share of rms. As explained before, the agglomeration force
weakens when trade costs decrease (but not as fast as the dispersion force). As a consequence
the tendency toward the southern core solution becomes less erce and the initial advantage
given to the northern region (a higher sn) becomes important enough to generate a northern
core solution. For very high values of trade freeness, the agglomeration forces are too small to
have a CP-outcome, even after several thousands of steps. The shape of the transition path is
similar to the previous cases. In general, the closer the initial condition of a region resembles its
core solution, the higher the asymmetry in the labour force may be before the agglomeration
force toward the other region overpowers the other forces.
A-2.2 FE-model
Although the FE-model resembles the FC-model closely, the dynamical properties di¤er con-
siderably. This can be clearly seen if one duplicates gure A-8) for the FE-model. This is done
9Apparently it seems that a linear -dependence exists for the long run equilibrium values. This is caused
by the discretization necessary to simulate the dynamics. For instance, gure A-10 is drawn with  varying in
intervals of 0.05. In reality the long run equilibrium values change as depicted by the asymmetric tomahawk
diagram.
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Figure A-11: Symmetric FE-model with sn = 0:99.
in gure A-11.
The sustain and break point in the FE-model are characterized by higher trade freeness
levels. They10 respectively occur at  equal to 0.851303 and 0.851461. After 4000 time steps
the symmetrical equilibrium is still not reached for -values close to the sustain point. For
instance at =0.80 it will take more than 40000 steps to attain the long run symmetricum (see
A-4). This behaviour can evidently be explained by the weakened and closely matched forces
at the high trade freeness level of the FE-sustain point.
At the same time, the transition time for values of trade freeness below the CP-sustain point
is smaller for the FE-model than the FC-model. For instance, while in the FE-model it took
only 999 time steps to attain sn = 0:5 at  = 0:2 (starting at sn(0) = 0:99), this takes 1371
steps in the CP-model. For high values of trade freeness the FE-model becomes slower than
the CP-model (e.g. for sn(0) = 0:25,  = 0:95,Teq;CP = 841 < Teq;FE = 1186). This di¤erence
in transition times can be explained if one looks at the cost functions of both models. In the
FE-model the mobile factor is only used for a fraction of the total production cost. This means
that for the same number of people that migrated interregionally, more rms and varieties
are created in the FE-model compared to the CP-setting. This enhances the dispersion and
cost-linked agglomerative forces in the FE-model. The demand-linked agglomerative force does
10 see Baldwin et. al.([10]),p.100.
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not diverge between the two modelling set-ups. The relative increase of the dispersion force in
the FE-model versus the CP-model makes the transition faster toward the symmetricum and
slower toward the CP-outcome11.
Simulations done for asymmetric FE-models starting at sn = 0:51 and sL = 0:495 show that
there is no evolution at all. In the CP-model with the same set-up we saw a clear tendency
toward a northern core solution for relatively low levels of trade costs. Only for strong deviations
(sL < 0:45) in the northern labour share the tendency toward the southern core solution
becomes important. For these large sL-values the increased share of southern labourers enhances
the southern agglomeration forces to such an extent that the southern agglomeration forces
overpower the dispersion force in a region where the relative di¤erence of both forces is very
small in the symmetrical set-up (near the sustain and break point). For instance, at  = 0:8
and sn(0) = 0:51 the FE-system attains the sn-value of 0.19 after 2500 steps.
A-3 VL-models
In the following three paragraphs we discuss the di¤erences between the VL-framework and the
migrational framework of the CP-, FE- and FC-models.
A-3.1 FCVL-model
The dening equations of the FCVL-model are identical to the FC-equations except for the
-denitions and the relative market size condition12:
 = sn
 + (1  sn)(?) (A-16)
? = sn
 + (1  sn)(?) (A-17)
se = (1  )sL + bsK + sn(   1) (A-18)
11This also explains the higher values for the break and sustain point in the FE-model.
12We slightly changed the relative market size formulation of Baldwin et. al. ([10]) to assess the impact of
asymmetric regions.
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Figure A-12: Simulation of the dynamics in a symmetric FCVL-model with sn = 0:01.
.
Figure A-12 plots the share of norths industry in function of time and trade freeness. At
t = 0, we impose that 99% of the worldwide industry is located in the south. For values of trade
freeness below the sustain point (S = 0:2922) we see a rapid evolution toward the long run
symmetrical equilibrium. As in the previous discussed models, there is a clear -dependence
of the adjustment process: the lower the trade costs, the longer it takes to reach the long run
equilibrium state. The data in the appendix once again show the clear inuence of the sustain
and break point (at  = 0:2922 and  = 0:3145 respectively). Given our initial condition
there is practically no evolution after the break point. If one started at sn slightly above 0.50,
simulations show that there is no clear tendency toward the northern core solutions for higher
values of trade freeness. Only when the initial advantage given to the region is quite large
(sn(0) > 0:6 ) a clear evolution toward the northern core is seen.
To better illustrate the transitional behaviour we draw the time evolution at = 0:2 given
an initial condition of sn = 0:01 in gure A-13. The shape of the transition path is similar to
the previous models. The identical form of the dynamic equation in the models explains this.
Figure (nref{guur17}) shows that the deviation in the share of labourers must deviate
163
Figure A-13: Evolution at  = 0:15 of the symmetric FCVL-model starting from sn = 0:05.
Figure A-14: Asymmetric FCVL-model with sn(0) = 0:51 and sL = 0:45.
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considerably (sL < 0:45) in order to change the outcome. On top of that we only see a
tendency toward the southern core-solution in the region of trade freeness around the break
and sustain point. There is no longer an evolution toward a northern core solution for high
values of trade freeness as was the case in the CP-model. The reduced impact of a change
in the share of labourers has to do with the di¤erent role labourers have in both models: in
the FCVL-model it is not the share of labourers as such that is important but the fraction of
that share that works in the imperfect competitive sector is. Similar simulations show that a
deviation in the share of capital in each region has little or no inuence on the dynamics. This
can easily be understood if one looks at the relative market size condition A-18. The term with
sK is divided by  compared to the sL-term. In our context this means that the e¤ect of a
change in capital is 8 times less e¤ective than a change in labourers.
A-3.2 CPVL-model
Probably the most intractable model of all discussed models is the CPVL-model. The system
is dened as follows13:
_n = n (A-19)
_n? = n?? (A-20)
 =    P

(A-21)
 =
bB
nw
(A-22)
B = P 1 (
se

+ 
(1  se)
?
) (A-23)
P = (nw) a (A-24)
 =
n
nw
P 1  + 
n?
nw
(P ?)1  (A-25)
se = (1  )sL +  n
nw
B (A-26)
13We only give the normalized northern equations as the southern are isomorphic. Note also that the ex-
pressions for the biases in the sales B and B di¤er from the equations in Baldwin et. al. ([10]), p. 196 as
these formulas apparently have some typos. We also generalized the relative market size expressions to allow for
regional asymmetries.
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Figure A-15: Simulations of dynamics in symmetric CPVL-model with n = 0:99 and n = 0:01.
As in the CP-model the equations for the bias in salesB and the price index are recursively
dened. On top of that the relative market size condition does not depend on the number of
rms in the north n directly but via the sales bias B. This makes the model as a whole more
intractable than the CP-model.
The dynamics of this model are illustrated in gure A-15. Just like the FCVL-model we see
a rapid evolution toward the long run symmetricum if one started close to the northern core
solution (sn(0) = 0:99) for values of trade freeness below the sustain point. Secondly the same
-dependence of the dynamical behaviour occurs as in all the previous models. Simulations done
for initial values close to the symmetricum show that there still is an evolution for high values
of trade freeness toward the northern or southern (depending on which region has the highest
initial share) core solution. This tendency was lacking in the FE- and FC-model but present in
the CP-model. It is possible to explain this phenomenon by referring to the relative low values
of trade freeness at which the break and sustain point occur in the CP- and CPVL-model. Or
otherwise stated, the existence of very strong agglomeration forces create this behaviour.
Figure A-16 plots the transition behaviour at  = 0:1 if one started near the northern
core solution (sn(0) = 0:99). The shape of the transition is similar to the previous models
although the dynamical equation is di¤erent. It starts concave and ends convex with the point
of inection roughly in the middle. Again we see a very long tail.
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Figure A-16: Evolution at  = 0:1 of the symmetric CPVL-model starting from sn = 0:99.
Figure A-17: Simulations of dynamics in asymmetric CPVL-model with n = 0:51, n = 0:49
and sL = 0:495.
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Figure A-18: Simulation of dynamics in symmetric FEVL-model with n = 0:01 and n = 0:99.
Lastly we want to briey discuss the impact of regional asymmetries. This behaviour as
depicted in gure A-17. This is almost an exact copy of the CP-case. This should come as no
surprise as both models use the labourers in exactly the same way.
A-3.3 FEVL-model
The last model we discuss in this paper is the FEVL-model. We modelled this model using the
following expressions:14
14Again we used the normalized equations for the northern region and generalized them slightly to introduce
size asymmetries.
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_n = n (A-27)
_n? = n?? (A-28)
 =    P (A-29)
 =
bB
nw
(A-30)
B =
se

+ 
(1  se)
?
(A-31)
P = (nw) a (A-32)
 =
n
nw
+ 
n?
nw
(A-33)
se = (1  b)sL + b n
nw
B (A-34)
Figure A-18 represents the simulated dynamics of the symmetric FEVL-model in case we
started from sn(0) = 0:01. The evolution toward the long run symmetrical equilibrium is very
fast. The break and sustain point occur at the same level as in the FE-model. Compared to
the FE-model (gure A-11) the evolution is nearly a duplicate except for a di¤erent time scale.
For instance, at =0.65 it takes 358 time steps in the FEVL-model to reach the symmetricum
compared to 412 steps in the FE-model (at sn(0) = 0:95). This di¤erence also remains for
values of trade freeness above the break point: at  = 0:95 and starting at sn = 0:95 it took
3096 steps to reach the northern core solution in the FEVL-model while the FE-model requires
2707 time steps to reach the same solution. This illustrates the larger di¤erence between the
dispersion and agglomeration force in the VL-based models, although these di¤erences remain
relatively small.
This models exhibits the same di¤erences with the CPVL-model as the FE-model did with
the CP-model. For instance for low values of trade freeness (e.g.  = 0:2) the transition is
fastest in the FEVL-model: only 35 steps are needed to reach the symmetricum starting from
sn(0) = 0:99 while the FCVL-model needs 472 steps. The reverse occurs for high values of trade
freeness ( = 0:9). If the initial condition equals sn(0) = 0:9, the CPVL-model needs 2503 steps
to reach the northern cores solution while the FEVL-framework requires 3659 time steps. The
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relative reduction of the agglomeration force versus the dispersion force in the FEVL-framework
lie at the basis of this feature.
Simulations show, as could be expected, that the inuence of size asymmetries is similar to
the FE-model. There is no noticeable inuence of reasonable size asymmetries.
A-4 Transition times for di¤erent models
T10% CP CPVL FE FEVL FC FCVL
 = 0:05 sn(0) = 0:05 6 10 1 2 6 12
sn(0) = 0:15 3 7 1 2 4 7
sn(0) = 0:25 2 6 1 2 4 5
sn(0) = 0:35 1 5 1 2 4 5
sn(0) = 0:45 1 5 1 2 4 5
 = 0:15 sn(0) = 0:05 23 31 1 3 12 45
sn(0) = 0:15 9 18 1 3 7 20
sn(0) = 0:25 6 14 1 3 7 14
sn(0) = 0:35 4 12 1 3 6 12
sn(0) = 0:45 4 12 1 3 6 11
 = 0:25 sn(0) = 0:05 49(CP) 27(CP) 1 4 22 232
sn(0) = 0:15 464(CP) 183(CP) 1 4 12 90
sn(0) = 0:25 141(sym) 175(sym) 1 3 10 57
sn(0) = 0:35 69(sym) 94(sym) 1 3 9 44
sn(0) = 0:45 53(sym) 75(sym) 1 3 8 39
 = 0:35 sn(0) = 0:05 7 11 2 5 39 48
sn(0) = 0:15 10 14 1 4 20 71
sn(0) = 0:25 15 19 1 4 15 116
sn(0) = 0:35 28 30 1 4 13 218
sn(0) = 0:45 77 72 1 4 13 625
 = 0:45 sn(0) = 0:05 5 10 4 7 67 25
sn(0) = 0:15 7 12 2 5 33 34
sn(0) = 0:25 11 16 2 5 25 50
sn(0) = 0:35 20 24 1 4 22 88
sn(0) = 0:45 54 53 1 4 20 241
Table 8.2: Time necessary to close 10% of gap between initial state and nal equilibrium state.
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T10% CP CPVL FE FEVL FC FCVL
 = 0:55 sn(0) = 0:05 5 10 7 9 120 22
sn(0) = 0:15 7 12 4 7 58 29
sn(0) = 0:25 11 16 3 6 43 43
sn(0) = 0:35 19 24 2 5 37 75
sn(0) = 0:45 52 52 2 5 34 205
 = 0:65 sn(0) = 0:05 6 11 15 16 231 23
sn(0) = 0:15 8 14 7 10 110 31
sn(0) = 0:25 12 18 5 8 80 46
sn(0) = 0:35 21 27 5 8 68 80
sn(0) = 0:45 59 58 4 8 63 219
 = 0:75 sn(0) = 0:05 7 13 45 44 518 28
sn(0) = 0:15 9 17 22 23 245 39
sn(0) = 0:25 15 22 16 18 177 58
sn(0) = 0:35 24 33 13 16 150 101
sn(0) = 0:45 75 74 12 16 139 277
 = 0:85 sn(0) = 0:05 11 18 6302 5632 1623 43
sn(0) = 0:15 16 23 2868 2640 766 59
sn(0) = 0:25 24 41 2014 1894 522 89
sn(0) = 0:35 42 47 1671 1593 465 158
sn(0) = 0:45 117 113 1537 1476 432 434
 = 0:95 sn(0) = 0:05 31 39 44 39 16299 120
sn(0) = 0:15 44 50 62 55 7622 167
sn(0) = 0:25 67 71 94 83 5518 254
sn(0) = 0:35 120 119 169 149 4651 454
sn(0) = 0:45 333 313 468 410 4313 1257
Table 8.3: Time necessary to close 10% of gap between initial state and nal equilibrium state.
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T50% CP CPVL FE FEVL FC FCVL
 = 0:05 sn(0) = 0:05 18 24 2 4 27 45
sn(0) = 0:15 10 20 1 4 25 34
sn(0) = 0:25 7 18 1 4 24 30
sn(0) = 0:35 6 18 1 4 23 29
sn(0) = 0:45 5 18 1 4 23 28
 = 0:15 sn(0) = 0:05 70 71 3 5 50 150
sn(0) = 0:15 40 49 2 5 40 98
sn(0) = 0:25 30 41 2 5 37 80
sn(0) = 0:35 25 38 2 5 35 71
sn(0) = 0:45 23 36 2 5 34 68
 = 0:25 sn(0) = 0:05 281(CP) 229(CP) 4 7 86 704
sn(0) = 0:15 1203(CP) 822(CP) 3 6 65 415
sn(0) = 0:25 605(sym) 583(sym) 3 6 57 317
sn(0) = 0:35 400(sym) 387(sym) 3 5 54 272
sn(0) = 0:45 338(sym) 330(sym) 3 5 52 254
 = 0:35 sn(0) = 0:05 42 46 7 9 144 302
sn(0) = 0:15 55 56 5 8 104 405
sn(0) = 0:25 76 73 5 7 90 574
sn(0) = 0:35 115 105 4 7 83 891
sn(0) = 0:45 219 191 4 7 81 1747
 = 0:45 sn(0) = 0:05 31 38 12 14 243 155
sn(0) = 0:15 40 45 9 11 172 195
sn(0) = 0:25 55 57 7 10 147 258
sn(0) = 0:35 82 78 7 9 135 375
sn(0) = 0:45 154 136 7 9 130 695
Table 8.4: Time necessary to close 50% of gap between initial state and nal equilibrium state.
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T50% CP CPVL FE FEVL FC FCVL
 = 0:55 sn(0) = 0:05 30 38 23 23 428 136
sn(0) = 0:15 39 45 16 17 298 170
sn(0) = 0:25 53 56 14 15 252 223
sn(0) = 0:35 79 77 12 14 230 322
sn(0) = 0:45 149 133 12 14 221 593
 = 0:65 sn(0) = 0:05 34 42 50 47 817 145
sn(0) = 0:15 44 50 35 24 565 180
sn(0) = 0:25 60 63 29 29 474 238
sn(0) = 0:35 89 86 26 27 432 344
sn(0) = 0:45 167 151 25 26 413 635
 = 0:75 sn(0) = 0:05 44 51 157 141 1824 176
sn(0) = 0:15 56 62 108 98 1254 224
sn(0) = 0:25 76 78 90 83 1049 297
sn(0) = 0:35 113 109 82 76 952 432
sn(0) = 0:45 213 194 78 73 911 800
 = 0:85 sn(0) = 0:05 68 74 21544 18888 5702 271
sn(0) = 0:15 88 91 14361 12635 3905 343
sn(0) = 0:25 119 118 11796 10401 3662 458
sn(0) = 0:35 177 169 10583 9344 2956 672
sn(0) = 0:45 333 305 10071 8898 2827 1251
 = 0:95 sn(0) = 0:05 196 193 277 243 57186 757
sn(0) = 0:15 253 243 356 312 39113 968
sn(0) = 0:25 342 324 482 422 32637 1305
sn(0) = 0:35 508 474 714 625 29565 1928
sn(0) = 0:45 954 879 1342 1173 28268 3611
Table 8.5: Time necessary to close 50% of gap between initial state and nal equilibrium state.
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T90% CP CPVL FE FEVL FC FCVL
 = 0:05 sn(0) = 0:05 31 45 4 6 80 111
sn(0) = 0:15 22 41 4 6 77 99
sn(0) = 0:25 19 39 4 6 76 95
sn(0) = 0:35 16 39 4 6 76 93
sn(0) = 0:45 15 38 4 6 76 92
 = 0:15 sn(0) = 0:05 128 130 6 8 131 317
sn(0) = 0:15 96 105 6 8 120 260
sn(0) = 0:25 83 97 5 8 116 238
sn(0) = 0:35 77 93 5 8 114 228
sn(0) = 0:45 74 36 5 7 113 223
 = 0:25 sn(0) = 0:05 785(CP) 671(CP) 10 11 210 1351
sn(0) = 0:15 1883(CP) 1416(CP) 9 10 187 1034
sn(0) = 0:25 1431(sym) 1371(sym) 8 10 178 918
sn(0) = 0:35 1188(sym) 1090(sym) 8 10 173 862
sn(0) = 0:45 1110(sym) 1018(sym) 8 10 171 838
 = 0:35 sn(0) = 0:05 129 128 16 17 338 944
sn(0) = 0:15 151 145 14 15 295 1110
sn(0) = 0:25 162 170 13 14 278 1354
sn(0) = 0:35 232 211 13 14 269 1762
sn(0) = 0:45 351 309 12 14 268 2731
 = 0:45 sn(0) = 0:05 97 102 27 26 558 493
sn(0) = 0:15 112 114 23 23 480 557
sn(0) = 0:25 133 130 22 22 450 649
sn(0) = 0:35 168 158 21 21 435 801
sn(0) = 0:45 250 224 21 21 428 1163
Table 8.6: Time necessary to close 90% of gap between initial state and nal equilibrium state.
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T90% CP CPVL FE FEVL FC FCVL
 = 0:55 sn(0) = 0:05 95 101 51 47 968 433
sn(0) = 0:15 109 112 43 41 826 487
sn(0) = 0:25 130 128 40 38 770 564
sn(0) = 0:35 163 155 39 37 743 693
sn(0) = 0:45 242 219 38 36 730 999
 = 0:65 sn(0) = 0:05 106 113 111 100 1833 459
sn(0) = 0:15 122 125 94 85 1554 517
sn(0) = 0:25 145 144 88 79 1446 601
sn(0) = 0:35 183 174 84 76 1392 739
sn(0) = 0:45 272 247 83 75 1368 1068
 = 0:75 sn(0) = 0:05 136 141 349 307 4067 565
sn(0) = 0:15 157 158 294 260 3437 639
sn(0) = 0:25 186 182 273 241 3192 745
sn(0) = 0:35 235 222 263 232 3069 921
sn(0) = 0:45 348 318 258 228 3016 1338
 = 0:85 sn(0) = 0:05 214 213 46532 40620 12670 857
sn(0) = 0:15 247 241 38609 33725 10867 975
sn(0) = 0:25 293 261 35535 31048 9915 1143
sn(0) = 0:35 368 346 34001 29711 9529 1420
sn(0) = 0:45 545 501 33334 29129 9361 2077
 = 0:95 sn(0) = 0:05 618 587 873 764 126886 2392
sn(0) = 0:15 710 669 1002 876 106940 2736
sn(0) = 0:25 841 788 1166 1037 99173 3228
sn(0) = 0:35 1056 982 1488 1301 95286 4036
sn(0) = 0:45 1563 1442 2200 1924 93595 5947
Table 8.7: Time necessary to close 90% of gap between initial state and nal equilibrium state.
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T100% CP CPVL FE FEVL FC FCVL
 = 0:05 sn(0) = 0:05 31 45 4 6 80 111
sn(0) = 0:15 22 41 4 6 77 99
sn(0) = 0:25 19 39 4 6 76 95
sn(0) = 0:35 16 39 4 6 76 93
sn(0) = 0:45 15 38 4 6 76 92
 = 0:15 sn(0) = 0:05 128 130 6 8 131 317
sn(0) = 0:15 96 105 6 8 120 260
sn(0) = 0:25 83 97 5 8 116 238
sn(0) = 0:35 77 93 5 8 114 228
sn(0) = 0:45 74 36 5 7 113 223
 = 0:25 sn(0) = 0:05 785(CP) 671(CP) 10 11 210 1351
sn(0) = 0:15 1883(CP) 1416(CP) 9 10 187 1034
sn(0) = 0:25 1431(sym) 1371(sym) 8 10 178 918
sn(0) = 0:35 1188(sym) 1090(sym) 8 10 173 862
sn(0) = 0:45 1110(sym) 1018(sym) 8 10 171 838
 = 0:35 sn(0) = 0:05 129 128 16 17 338 944
sn(0) = 0:15 151 145 14 15 295 1110
sn(0) = 0:25 162 170 13 14 278 1354
sn(0) = 0:35 232 211 13 14 269 1762
sn(0) = 0:45 351 309 12 14 268 2731
 = 0:45 sn(0) = 0:05 97 102 27 26 558 493
sn(0) = 0:15 112 114 23 23 480 557
sn(0) = 0:25 133 130 22 22 450 649
sn(0) = 0:35 168 158 21 21 435 801
sn(0) = 0:45 250 224 21 21 428 1163
Table 8.8: Time necessary to close 100% of gap between initial state and nal equilibrium state.
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T100% CP CPVL FE FEVL FC FCVL
 = 0:55 sn(0) = 0:05 95 101 51 47 968 433
sn(0) = 0:15 109 112 43 41 826 487
sn(0) = 0:25 130 128 40 38 770 564
sn(0) = 0:35 163 155 39 37 743 693
sn(0) = 0:45 242 219 38 36 730 999
 = 0:65 sn(0) = 0:05 106 113 111 100 1833 459
sn(0) = 0:15 122 125 94 85 1554 517
sn(0) = 0:25 145 144 88 79 1446 601
sn(0) = 0:35 183 174 84 76 1392 739
sn(0) = 0:45 272 247 83 75 1368 1068
 = 0:75 sn(0) = 0:05 136 141 349 307 4067 565
sn(0) = 0:15 157 158 294 260 3437 639
sn(0) = 0:25 186 182 273 241 3192 745
sn(0) = 0:35 235 222 263 232 3069 921
sn(0) = 0:45 348 318 258 228 3016 1338
 = 0:85 sn(0) = 0:05 214 213 46532 40620 12670 857
sn(0) = 0:15 247 241 38609 33725 10867 975
sn(0) = 0:25 293 261 35535 31048 9915 1143
sn(0) = 0:35 368 346 34001 29711 9529 1420
sn(0) = 0:45 545 501 33334 29129 9361 2077
 = 0:95 sn(0) = 0:05 618 587 873 764 126886 2392
sn(0) = 0:15 710 669 1002 876 106940 2736
sn(0) = 0:25 841 788 1166 1037 99173 3228
sn(0) = 0:35 1056 982 1488 1301 95286 4036
sn(0) = 0:45 1563 1442 2200 1924 93595 5947
Table 8.9: Time necessary to close 100% of gap between initial state and nal equilibrium state.
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